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I. INTRODUCTION 
A major characteristic of Peru's recent economic history has been the 
very dynamic expansion of its foreign trade. The purpose of this study is, 
first of all, to examine in some detail the role played by the foreign 
trade sector in the past economic growth of the country. Secondly, the 
analysis is concerned with the extent to which foreign trade can be made to 
contribute to the economic development of Peru in the future. 
Considerable disagreement exists in the economic literature about the 
role of the foreign sector in the development of underdeveloped countries. 
Chapter II is devoted to a discussion of the conflicting points of view and 
policy conclusions derived from trade theory (centered on the principle of 
comparative advantage) on the one hand and modern growth theory on the 
other. In the light of this discussion, a review of the importance of for­
eign trade in the development process is then presented, with an identifi­
cation of the major variables relevant to the subsequent analysis for Peru. 
The evolution of the Peruvian economy from 1950 to 1964 is examined in 
Chapter III. Special emphasis is placed on the contrast between the per­
formance of the export sector and the evolution of the remainder of the 
economy. Accordingly, the basic features and weaknesses of the economy are 
reviewed. The second part of Chapter III is devoted to an analysis of the 
development of the major exports and imports over the period concerned. 
The analysis in Chapter IV is an attempt to measure the contributions 
made by the foreign sector, from 1950 to 1964, to a number of major policy 
objectives which would be included in a program for Peruvian economic de­
velopment. The principal policy objectives considered are a given increase 
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in national income, an improvement in income distribution (functional as 
well as regional), an increase in employment, balance of payments equilib­
rium and price stability. 
Chapter V starts with export projections for Peru's traditional export 
products and with an analysis of the importance for Peru of such interna­
tional institutional arrangements as the United Nations' Conference on 
Trade and Development and the Latin American Free Trade Association. On 
the basis of the prospects of future development of Peru's primary exports 
and the analysis of Chapter IV concerning the contribution (gains and 
shortcomings) made by the traditional export sector to overall economic 
development in the past, the desirability of alternative future develop­
ment policies is examined in terms of their respective contribution to the 
major planning objectives. In particular, the analysis attempts to deter­
mine the role of import substitution and export promotion policies in fu­
ture development. Special attention also is paid to the problem of infla­
tion in the development process. 
Chapter VI summarizes the main conclusions and policy implications. 
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II. THE ROLE OF THE FOREIGN SECTOR IN A DEVELOPING ECONOMY 
One of the most critical problems of our times is the attainment of 
increased economic development in the less developed economies of the 
world.^ Since the foreign sector in most of these nations constitutes a 
major part of their total economic activity, it is of great practical im­
portance to consider the extent to which their development can be promoted 
through trade. 
The role of international trade during the 19th century in the trans­
mission of growth from Britain to her suppliers of food and raw materials 
in the new countries overseas is universally recognized; trade, because of 
its very dynamic character, was more than a scheme for the optimum alloca­
tion of resources; it was, in the words of Sir Dennis Robertson, an "engine 
of growth". 
"Economic Growth" and "Economic Development" are used interchangeably 
throughout this chapter, in a broad sense, to indicate the higher level of 
attainment of a conceptual welfare function. 
The latter can be thought of including as elements not only the 
achievement of static economic efficiency and a high growth rate, but also 
various other objectives of economic policy such as a better income distri­
bution, price stability, full employment, regional equilibrium and balance 
of payments equilibrium. 
In any given instance appropriate weights have to be attached to these 
different elements of a welfare function. 
Classical trade theory is a special case where the full weight is 
given to static economic efficiency, which was believed to lead to maximum 
income growth. In the modern growth theory, the concept of static economic 
efficiency may conflict with growth of national income. Removing obsta­
cles which impede the dynamic growth of income such as monopoly elements, 
and taking advantage of external economies, for instance, may result in a 
higher rate of growth than if resources had been allocated purely on the 
basis of static economic efficiency considerations. 
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Current world economic conditions, however, differ greatly, and it is 
said that this transmission mechanism does not, consequently, work satis­
factorily. Expansion of foreign trade does not seem to help the growth 
process in developing economies very much and some economists argue that, 
among others, it has accentuated the dualistic nature of the underdeveloped 
countries, which leads other writers to claim that international trade may 
have been positively harmfi J- as an engine of development. 
The issue has led to much discussion about the optimum commercial 
policy to be followed by developing economies and accordingly the strategy 
and the optimum allocation of resources to induce growth. 
The main issue appears to revolve around the conflicting policy con­
clusions which are derived from principles of trade theory, on the one 
hand, and modern growth theory, on the other. Trade theory, based on gen­
eral equilibrium conditions and centered on the principle of comparative 
advantage and static economic efficiency, would rely on specialization of 
production and trade in order to promote growth. It is, however, a static 
theory (by definition) and thus ignores many dynamic elements which are 
inherent to the growth process itself. 
In contrast, growth theory is concerned with the changes which take 
place in the economy within and as between the production and consumption 
spheres over time. It makes a number of assumptions about underdeveloped 
economies which are quite different from those underlying trade theory. 
For instance, the following assumptions are usually made: structural 
disequilibrium may exist in factor markets, as a result of the growth pro­
cess the quality and quantity of factors of production may change over time 
and external and internal economies of scale exist. On this basis, a 
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pattern of growth can be determined which will lead to an acceleration of 
development and a maximization of income over time, but which, because of 
the difference in assumptions, will normally differ from the most efficient 
allocation of resources in a static sense. 
The differences between the two lines of thought must be resolved. 
Experience leads us to believe that international specialization alone 
fails to bring overall economic growth in the underdeveloped nations of 
today, while on the other hand, it can safely be said that the world is not 
rich enough to neglect considerations of economic efficiency. It is impor­
tant to analyze the extent to which a conflict may exist between the 
attainment of, respectively, economic growth and static economic efficiency 
and specify the weights to be attached to each, before a strategy and 
policies conducive to overall development can be derived. 
This chapter attempts to study the contribution which the foreign 
sector can make to economic development. In the first part the arguments 
against continued specialization will be analyzed, as presented in the 
existing literature by Myrdal, Prebisch and Singer. This is followed by 
the more neutral treatment of the issue by Nurkse and Chenery. Secondly., 
the arguments against free trade will be critically examined, and suggested 
solutions will be presented as to how the foreign sector can be encouraged 
to contribute as much as possible to the attainment of the major planning 
goals of the developing nations. 
A. Opposing Views in the Existing Literature 
1. Arguments against free trade 
One of the most common complaints of many underdeveloped countries 
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is that, in view of their function as exporters of primary materials and 
importers of finished goods, there is a long term tendency for the terms of 
trade to move against them. Consequently, there has been much emphasis on 
the desirability of protectionism for such countries in order to induce do­
mestic industrial development. Most outspoken in this respect is perhaps 
Prebisch, who sees the deteriorating terms of trade as a factor inhibiting 
the economic development of Latin America. The Prebisch thesis cannot be 
very easily summarized, mainly because it has differed somewhat over time. 
For example, in (1) Prebisch claims that the developed countries obtain 
through the deteriorating terms of trade part of the increase in productiv­
ity in the underdeveloped economies and this is explained through differ­
ences in the market structure; in (2) however, this process of transfer of 
real income is explained through productivity ratios and technological 
densities. Whatever the explanation that is given, Prebisch bases himself 
largely upon this issue of transmission of real income through the deteri­
oration of the terms of trade in his argument for protectionism. 
According to Prebisch, the scheme of the international division of 
labor, which made Latin America the producer of food and raw materials, has 
become outdated. In general, technical progress seems to have been greater 
in industry than in primary production. As a result the price of manufac­
tures should have decreased relatively more than the price of primary 
goods. This would have led to an improvement in the terms of trade for the 
primary producing countries and the latter would have profited from the 
Technological density is defined as "the amount of technological 
knowledge as well as the real aptitude for using it in production". 
R. Prebisch in (2, p. 261). 
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fall in price of finished goods to the same extent as the industrial coun­
tries. The benefits of the international division of labor would have been 
shared equally and Latin America would have had no reason to industrialize. 
In reality, according to Prebisch the opposite has happened and the 
primary producers have experienced a long run deterioration of the terms 
of trade. Prebisch provides an explanation of why he thinks this has 
happened and proposes to counteract this tendency by imposing tariffs on 
industrial imports. 
This protectionism is meant first of all to prevent further deteriora­
tion of the terms of trade, or at best reverse the present conditions. 
Protectionism can, in addition, help resolve the balance of payments pro­
blem, which is one of the major preoccupations of Prebisch. As a result 
of a faster growing demand for imports in the underdeveloped countries than 
in the industrial centers, balance of payments equilibrium can be obtained 
only if either the underdeveloped world grows more slowly or if it re­
stricts its imports. Furthermore, Prebisch claims that the free market, 
responding to existing relative prices misallocates resources in under­
developed economies between export-industries and import-competing indus­
tries, such that aggregate real income is not maximized. Protectionism 
supposedly can direct the economy towards more optimal resource allocation. 
A parallel argument about the deteriorating terms of trada and conse­
quently, the maldistribution of gains from international trade, was devel­
oped by Singer (3), who, however, stresses some other aspects of the pro­
blem which are of great importance. According to Singer, geography may 
have obscured our understanding of the workings of the international eco­
nomic system. The export sector in underdeveloped countries is typically 
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the result of foreign investment and as such never really became an inte­
gral part of the domestic economy, except in a geographical sense. The 
benefits of investment and trade of the foreign-owned sector which we nor­
mally expect, were largely transferred abroad. Singer carries his thesis 
even further and claims that not only has there been this foreign transfer 
of the benefits of investment, but that the very presence of traditional 
investment may, by its non-progressive nature, have hampered the develop­
ment of domestic industry. 
Singer's argument for protectionism on the basis of the indirect 
benefits which come from industrialization should not be passed over 
lightly. For instance. It is claimed that the levels of education and 
technology and the general changes in economic and social structure seem 
to be associated mainly with an increase in the proportion of industrial 
output in the total output of a nation. 
Singer defines the purposes of foreign trade and foreign investment 
as to produce gradual changes in the structure of comparative advantage 
rather than the development of a world trade system based on present condi­
tions . 
The policy measures which Singer proposes in the light of the present­
ly existing trade relationships are directed to counteract the above men­
tioned drain on the benefits of investment by providing for some method of 
income absorption, such as required reinvestment of the profits in the 
underdeveloped country itself or absorption of profits by fiscal means. 
Absorption of the rise in productivity in export production can also be 
accomplished by such means as a rise in real wages, but absorption alone 
is not enough; the increment has to lead to a rise in domestic savings or 
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to a market expansion for domestic industries. The tendency should be 
noted in this connection for countries in a period of high export earnings 
to expand the export sector itself, instead of utilizing the available 
funds for development of domestic industry. The reason is simple: short 
run considerations lead to renewed investment in the foreign sector and 
the possibility of absorption of profits for domestically oriented activi­
ties is foregone. In a period of low export earnings on the other hand the 
desire to industrialize is strengthened but the means are lacking. 
Myrdal (4) believes also that international trade and capital move­
ments, if left uncontrolled, do not lead to development of the poorer 
countries, but rather intensify stagnation or regression, Myrdal argues 
that trade not only did not induce industrial development in the poor coun­
tries, but that, in addition, the production in the industrial centers of 
cheap substitutes for certain culturally valuable craftsman products of the 
underdeveloped world impoverished the latter. 
Whereas it is recognized that international trade developed export 
production, which is predominantly foreign owned, and related activities 
in the major export harbor, the spread effects radiating centrifugally from 
these centers appear weak. In other words, the weak spread effects of the 
developed countries on the poorer nations are a result of bad linkages 
existing within the poor country itself. These weak spread effects within 
the underdeveloped countries are closely interrelated with their economic 
and social backwardness. 
The higher level of development in the rich countries, and with it the 
higher level of social mobility, communications and other social overhead 
facilities, have permitted an effective carry-over of technological 
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progress and development from one region tu another within these countries. 
Government interferences in order to equalize opportunities have played a 
vital role in this process. The result has been continuous economic devel­
opment. The underdeveloped countries, on the other hand, are not only 
poorer, but also politically backward. As a result an internal integration 
has not taken place, and development has not been forthcoming. 
The free plfy of the market forces strengthens inequalities in pro­
duction and income distribution and, therefore, hampers the spread of 
economic development within a poor country and consequently, also from one 
country to another. It would, therefore, appear to be obvious, according 
to Myrdal, that policy interferences are needed, both nationally and inter­
nationally, in order to reverse the trend towards greater inequality within 
and as between countries. 
It can be said, in general terms, that the existing involvement of 
most of the underdeveloped countries in the international economic system 
is based upon the principle of comparative advantage. The process of 
economic development which accordingly these countries are striving to 
undergo, is not taking place satisfactorily. It was shown above that the 
inquiry into the causes of the shortcomings of international specialization 
led to various theories, among which the positions of Prebisch, Singer and 
Myrdal are similar, in the sense that they claim that the gains from trade 
have been badly distributed internationally and that foreign trade has, in 
fact, checked industrial development in underdeveloped nations. Conse­
quently, the gap among countries has increased. However, their extreme 
positions may lead to policy recommendations which are biased in favor of 
protectionism. Starting from their critique of the classical market-deter-
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rained concept of comparative advantage and development through trade, the 
next section will explore to what extent comparative advantage theory and 
the protectionist thesis as a growth inducement can be reconciled. 
2. Comparative advantage and growth theory combined 
The defense of foreign trade as a promoter of development based on 
the classical principle of benefits through division of labor, has been 
taken up by such writers as Haberler (5) and Cairncross (6). Beside the 
direct static gains of trade, which are of great importance, a number of 
indirect benefits have to be considered. In addition to providing a devel­
oping country with badly needed capital and raw material imports, trade 
brings with it new ideas, technological knowledge, skills, entrepreneurship 
and the like. The fact that these benefits may be difficult to measure 
does not make them less important. In this sense the underdeveloped coun­
tries of today may have an advantage over Great Britain, for example, in 
its early stages of development; it is now possible to speed up development 
through the adaptation of adopted technological knowledge from the indus­
trial world. 
The principle of comparative advantage and resulting specialization, 
as established by classical economists, is a logical deduction and, as 
such, always valid. Giving up trade even there, where the distribution of 
gains obtained from trade is uneven, would result in a net loss of economic 
efficiency. The concept, however, is essentially static. While the 19th 
century experience showed that growth was indeed promoted through trade, 
the underdeveloped countries of today, whose existing commercial relation­
ships are based on the principle of international specialization, wonder 
why the alleged development through trade is not forthcoming or, in other 
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words, why the theory does not seem to be valid any longer. 
Nurkse (7) correctly points out that the theory of specialization has 
received more credit than it actually deserved, and this because of the 
unique experience of the 19th century. Circumstances prevailing in the 
relationships between Great Britain and the so-called regions of recent 
settlement were very different from present-day developments. Not only 
did the then underdeveloped regions receive capital from Europe, but with 
it came the labor force, which helped to make the countries efficient pro­
ducers from the start. 
Furthermore, the European markets for food and raw materials were 
growing rapidly. The foodstuffs from the. overseas settlements were re­
placing higher cost producers in Europe, which helps to explain partly why 
the rate of expansion of demand for their products was so high. These con­
ditions are practically non-existent today; most of the products exported 
presently from the underdeveloped world to the industrial centers face a 
much more limited market (except in the case of petroleum and minerals) 
with hardly any replacement of production possible. 
Trade in the 19th century (1850-1913) increased twice as fast as world 
production, and it was this very dynamic character of trade that helped 
transmit the rapid growth in the industrial center to the overseas settle­
ments. Development, in other words, was promoted not simply because of 
international specialization, but because at the same time the export mar­
kets for the developing countries were growing at a very fast rate. Also, 
as mentioned above, the fact that these countries were settled with Euro­
pean labor (from a capitalistic society), together with the very favorable 
ratio of natural resources to population, made them efficient producers 
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from the very beginning. The resulting relatively high income was an im­
portant contributing factor to their subsequent industrial development. 
Generally speaking, classical trade theory overlooked the dynamic character 
of international commerce and attributed unwarranted credit to internation­
al specialization as such. 
As previously indicated, the markets for the export products of the 
developing countries are no longer dynamically growing markets with the 
exception of petroleum and minerals. 
The relatively slow expansion in the world demand for primary products 
(and export products from the developing areas are primarily of this type) 
is fairly general and stems mainly from the following two contributing 
factors: the low elasticity of demand for foodstuffs and technical pro­
gress. The latter factor leads to a reduction in the amount of raw mate­
rials used per unit of output and to the substitution of synthetic products 
for raw materials. In addition, food exports from underdeveloped countries 
have been adversely affected by agricultural protection in the industrial 
countries and by the fact that the latter themselves are very often (effi­
cient producers of food. 
The ratio of the growth of world trade to the growth of world output 
has declined after 1913 compared to the 19th century. Furthermore, in 
times when trade grew more rapidly than gross product, it was a reflection 
of an increase in trade primarily among the industrial countries. In 
other words, with the possible exception of a few products, such as oil and 
some minerals, the 20th century has not been characterized by a dynamic ex­
pansion of trade, at least between the developed and the underdeveloped 
world. Thus, the same basis for development as existed in the former 
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century is no longer present. Because the expectations of the developing 
countries were not fulfilled, a reaction developed which tended to over­
emphasize balanced growth and protectionism, thereby neglecting the poten­
tial gains from trade. This reaction was further strengthened by the type 
of economic structure which international trade had often generated in many 
underdeveloped countries, i.e. a highly productive, fast growing and mainly 
foreign owned export sector contrasting with a stagnant and primitive do­
mestic economy. Also, the uncertainty and instability which always char­
acterize specialization in primary exports have contributed to the trend 
towards protectionism. 
If trade alone cannot generate economic development for a country, a 
balanced pattern of investment for domestic production must be looked for. 
In strict theoretical terms, this seems to signify a choice between two 
mutually exclusive alternatives: a design of investment and trade based on 
comparative advantage and private profit maximization on the one hand, ver­
sus a balanced growth pattern on the other hand. The solution given in a 
concrete instance will obviously depend on such factors as the relative 
size of the particular country, its endowment of natural resources and 
other factors of production and the demand which its products face in ex­
port markets. The choice that is made should not be at either extreme, 
but rather elements of growth theory should be combined with elements of 
trade theory in order to determine the optimum resource allocation. This 
is so because, just as international specialization alone, as it presently 
exists, does not seem to generate desired growth patterns, so is it equally 
true that the benefits obtainable from foreign trade should not be neglect­
ed when they exist. 
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Resources should not be drawn away from export production, but rather 
the sector should be encouraged as long as some gains can be obtained and 
this is even more so in view of the needs of foreign exchange availability 
for all development efforts. The domestic sector has to be developed side 
by side with the export sector. Notwithstanding what critics of free 
trade, such as Singer and Myrdal, at times contend, the traditional spe­
cialization and growth in the export sector, with all its shortcomings and 
unfavorable effects upon the structure of the underdeveloped economy, has 
on balance been very beneficial. 
It has increased the demand for local labor and thereby wages, it has 
had some linkage (even though small) with the rest of the economy and has 
been an important source of taxation revenue. 
It seems quite reasonable to assume that the utilization of resources 
in the export sector was not competitive with domestic production (both 
labor and natural resources were in surplus and foreign capital would not 
have been available but for export production) and accordingly the exis­
tence of the export sector has given the underdeveloped countries the op­
portunity of some growth rather than no growth at all. In other words, 
development policy in regard to resource allocation should aim at the 
attainment of the gains from trade without entering in conflict with the 
goals of growth. 
Certainly the major component of growth is a maximum increase in 
national income with the stock of resources available. The classical view 
of the solution to this problem is simply that, under static conditions 
of perfect competition, the optimum allocation of resources is determined 
by the free market forces, which then also implies that any interference 
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with the market forces is bad for development. 
Comparative advantage and consequently the optimum pattern of trade 
and production are determined by current market prices. It is well known, 
of course, that there are serious defects in the assumptions underlying the 
classical theory. Furthermore, the divergences between these assumptions 
and the underlying reality are much greater in underdeveloped than in 
developed countries, such that interferences can certainly be justified. 
In particular, the following shortcomings in the workings of the free 
price mechanism are specially important in underdeveloped economies. First 
of all, deviations of perfect competition are, generally speaking, very big 
in underdeveloped countries. Information about producer and consumer de­
mand, about alternative production techniques and about supplies of factors 
of production is far from being adequate. Capital and natural resources 
are not equally accessible to everyone and social barriers are obstacles to 
the equal opportunity of entry into the different occupations. As a result 
of the lack of mobility of labor and capital, monopoly positions and other 
imperfections in the market structure, factor prices do often not reflect 
opportunity costs and are, consequently, c very poor guide to resource al­
location. 
In the second place, decisions based on present market prices do not 
necessarily lead to an optimum allocation of resources over time, because 
these prices Reflect an economic situation (factor costs, product prices, 
etc.) as it is now and not as it will be in the future. Investment deci­
sions, which by their very nature have delayed effects, have to be guided 
by long run considerations. This again is of utmost importance, particu­
larly in underdeveloped countries where any investment, however small it 
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may appear is likely to have a great and discrete impact on the economic 
strueture. 
The fact that investment can change the economic structure of a lesser 
developed economy and thereby affect the benefit and cost conditions may 
lead to allocation of private investment to uses which are less productive 
than they could be if the future effects were properly discounted. Conse­
quently, the set of market prices which exists is not the best guide to 
resource allocation in a dynamic sense, and productive factors are not used 
in the proportion in which they are available; for instance capital may be 
in shortage such that labor is not fully employed. At the same time, in­
come is badly distributed by classes as well as geographically. 
The conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that the conditions pre­
vailing in underdeveloped economies are not only far away from the perfect 
competition model, but that also, even if perfect competition would exist, 
optimum allocation of resources would not be achieved automatically, be­
cause of the interdependence among sectors. Consequently, classical com­
parative advantage theory has come under considerable attack, and it is 
apparent that the elements of growth theory have to be entered in compara­
tive cost analyses for them to be useful in development planning. Chenery 
in (8) studies the extent to which allocation principles derived from trade 
theory and from growth theory can be combined, and concludes that only in a 
linear programming framework the conflicting policy implications of the two 
approaches can be resolved. Market forces do not only fail to lead to an 
efficient resource allocation but also "since market forces cannot be re­
lied on to balance supply and demand under conditions of initial disequili­
brium and accelerated growth, a principal concern of development policy is 
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to ensure the consistency of production levels with commodity demands and 
factor supplies. The technique of linear programming is designed to com­
bine the test of consistency with the test of the social profitability of 
a given resource use". (8, p. 48). 
The statistical information presently existing in underdeveloped coun­
tries is very limited and the application of linear programming to resource 
allocation is, therefore, restricted. The methodology, however, is very 
useful in improving the theoretical framework for development policy. In­
deed, the problems to be solved in a development program are mainly of the 
two above mentioned kinds: structural disequilibrium relating to commodi­
ties as well as to factors of production, and efficiency. 
Chenery points out that the practical approach to development pro­
gramming has been guided mainly by the short run disequilibrium problem 
(supply imbalances) facing many underdeveloped countries and that, conse­
quently, consistency in terms of balancing supply and demand requirements 
by sectors has been given most of the attention as opposed to economic 
efficiency. This procedure may not be very harmful in large countries with 
a diversified stock of resources. Russia may be cited as an example of 
this type of planning. The relative success of Soviet planning has been 
one of the factors leading to an overemphasis of domestic balance consider­
ations in many underdeveloped countries. It appears self-evident that this 
type of procedure with its lack of efficiency considerations has much more 
serious disadvantages in a small country such as for instance Peru, with 
its existing heavy involvement in international trade, than in very large 
countries. 
Alternatively, the optimum pattern of production and trade cannot be 
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determined on simple static efficiency criteria either, and in the efforts 
to include more growth theory in the determination of the lines of special­
ization, the following considerations emerge as imperative. First of all, 
it has to be taken into account that prices of capital and labor do not 
generally reflect their opportunity cost, and because of the imperfect mar­
ket structure it is possible for instance that a certain factor receives 
different remunerations in different uses or that the price relation be­
tween factors is not a true reflection of the factor availability. As an 
example may be cited the fact that underdeveloped countries imitate devel­
oped countries often not only in technology, but also in the field of so­
cial policy with subsequent high wages in the relatively more advanced 
sectors of the economy as opposed to very low wages in the much larger sub­
sistence sector. As a result a new industry may be forced to adopt factor 
proportions very much different from what one would expect on the basis of 
the overall low wage level of the country. 
Secondly, comparative advantage theory has been said to induce spe­
cialization in primary products, which, because of low demand elasticity 
and cyclical fluctuations, has caused great concern. However, demand elas­
ticity is not low for all primary production and furthermore the difficulty 
can be identified by considering marginal revenue instead of average as a 
basis of comparative advantage. Cyclical fluctuations, on the other handj 
are only one aspect of the overall risk and uncertainty involved in spe­
cialization in a few primary products. It should be added that specializa­
tion in few products of any kind involves a high risk element and 
Kindleberger in (9) argues that diversification is the main factor leading 
to favorable terms of trade. 
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A diversified economy permits an easier adaptation of the structure of 
exports and imports to sudden changes in demand or supply. This means that 
even if some efficiency has to be sacrificed, a certain degree of diversi­
fication will generally have a higher "social profit" than specialization 
along very few lines. But it does not mean that specialization in primary 
products is necessarily an undesirable policy, because its "social profit" 
may still be much higher than that of any other investment. 
In the third place, comparative advantage theory has been deficient 
because of its omission of dynamic elements from the analysis. As the pro­
cess of development proceeds, more industries are created and technologi­
cal improvements in agriculture take place, the quality of such factors of 
production as labor and management is bound to improve, and thus compara­
tive advantage may change over time. Very important also are the "dynamic 
external economies" as defined by Scitovsky in (10). The private profita­
bility of an investment is not always a good indicator of its social value, 
and this is specially true in the case of underdeveloped economies. Be­
cause of elements such as economies of scale and productivity increases, 
the profitability of one action may depend to a large extent on the exis­
tence of other activities and this interdependence of investment seems to 
be much more important in manufacturing than in primary production. Thus 
comparative advantage rules may include a bias against industry. 
The foregoing observations serve to illustrate the limitations of the 
application of the classical comparative cost doctrine to presently exist­
ing conditions in underdeveloped economies. If foreign trade has to be 
made to contribute more efficiently to the goals of development, it should 
not simply be based on existing comparative advantages, but the growth pro­
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cess itself has to be analyzed simultaneously in order to determine what 
the future structure of comparative advantage and factor endowments will 
be. The identification of the causes of underdevelopment is a very complex 
undertaking. The tendency to blame the present international trade struc­
ture of underdeveloped economies for the lack of growth appears to be the 
result of some real shortcomings, characteristic of the export sector in 
underdeveloped countries, such as fluctuating export earnings, concentra­
tion of exports in one or two commodities and the predominantly "foreign" 
character of the sector. 
As noted above, foreign trade recently has not had the same beneficial 
effects for development as it did in the 19th century and this has led to a 
host of arguments indicating that specialization in primary products has 
been positively harmful. Wiiile most of the arguments are at best only par­
tially correct, it is unmistakable that an attitude hss developed whereby, 
in drawing up development plans, sight has often been lost of the advan­
tages which a high trade-output ratio can bring to developing economies, 
especially those economies which do not have the size nor the diversified 
resources of a country like Russia or the United States. At the same time, 
the discussion in the literature has been very profitable inasmuch as it 
has illustrated the basic shortcomings of the classical comparative cost 
approach to problems of resource allocation in developing economies. Bet­
ter criteria than simple capital-labor ratios are necessary and the devel­
opment of the social marginal product criterion as the net contribution of 
a marginal project to national product is a step in that direction. 
In conclusion, it may be said that the classical comparative cost 
doctrine is inadequate in determining optimal resource allocation for 
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underdeveloped economies and that elements of growth theory have to be in­
cluded in establishing the extent and scope of international specializa­
tion. At the same time, underdeveloped countries are much concerned with 
their present international trade position, mainly because it did not get 
them started on the road to development. Consequently, the unfavorable 
aspects resulting from exporting primary products have been analyzed and 
exaggerated to the point where a conviction has arisen in some circles that 
foreign trade, far from promoting development, has actually retarded the 
betterment of backward regions. The chief argument being that the "for­
eign" character of the export sector has led to the existence of a "dual" 
economy. The proposed solution has been stated in terms of industrializa­
tion and trade restriction. 
Even if it is granted that foreign trade has often failed to contri­
bute substantially to development, the causes must be looked for primarily 
domestically; the weak carry-over from the export sector to the other sec­
tors provides a much better explanation. It is wrong, therefore, to con­
clude that the problems of a "dual" economy can be solved by trade re­
strictions. The bottlenecks to economic development are not as much con­
sequences of foreign trade, as they are of low productivity, capital scar­
city, population growth and the like. 
It may be argued that the opportunities resulting from foreign trade 
are vital in determining the rate of economic growth. What, however, ap­
pears to be essential, is the improvement of the linkages between the for­
eign and the domestic sectors and to pay full attention to considerations 
of growth theory in establishing the optimum structure of production and 
trade. These points will be discussed in the next section. 
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B. Suggested Contribution of the Foreign Sector 
The existence of economic relations with the rest of the world is 
beneficial for economic development purposes for a number of reasons. 
First, more savings can thereby be obtained than the domestic economy 
alone is able to generate, a factor of vital importance in any developing 
economy. Secondly, the possibility of importing and exporting goods gives 
the developing country the chance to import materials and capital goods at 
a much lower price than it could produce them domestically. At the same 
time, it enables the country to specialize in the production of goods in 
which it has a comparative advantage, thus securing a higher rate of return 
on its investment. 
Having thus defined the important role of the foreign sector as an 
economic determinant of development, the little emphasis which is placed 
on it in the development plans of many underdeveloped countries warrants 
some explanation. 
International trade has historically made a tremendous contribution to 
the development of underdeveloped economies, as indicated earlier in this 
chapter. There appear to be many reasons to believe it still can in the 
future. The presently existing skepticism in most underdeveloped coun­
tries, therefore, has to be analyzed, and the role of foreign trade should 
be explored in terms of present-day conditions. Nineteenth century devel­
opment through trade was based mainly on very dynamically growing markets 
for exports of primary products. Today, conditions are different: export 
markets for many primary products are not growing very fast (with the pre­
viously mentioned exceptions of petroleum and minerals). 
In development literature cause and effect, very often, have become 
confused. A well known example is the causal association that is said to 
exist between agriculture and poverty, and industry and prosperity. On the 
international front the foreign trade structure of many underdeveloped 
economies is said to impede economic development and consequently "bal­
anced growth" and "protectionism" have become overemphasized. The net con­
tribution of the foreign sector to underdeveloped countries has been mini­
mized and even said to be negative. It is very tempting to blame the out­
side world for one's own shortcomings, and it is also much easier to mani­
pulate international trade policies rather than domestic policies. 
The argument that international trade has been a cause of internation­
al inequality appears to be the result of a partial analysis of the problem 
and a failure to specify the real bottlenecks in underdeveloped countries. 
Among the different arguments, as presented by Prebisch, Singer and others, 
the following have been most dominant. 
It is said that foreign investment and trade have contributed to the 
existence of a "dual" economy, and thus retarded economic development. It 
is a very weak argument indeed to claim that in the absence of foreign in­
vestment the domestic supply of entrepreneurs and savings would have been 
larger. 
Another favorite point is that the international relationships of the 
country have raised its marginal propensity to consume, through the demon­
stration effect, thus lowering the capacity to save. This is probably 
true, but the simultaneous positive effect on incentives and factor supply 
may have been even greater. Most important of all is probably the terms 
of trade argument: the general conclusion of the literature is that there 
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is no definite proof that the terras of trade do in fact deteriorate for 
exporters of primary commodities. Furthermore, comparisons over long per­
iods lose much significance because of quality changes of the products. 
Even if it is assumed that the commodity terms of trade do deteriorate for 
primary exporters, this does not necessarily imply a check on their devel­
opment. The important variables in this respect are the factoral terms of 
trade, reflecting productivity changes, or the income terms of trade, re­
flecting changes in volume of exports, and these are very often rising. 
Also, the situation may be quite different from one primary product to 
another. 
The position that protectionism will solve these difficulties (if they 
exist) reflects some lack of insight. Generally speaking, underdeveloped 
countries are neither monopolists nor monopsonists in world markets, and 
their influence on world prices is therefore very limited. Consequently, 
the "optimum tariff" argument in order to improve their terms of trade 
lacks realism. 
It is true that export markets for certain products are not growing 
very rapidly. The countries concerned in order to strengthen their exter­
nal positions and to secure the benefits for development obtainable through 
trade will have to shift resources to those export products which are grow­
ing fastest and will have to explore the possibilities of producing new 
products (for instance light manufactures) for export. The problems in­
volved may be big, but the importance of a strong external position, as 
will be clarified below, has to be emphasized. 
Yet for other countries, export markets have been growing dynamically 
and still are (such as petroleum markets and minerals) and yet development 
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has not taken place. Thus, how can the lack of stimulus from the export 
sector to the rest of the economy be explained in underdeveloped coun­
tries? 
One obtains a relatively convincing explanation of the problem by 
looking at the whole set of domestic (underdevelopment) factors which do 
not permit an important carry-over from the export sector to the rest of 
the economy.^ Market imperfections and the general internal economic and 
social structure have prevented the beneficial effects of a growing export 
sector to be transferred to the rest of the economy. Social and political 
as well as economic changes are needed in order to make the economies more 
receptive to the stimulus that comes from trade. Or, in other words, the 
problem of underdevelopment has to be attacked on all fronts, and one can­
not expect more from a single leading sector - the export sector - than the 
existing (inflexible) internal economic structure allows. 
Domestic development has to take place in order for the country to 
absorb fully the gains from trade. The internal obstacles are many, but 
they can be solved; the social structure has to change, the capital market 
widened and credit and marketing facilities improved. In general, an in­
crease in social overhead capital will improve factory mobility and allow 
imported technological knowledge to be diffused more easily. 
Besides the market imperfections, some special characteristics of the 
export activities in underdeveloped countries have prevented an adequate 
contribution to development. In many cases, a great majority of the factor 
payments leave the country. Inasmuch as the investment is foreign and no 
See the analysis of Meier (11, pp. 371-376). 
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reinvestment takes place, a large part of the value added is used for the 
amortization and other factor payments abroad. Another portion of the 
earnings is for income of entrepreneurs which is often converted into capi­
tal flight. Of that part of income which is reinvested, an important pro­
portion flows out of the country because of the high import content of 
investment. The remaining fraction of factor payments is used for consump­
tion, which also has an important import content. Whatever did not leak 
out of the country in the above ways is spent on domestically produced 
goods which provides the first effort to stimulate the domestic economy 
(needless to say that this part is often quite small). 
Typically, the export sector in underdeveloped countries does not have 
important backward (or forward) linkages^ with the rest of the economy and 
does not make an important contribution to employment while the larger part 
of the factor payments leaves the country in one way or another. It fol­
lows then that in order to strengthen the stimulus of the export sector 
these shortcomings have to be improved upon to the extent possible. For 
An illustration of this can be found in Peru in the very important 
and profitable mining sector, which is overwhelmingly financed by foreign 
(mainly U.S.) capital and at the same time employs only about 70,000 peo­
ple. Alternatively, the fishing sector in Peru provides an example of how 
the export sector through linkages can contribute substantially to domestic 
development. More than half of the sector is financed by Peruvian capital, 
and even though the activity is quite capital-intensive and does not employ 
a very large proportion of the labor force, the labor share of value added 
is substantial. (Fishermen are by far the best paid workers in Peru). At 
the same time, the sector has stimulated the construction of fishing boats, 
which by now is one of the fastest growing industries, which also produces 
for exports. An important input which is still mainly imported but could 
be produced domestically are the jute bags. Presently the expansion of 
their production (or of substitutes) is under study. Also forward linkages 
are possible, of course, as for instance the utilization of fishmeal in the 
production of bread. 
% 
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instance, reinvestment of profits could be encouraged through taxation 
policies, or a redistribution of factor incomes could be achieved in order 
to favor those with a higher marginal propensity to consume domestic goods. 
In general, whatever policy measures can be applied to eliminate any of the 
cited shortcomings, should be utilized. 
Thus, it may be said that development policy has to be such as to make 
the foreign sector contribute as much as possible to the major policy 
goals. To this end, backward and forward linkages have to be maximized, 
the distribution of factor payments has to be optimized with the aim of 
achieving a balance between effective demand for home-made goods and supply 
of investment funds, and removal of market imperfections and social and 
cultural obstacles within the country has to be achieved in order to 
strengthen the stimulus from exports. Clearly, markets have to grow and 
production should be directed primarily towards those products which have 
the better prospects. 
Underdeveloped countries are, on the average, very dependent upon the 
foreign sector, not only because of high export and import to gross nation­
al product (GNP) ratios but also because of the importance of foreign capi­
tal inflow and of customs duties as an essential source of government 
revenue. Yet, development programs have perhaps, too often, neglected the 
potential positive contribution of the foreign sector. The unfortunate re­
sults of this approach, such as for instance the Peron experiment in 
Argentina, are well known. Instead it is necessary to explore fully the 
advantages a developing country may derive from development in the "inter­
national setting". 
The demand for imports tends to grow faster than income in the early 
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stages of development for a number of reasons, such as the change in the 
composition of consumption as income rises, or the increased demand for im­
ported capital goods and raw materials. Consequently, the choice that has 
to be made between expanding exports or expanding import substitution is 
one of the most vital problems of development planning. The decision to 
invest in one~versus the other of these two sectors must be made on the 
basis of demand and supply conditions of exports and the possibility of 
producing efficiently at home goods that were previously imported. In 
practice, more attention is paid to import substitution rather than export 
development for two reasons. First, because industrialization rather than 
increases in productivity as such is usually the major concern of develop­
ment planning. Secondly, because import substitution is an easier way to 
solve the balance of payments problems, so characteristic of underdeveloped 
countries. 
However, the choice to be made is not exactly of export promotion or 
import substitution, but an efficient balance between the two has to be 
achieved such that their joint contribution to the major goals which are 
included in the welfare function, is maximized. Exports, on the one hand, 
are of foremost importance because of their multiplier effect on income 
and, on the other, constitute the source of and the restraint to the ex­
pansion of imports and permit the servicing of indispensable foreign capi­
tal inflow. 
It can safely be said that the underdeveloped countries themselves do 
not understand this role very well: the export sector to them is mainly an 
easy source of tax income and exports are considered to be necessary for 
machinery and raw materials imports. 
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The multiplier effects on income are well known. Even if the demand 
does not grow very rapidly, as is the case of cotton for instance, an indi­
vidual country that provides only a small portion of the world market (for 
instance Peru) has the possibility of increasing its share. Furthermore, 
light manufacture exports to other underdeveloped countries and to other 
markets are feasible as proven by the example of several countries. As 
cited earlier, development of the domestic economic structure will improve 
the beneficial effects of the growing export sector on the rest of the 
economy. On the other hand, exports make imports possible. What is really 
scarce in underdeveloped economies is not capital as such, but rather the 
capacity to absorb capital. Lack of knowledge and uncertainty about the 
market are bottlenecks to development, in the sense that domestic business­
men do not find sufficient incentives for production. Imports have the 
very important function of showing where the market is and this inducing 
effect is a real engine of economic development. Once the amount imported 
of a certain good is large enough to allow competitive domestic production, 
import substitution and industrialization can and will take place. 
The role of exports can thus be summarized as follows: First of all, 
exports have a very important multiplier effect on gross national product; 
secondly, exports make imports possible and thus gradual industrialization, 
and in the third place, exports provide the foreign exchange needed to ser­
vice foreign capital inflow. In short, the existence of a strong export 
sector is one of the most important factors in the economic development of 
most countries. The example of Japan is quite enlightening in this con­
nection: Japan originally financed its development through raw silk ex­
ports; the agricultural sector was developed and consequently a domestic 
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market for industrial products created; in time, Japan developed competi­
tiveness in its industrial production and became an exporter of manufac­
tures. 
Two other important factors relative to the international sectors of 
an economy (as well as to the whole economy) are the role of regional inte­
gration and the choice of techniques of production, i.e. labor intensive 
versus capital intensive activities. Regional integration proposals have 
received lately increased attention in many underdeveloped areas of the 
world. Undoubtedly, substantial benefits could be derived for the coun­
tries involved, stemming mainly from the creation of a larger market which 
would allow manufacturing industries to be established on a sounder basis. 
The case for regional integration is based primarily on the fact that 
economic development will involve industrialization which will be facili­
tated because of external economies and economies of scale, if a larger 
market can be secured than the domestic market. This reasoning is quite 
sound, of course, and rests at the basis for instance of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association (LAFTA, established by the Treaty of Montevideo in 
February 1960), which, because of its extensive area and important long run 
goals, is maybe the most prominent of the different regional groupings in 
the less developed world. 
It is clear, however, that much of the enthusiasm which accompanies 
regional integration movements in less developed areas is based only partly 
on economic considerations. 
The pursuit of integration as such in order to form a new "world 
power" has become stylish. Actually much more has been said about economic 
integration than executed. The implementation problems are very big 
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indeed. In the past, market forces (and the system of free world trade 
and payments) have divided the world into an industrialized part and an 
underdeveloped part. This situation, in fact, has been one of the incen­
tives leading to the establishment of regional groupings in the underdevel­
oped world in order to reduce the gap. Within a regional grouping, how­
ever, the same tendency towards uneven development among the different mem­
bers of the group is likely to exist and this inequality is unacceptable if 
the integration is to be a success. In other words, all countries within 
the group will want to share more or less equally in the advantages to be 
derived from the agreement which would require a strong coordination of 
development policy. Clearly, the problems (mainly political and adminis­
trative) which are likely to result from this situation may be a serious 
impediment to the success of any attempt at integration. A further compli­
cating factor is that most of the economic advantages which can be derived, 
will be obtained only in the long run, which may not be a very important 
determinant of current economic decisions. 
Economic integration theory indicates that the potential benefits are 
greatest in the case of countries which have already a substantial indus­
trial basis and which do most of their trading with each other. In this 
case, the benefits from competition can be derived fully and the gains ob­
tained will be substantial. These conditions, however, do not exist satis­
factorily for instance in LAFTA. 
In general, the short run advantages to be obtained are very small, 
while all sorts of disadvantages and problems may prove to be serious ob­
stacles to long run success. Nevertheless, the benefits obtainable through 
integration are real and any progress, however small, towards more region-
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al cooperation and integration, has to be pursued. 
The choice of technique of production is another important aspect of 
development planning, both with regard to the domestic and foreign sectors 
of an economy. As a general rule, it seems quite reasonable to say that 
underdeveloped (capital-poor) countries should use as much labor as possi­
ble in production; similarly, this would imply that they should export 
commodities that use relatively less capital and import goods that use rel­
atively more capital. The issue, however, is much more complicated than 
may appear at first. Presently existing exports (and comparative advan­
tage) of underdeveloped countries are probably based primarily on factors 
other than relative scarcity of labor or capital. The existence of natural 
resources, fertile land and in general certain climatic and geographic con­
ditions are the most important determinants of comparative advantage. In 
the future process of industrialization and development it is obvious that, 
if techniques exist, whereby output per man can be raised substantially 
without raising capital per unit of labor much, then these techniques 
should be preferred. After all, full employment is a very important goal 
of development planning, and every step in that direction is most desir­
able. Labor intensive techniques can probably be effectively applied in 
small scale agriculture, which is characteristic of many developing coun­
tries. 
The introduction of very simple tools at a very small total capital 
cost may be sufficient to raise output substantially. Also construction is 
a field where much flexibility exists with respect to the technique of pro­
duction. However, examples of activities where labor intensive techniques 
can be efficiently used are quite limited, and this can be best explained 
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by the fact that modern technology tends to be both labor and capital 
saving; employing more labor per unit of capital will not, in general, in­
crease output, turthemore, the common argument that labor is cheap and 
abundant in underdeveloped countries does not take into account its quali­
ty. Unskilled and undisciplined labor certainly is plentiful, but this 
can hardly be said to form an adequate factor of production. At most what 
can be said is that the labor force is "potentially abundant", but this 
will require substantial social overhead investment in education, health 
and public utilities. Also, the labor market very often is quite imperfect 
and the wage rate facing new industries is frequently higher than the pro­
ductivity warrants; accordingly, capital intensive industries are pre­
ferred. even though there is substantial unemployment. In view of the fact 
that skilled labor is perhaps even more scarce than capital in underdevel­
oped countries, it is not surprising that repeatedly fully automatic plants 
are installed. 
These considerations focus the attention on what is probably the most 
important bottleneck to development: education. Governments of underdev­
eloped countries should attach major importance in their development pro­
grams to this particular aspect, even considering the acute shortage of 
better roads and housing and other infrastructure which compete with educa­
tion for public funds. It is unquestionable that, for long run develop­
ment, education is the most important and urgently needed kind of social 
overhead capital. Unfortunately, education is not much emphasized because 
of the fact that the rewards of education are not directly visible. 
In conclusion, it can be said that the role of the foreign sector is 
to contribute as much as possible to the attainment of the various objec-
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Lives of economic policy. These are mainly: static economic efficiency, 
a high growth rate, a better income distribution, price stability, full 
employment, regional equilibrium and balance of payments equilibrium. The 
foreign sector will, by its nature, contribute more readily to some of 
these targets chan to others. For instance, the export sector of Peru has 
obviously contributed substantially to the attainment of a high growth 
rate, relative price stability and balance of payments equilibrium; but 
income distribution and employment have not been favored very much. In 
Chapter IV these points will be examined in detail for the case of Peru. 
Means have to be devised for the export sector to contribute as much as 
possible to all of these targets. 
The importance of development in terms of an "open" economy has been 
stressed continuously. Growth through trade is still quite possible, even 
though, in general, conditions are not the same as in the 19th century. 
In some cases, exports of primary products are growing dynamically. 
As explained above, the lack of responsiveness of the rest of the 
economy to the stimulus from exports is due mainly to domestic obstacles, 
which will have to be removed in the process of development. In any case, 
even if export growth prospects are presently not very encouraging, a dev­
elopment plan has to foster those exports with the highest joint contribu­
tion to the major goals which in some cases might be "new" products. The 
availability of foreign exchange is indispensable in development. For most 
underdeveloped countries, which are of relatively small size, it can safely 
be said that neglecting the export sector would make major development 
quite impossible. Furthermore, foreign capital can generally be obtained 
more readily in an internationally-oriented economy. The role of the for­
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eign sector in the case of Peru's future development will be analyzed ex­
tensively in Chapter V. 
An underdeveloped country is generally characterized by a large agri­
cultural sector, which is too poor to buy industrial products and, conse­
quently, by a parallel lack of industrial development. Agricultural devel­
opment means an increase in farm income and thus a market for the products 
of industry, which will grow simultaneously, and whose increased needs for 
food can be satisfied by the agricultural expansion and possibly by im­
ports. Existing exports of primary products have, besides their multiplier 
effects on the economy, the very vital task of financing this development 
process. Once a domestic industry has become efficient on the basis of the 
home market, competitive production for exports becomes possible. Often, 
however, the home market may be too small to produce efficiently; there­
fore, all efforts towards regional cooperation and integration; whatever 
the obstacles, have to be favored in order to secure a larger market for 
the newly established industries. 
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III. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF THE PERUVIAN 
ECONOMY AND ITS FOREIGN SECTOR (1950-1964) 
A. The Overall Situation 
Judging from Table 1, Peru, in terms of per capita gross national 
product (GNP) belongs to the poorer countries of Latin America, with a per 
capita GNP in 1964 of U.S. $286.00. as opposed to the Latin American aver­
age of U.S. $325.00. The picture is quite different, however, if one con­
siders GNP growth rates during the last decade; Peru, together with Mexico 
and Venezuela, figures then among the group of countries which have 
achieved the highest growth rates. It is interesting to note that, during 
the same period, these three economies have also been characterized by the 
most dynamically growing export sectors of the region. 
An analysis of the growth of the Peruvian economy from 1950 to 1964 
illustrates its heavy dependence upon the export sector; a simple linear 
regression of gross domestic product as the dependent variable (Y) on ex­
ports, lagged one year, as the independent variable (X), both in 1960 
prices (Table 2), yields the following: 
Y = 22,641 + 2.793 X R^ = .98 
(1,190) (.110) 
The evolution of Peru's exports during the period 1950-1964 was character­
ized by changes in both prices and volume, but by far the major feature of 
export development was the tremendous increase in the volume of exports 
which, in turn, was the major determinant of the growth of the economy. In 
1959-1961 exports increased so dramatically (and with it gross domestic 
product) that one can best divide the period under consideration in two 
Table 1. Latin America; gross national product, population and growth rates^ 
Gross national 
Per Capita 
US$ 
product 1955 
Total 
Mlns. US$ 
Population 
1966 Growth 
Mlns rate 
1965-66 
Annual growth rates of GNP (%) 
1955-60 1960-64 1955-60 1960-64 
Total Total Per capita Per capita 
Venezuela /54 6,405 9.0 3.6 6.5 5. ,4 2.5 1.8 
Argentina 613% 12,873° 23.2 1.6 2 . 7  1. ,2 0.8 -0.6 
Chile 485% 3,930^ 8.8 2.5 3 . 8  3. ,3 1.4 1.3 
Uruguay 473 1,420° 2 . 8  1.1 -0.1 0. 2 
-1.3 -1.0 
Panama 450 540 1.1 3 . 0  5 . 3  7. ,8 2.5 5.0 
Mexico 443 17.450 42.9 3 . 5  6.1 6. ,2 2.8 2 . 8  
Colombia 292° 4,700° 18.3 2.9 4 . 0  4. ,6 1.1 1.7 
Peru 286 3,180 11.9 2 . 8  4.7 6, ,4 2.1 3.7 
Ecuador 204 1,000 5.2 3.0 4.5 3. ,6 1.3 0.4 
Paraguay 197b 374 2.0 2 . 7  2.4 3. ,6 -0.1 1.1 
Brazil 196 15,160° 83.8 2.9 5 . 9  3, ,9 2 . 8  0.7 
Bolivia 171 720 4.2 2.4 -0.2 5, .0 -2.2 2 . 6  
Central Am.^ 287 3,539 12.8 3 . 3  4 . 3  6, ,0 1.0 2.7 
Total L.A.^ 325 72,546 234.5 2 . 9  4.7 3, .9 1.8 1.0 
^Source (12, pp. 64-71 and 13, p. 6). 
^1963. 
""Includes; Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica. 
^Includes estimates for Haiti and the Dominican Republic but does not include Cuba. 
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parts, one before, and one after 1959. The growth rates which follow are 
based on Instituto Nacional de Planificaci'ôn (INP) data in constant 1960 
prices. From 1950 to 1958 gross domestic product grew at an annual cumula­
tive rate of 4.1%, while exports grew at 6.5%; from 1959 to 1964, however, 
these growth rates were, respectively, 7.6% and 10.8% and for the whole 
period 1950-1964, respectively, 5.3% and 8.5%. 
During the first years of the 1950's, the Peruvian economy grew at a 
relatively high rate, propelled by a fairly fast expanding export sector. 
Export volume increased rapidly up through 1956. Real income, which takes 
into account not only income resulting from the volume of domestic produc­
tion but also income derived from changes in the terms-of-trade, showed 
important fluctuations. Gross domestic income, which is equal to gross 
domestic product plus the terms-of-trade effect, grew 10% (Table 2) in 
1951, mainly because of the very high world market prices for Peru's export 
products during the Korean conflict. These prices dropped substantially in 
1952, but a tremendous increase in the volume of exports cushioned somewhat 
the impact. From 1955 on, the expansion of the economy slowed down, and 
the suspension of stockpile purchases by the United States of non-ferrous 
metals in 1957 together with the recession in the industrialized world in 
1958 led to the stagnation of the economy during these two years.^ 
In the years 1959-1960, Peru emerged out of its economic difficulties 
during the depression in a spectacular way. Fishmeal exports, which had 
been insignificant during the first half of the 1950's, reached a high lev­
el and kept on increasing tremendously. The opening up of a new copper 
Gross domestic income actually declined 2.7% in 1958. 
Table 2. Gross domestic product, terms-of-trade effect, gross domestic income and exports of goods 
and services^ (at 1960 market prices) 
Gross domestic product Terms-of-trade Gross domestic income Exports 
Year Million Yearly effect, million Million Yearly Million Yearly 
soles growth rate soles^ soles growth rate soles growth r 
(%) (%) (%) 
1950 34,409 1,595 36,004 5,447 
1951 36,694 6.6 2,910 39,604 10.0 5,315 -2.4 
1952 38,505 4.9 1,541 40,046 1.1 6,507 2 2 . 4  
1953 41,010 6.5 1,191 42,201 5.4 7,211 10.8 
1954 42,707 4.1 1,451 44,158 4.6 7,754 7.5 
1955 44,161 3.4 1,490 45,651 3.4 8,161 5 . 2  
1956 45,175 2.3 1,960 47,135 3.3 9,011 10.4 
1957 47,162 4,4 1,779 48,941 3 . 8  9,147 1.5 
1958 47,591 .9 47 47,638 -2.7 9,655 5.6 
1959 49,499 4,0 - 492 49,007 2 . 9  11,015 14.1 
1960 55,650 12.4 0 55,650 13.6 13,686 24.2 
1961 60,782 9.2 - 338 60,444 8.6 15,898 16.2 
1962 65,260 7.4 - 252 65,008 7.6 16,936 6.5 
1963 67,650 3.7 842 68,492 5.4 16,097 -5.0 
1964 71,270 5.4 2,497 73,767 7.7 17,692 9.9 
^Source (14). 
^The terms-of-trade effect with respect to the base year (1960) is defined as the difference be­
tween the value of exports at constant 1960 prices on the one hand and the same value of exports at 
constant 1960 prices multiplied by the terms-of-trade index on the other hand. It is zero, by defi­
nition, for the base year 1960. 
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mine meant a 243% increase in the volume of copper exports in one year 
(1960) only. Furthermore, world prices of Peru's exports had by 1960 re­
covered from their 1958 decline. The result was a 12.4% growth of gross 
domestic product in 1960 and continued high growth rates of both product 
and income up to 1964. 
The strength of Peru's export sector since 1950 is to be found largely 
in its diversification, which has moreover, increased over time. The 
growth in aggregate exports has been due not only to the export growth in 
traditional items, such as cotton, sugar and metals, but more importantly 
to the appearance of new products: iron, fishmeal, coffee and the expan­
sion of copper mining. During this growth process, the rate of inflation 
has, in general, been under control. This may be largely explained by the 
fact that the dynamic export growth provided sufficient foreign exchange to 
make it possible to expand imports rapidly and to compensate for any short­
ages in domestic output. 
Even though Peru's diversified export sector has shown conclusive 
proof of the contribution it can make to income growth, balance of payments 
equilibrium and price stability - all important determinants of economic 
development - the economic and social problems which remain to be solved 
are so serious that the spectacular progress achieved during the last few 
years should not be overestimated in terms of its contribution to total 
economic development. A detailed study of the contribution of the foreign 
sector to a number of major macro-economic policy objectives is presented 
in Chapter IV, where it will be shown for instance that the effect of the 
export sector on employment is relatively small and the effect on a better 
income distribution may actually have been negative. Also, the integration 
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between the two main regions, the Coast ("Costa") and the "Sierra" has not 
been improved. In summary, the major features and weaknesses of the econo­
my have not changed much over the period under consideration. First of 
all, the productive structure is highly dualistic. An advanced and effi­
cient export sector exists side by side with a very backward (subsistence) 
sector, and the interaction between these two segments of the economy is 
very limited. Secondly, this economic dualism overlaps to a large extent 
with the geographical dualism; the coastal area is relatively much more 
developed and has better economic prospects than the Sierra, which is made 
up largely of subsistence agriculture. It has to be noted, however, that 
this overlap of economic and geographical dualism is not complete; within 
the coastal area extremes of wealth and poverty (i.e. the urban slums) can 
be found, while the mining centers -in the Sierra are small enclaves of very 
advanced activities. In the third place, the distribution of income is 
still very uneven and social problems are staggering; a large portion of 
the rapidly growing population is poorly fed and housed, and educational 
and health facilities are inadequate. And fourth, the economy is still 
highly sensitive to international developments. These four characteristics 
will be described in very general terms. 
1. Lopsidedness in the productive structure 
Approximately 50% of Peru's labor force is employed in agriculture. 
Yet, in 1964, only about 20% of gross domestic product (GDP) originated in 
this sector (Table 3). While these simple statistics may already give a 
rough indication of the asymmetry which is characteristic of the productive 
structure of the Peruvian economy, the actual imbalances are much more pro­
nounced. Within agriculture, for instance, one must distinguish between an 
Table 3. Gross domestic product by sectors for selected years, and growth rates^ 
(at 1960 market prices) 
1950 
Million 
soles 
7c 
1960 
Million 
soles 
7= 
1964 
Million 
soles 
7„ 
Annual cumulative 
growth 1950-64 
% 
Agriculture 8,860 25. 7 11,317 20. 3 13,998 19. 6 3.3 
Cotton, sugar. 
coffee 1,265 3. 7 2,813 5. 0 3,372 4. 7 7.3 
Rest 7,595 22. 0 8,504 15. 3 10,626 14, 9 2.4 
Fishing 167 0. 5 785 1. 4 1,266 1. ,8 15.6 
Mining 1,831 5. 3 4,908 8, ,8 5,448 7, ,6 8.1 
Industry 5,349 15, ,6 10,467 18, .8 13,952 19, ,6 7.1 
Construction 1,179 3, .4 1,768 3, .2 2,921 4 .1 6.7 
Commerce 5,512 16, .0 9,280 16 .7 12,528 17 . 6 6.0 
Other 11,511 33 .5 17,125 30 .8 21,157 29 .7 4.4 
TOTAL 34,409 IQO .0 55,650 100 .0 71,270 100 .0 5.3 
^Source (15). 
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efficient capital-intensive export agriculture on the coast and the stag­
nant subsistence agriculture in the Sierra. 
Peru's economy can best be divided into those activities that are 
geared towards export demand and those that are not. Such primary activi­
ties as cotton, sugar, coffee, mining and fishing are performed under con­
ditions of high productivity and efficiency by any standards. They are, in 
general, highly capital-intensive occupations, giving employment to only a 
small proportion of the labor force, and their major characteristic during 
the last few years has been their tremendous growth. Also, in the manu­
facturing sector, that group of industries which is based on th': export 
market - sugar and metal refining, fishmeal plants, etc. - is quite dis­
tinctive from the rest of the sector because of high capital and low labor 
utilization and a resulting efficient production. 
In contrast to the export sector, most of the remainder of the economy 
is still in a relatively backward stage and has not changed substantially 
in recent years. It is true that the industrial sector as a whole has in­
creased its share of total GDP from 15.6% in 1950 to 19.6% in 1964, but a 
major part of this increase has been due to the performance of the above 
mentioned export-oriented group. The rest of the Peruvian industry, which 
is domestically-oriented, can roughly be divided into those industries that 
produce durable consumption goods and investment goods and those that pro­
duce non-durable consumption goods. The first group is composed mainly of 
relatively new industries (tires, glass, chemicals, metal fabricating), 
operating at satisfactory levels of productivity, but its total importance 
in view of the needs of the country is still very small. One of the fast­
est growing branches in this group has been the construction of fishing 
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vessels, an excellent example of the important linkage effects of the fish 
industry. 
The second group producing non-durable consumption goods is composed 
of the more traditional activities and has on the average not modernized 
very much; consequently, advances in productivity in this group have been 
very limited. 
In general, the industrial sector producing for the domestic market 
has shown some development, but at the same time is confronted with a host 
of problems, typical of underdeveloped economies, which have impeded im­
portant structural changes. The problems facing industry are mainly the 
following. The first major bottleneck is the lack of a market. The larger 
part of the population, employed in agriculture or otherwise, has a very 
limited purchasing power. As a result, new industries have to work at low 
capacity with subsequent high costs, which limits the market even more and 
makes it very difficult to compete with imports. The shortage of qualified 
personnel and low labor productivity are other impediments to industrial 
growth; one of the greatest needs facing the administration is to develop 
education at all levels; primary, secondary, technical and university. 
The shortage of managers, technicians, foremen and artisans constitutes 
one of the most serious obstacles to industrial development. 
Finally, the lack of a capital market, and in general shortage of 
medium and long term capital hamper the establishment of industries. The 
government of Peru has traditionally followed a policy favorable to private 
investment, both domestic and foreign, and has made specific efforts, such 
as the Industrial Promotion Law passed in 1959. This law grants exemptions 
from import duties for industries producing basic materials, and exemptions 
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from all taxes for new industries for a period of three years in Lima-
Callao and for much longer periods in the area east of the Andes. But it 
is clear that the basic shortcomings, mentioned above, have to be simulta­
neously removed before the Industrial Promotion Law or any similar incen­
tive will have fuller effect. In addition, it should be added that the 
phenomenal export growth which took place during the last few years, there­
by enabling imports to be expanded equally fast, has checked the growth of 
domestic industries. 
By far the most important sector of the Peruvian economy, however, 
from the standpoint of employment or social welfare, is agriculture which 
employs approximately half of the labor force. According to INP statistics 
the annual cumulative growth of GDP in agriculture was only about 3.3% over 
the period 1950-1964. Furthermore, while GDP in the production of the ma­
jor export commodities (cotton, sugar, coffee) grew over 77» a year, in 
domestic agriculture it did so only by about 2.4%. Agricultural production 
statistics are very unreliable and, depending on the source, one may get 
very different information, but there seems to be a general consensus that 
the growth in output has been less than the current rate of population 
growth which is about 2.9% a year. This, together with increased incomes, 
is responsible for ever growing food imports. 
Obstacles to increased agricultural production as well as to improved 
marketing and to new land settlements are caused by the following factors 
among others: limitations of cultivable land and underutilization of 
existing lands, the property laws, difficult climatic and hydrological en­
vironment, lack of capital, transport facilities and other services, and a 
low level of education and low productivity. Under these conditions, 
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social tensions are becoming increasingly more pronounced, both in the 
Sierra, where 35% of Peru's labor force generates only 4% of total GDP, 
and in the Coast, where the rising urban population is faced with increasing 
food prices due to a failure of the food production to rise substantially 
in spite of constantly rising internal demand. 
Basic food production is spread all over Peru, and a large part takes 
place on very small farms. The farm producer of food himself receives gen­
erally very low prices, due partly to primitive conditions in marketing. 
This is one of the factors leading to the inelasticity of production, to­
gether with the government practice of intervening to control prices and 
marketing of some essential foodstuffs. On the other hand, the government 
has gradually increased its efforts to bring about structural and institu­
tional changes, forced mainly by mounting social pressures. An example of 
this is the agrarian reform that is presently under way. It is imperative, 
however, that in these programs a balance be achieved between social re­
forms and increases in productivity. First of all, the balance has to be 
assessed between the importance and the desirability of maintaining and in­
creasing export receipts, partly to finance purchases of food, and the need 
of increasing production of food for domestic consumption. Secondly, im­
portant social implications are connected to the issue as to whether pri­
ority should be given to development of agriculture in the Sierra or in the 
Coast. On the basis of the existing agricultural structure and the possi­
bilities of improving agricultural yields, a much more substantial and ef­
ficient increase in output is possible in the Coast rather than the Sierra. 
But on the other hand the uncontrolled migration from the Sierra to the 
Coast is one of the causes of the worsening food shortage in the Coast. 
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The problem, therefore, is not so much one of establishing priorities be­
tween development of the Coast and development of the Sierra agriculture. 
Rather a balance has to be achieved, on the basis of the welfare function 
of the policymakers, between productivity and output increases in the Coast 
and the emphasis on social reform, which is needed in the Sierra. In eco­
nomic terms, it seems reasonable to expect a higher return on investment in 
the Coast, and therefore emphasis on investment in that region seems to be 
warranted; but, in general development terms a gradually more equal income 
distribution should have high priority, and to that effect investment for 
rural social reform is imperative. In trying to achieve this balance be­
tween an optimum allocation of investment on the one hand and a more equal 
distribution of income between the Sierra and the Coast on the other, it 
appears clear that the Sierra can not be ignored. A certain amount of pub­
lic investment in social overhead capital (i.e. education) will have to be 
directed to the Sierra for social and political reasons. 
Activity in the rest of Peru's economy grew reasonably in recent 
years, despite its severe underdevelopment characteristics. The growth in 
these sectors (construction, transport and communications, commerce and 
others) is to a large extent an indication of the beneficial influence a 
strong export development and the resulting availability of foreign ex­
change can have on the rest of the economy. 
Sectors imposing major obstacles to the future development efforts in­
clude primarily transport, housing and education. To obtain fully the 
benefits of a public transport investment program, it is imperative to de­
fine a national coordinated transport policy; up to now this has not been 
done, and the misailocations which may result, such as between railroad 
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versus highway investment, can be very substantial. In spite of the rela­
tively large building program, the housing shortage remains acute and the 
deficit may actually grow. Too much emphasis is being placed on construc­
tion as such, rather than on a selection between various forms or alterna­
tives of construction, based on considerations of cost and efficiency. 
Furthermore, very little coordination exists between housing programs and 
other public services, and finally construction seems to be concentrated 
mainly on middle class housing rather than on the badly needed low class 
urban development. 
Education is probably the most important long term ingredient of so­
cial, cultural and economic development. It is also one of the better 
means of improving income distribution. Peru spends a very large amount of 
its annual budget on education, and yet not much seems to be forthcoming in 
terms of substantial improvements. Given the very low existing level of 
-general education and the limited financial capacity, improvement will at 
best come very slowly. The recent expansion of education seems to have 
occurred at the expense of quality. It would appear that it is in the lat­
ter area that most efforts seem to be warranted. 
Looking at the development picture as a whole, it is evident that 
Peru's growth was very unbalanced. It will be seen below that to a large 
extent, but not completely, the dualism between the export and domestic 
sectors overlaps with the regional differences in development. Very im­
portant industrial development has taken place in Peru, but it has been 
predominantly concentrated in those activities which are producing almost 
exclusively for the export market, rather than for the domestic market. 
One of the most urgent problems of Peru is employment-creation and better 
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income distribution. Since the export-oriented activities are highly 
capital-intensive, they have not contributed very much to the above goals. 
Linkages of the export sector with the rest of the economy have been very 
few. Generally speaking, the export industry relies only on limited 
amounts of processing: for instance, refining of metals or reducing fish 
to fishmeal. Furthermore, a large part of the export receipts leave the 
country as interest and amortization payments on foreign capital (which can 
be found predominantly in export activities) and to import capital goods 
when profits are reinvested. 
The major shortcoming of the export sector in most underdeveloped 
countries is that the effects on the rest of the economy tend to be margin­
al. On the whole with the exception discussed below, the foreign trade 
sector of Peru has not had many backward linkages. However, Peru's booming 
fishmeal sector has been exceptional and is an example of the linkages that 
can be created and lead to development. More than half of the sector is 
financed by Peruvian capital. It is estimated that direct employment is in 
excess of 25,000, while approximately 85,000 people are employed in comple­
mentary industries, mainly shipyards (by now Peru has become also an ex­
porter of fishing boats) and workshops. The potential linkages that can 
still be exploited are many; a new net factory was started in 1964. The 
net industry can undoubtedly be expanded. Likewise, most of the jute bags 
for packing which are still imported could be produced domestically or sub­
stituted maybe by another type of domestically produced bag.^ In addition. 
A recent study (16) indicated that the possibility exists for expand­
ing jute production in the "Selva" (Jungle) region. 
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fishmeal (and fishoil) can increasingly be made available for human con­
sumption. 
One may conclude that Peru's very satisfactory growth rate during the 
last few years was mainly based on a spectacular export development which 
has brought with it a strong balance of payments position and relative 
price stability. These last two factors have been instrumental in creating 
confidence in the future growth possibilities of the Peruvian economy. On 
the other hand, the attainment of very basic goals, such as a more equal 
income distribution and a higher level of employment for the growing labor 
force, is as critical now as ten years ago. The expansion of the economy 
has not resulted in substantial improvement in those more social aspects of 
development. The attainment of these goals will depend largely upon agri­
cultural development together with gradual industrialization. The specific 
role of the export sector in this process will be studied in Chapters IV 
and V. 
2. Geographical problem 
The Andes split Peru into three principal regions: the Coast, occupy­
ing 13.3% of the total area, the Sierra or mountains with 24.9%, and the 
jungle or Selva with 61.8% of the total area of Peru. The actual economic 
importance of these three regions is inversely related to the area they 
occupy. The Coast is by far the most developed with per capita income 
approximately seven times as high as in the Sierra. Cotton and sugar cane 
are very important export crops, and other crops, such as corn or rice, are 
grown quite successfully. Also industrial activity is concentrated in this 
region, mainly in the Lima-Callao area, which also claims the larger part 
of commercial, banking and other services. The sea along the Peruvian 
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coast is very fertile, mainly because of the cool Humboldt current. Pre­
dominant is the anchoveta, which is transformed into fishmeal and has made 
Peru the world's largest fishmeal exporter. Other types of fish, which 
feed themselves on achoveta, are also abundant. Furthermore, the Coast 
contains oilfields and very large iron mines. 
The Sierra, by contrast, is primarily characterized by a poor and 
backwards agriculture, generating only 4% of gross domestic product with 
35% of Peru's labor force. Yet, this area is a very rich part of Peru in 
terms of mineral deposits: copper, lead, zinc, silver and others. Known 
reserves are very large. The income and production effects of these mining 
centers on the rest of the region are, however, very small. 
Finally, the Selva, where economic activity is mostly related to for­
estry and the exploitation of coffee for export, is the least developed of 
all regions. Within the Selva, one can distinguish two parts: the jungle 
itself which is only partially explored and has a tropical climate, and the 
so-called "ceja de Selva" consisting of the eastern slopes of the Andes 
between the Sierra and the Selva with subtropical to tropical climate. 
Peru's geographical structure is thus essentially dualistic: a 
coastal part relatively much more developed and with better economic pros­
pects versus the Sierra and Selva, both very underdeveloped with much less 
optimistic prospects for the Sierra while the future possibilities for the 
Selva are still unclear. 
However, this simple splitting of Peru into two parts, while quite 
meaningful, is incomplete. The importance of this division can be judged 
from Table 4, which has been constructed on the basis of (17). Emigration 
from the Sierra to the Coast is taking place at a fast rhythm, primarily to 
Table 4. Population and population growth, 1940-1964 
Total 
Rural 
Urban 
Costa 
Sierra 
Selva 
Population Population Growth 
in millions % of total annual rate (%) 
1940 1961 1964 1940 
6,681 10,320 11,298 100.0 
4,317 5,426 5,740 64.6 
2,364 4,894 5,558 35.4 
2,061 4,113 4,788 30.8 
4,072 5,328 5,566 61.0 
548 879 944 8.2 
1961 1964 1940-61 1961-64 
100.0 100.0 2.3 2.9 
52.6 50.8 1.2 1.9 
47.4 49.2 5.1 4.5 
39.8 42.4 4.7 5.5 
51.7 49.2 1.5 1.4 
8.5 8.4 2.7 2.5 
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the Lima-Callao area. Higher wages and more opportunities, the availabil­
ity of more advanced social services, and the prospects of a better life in 
or close by the cities compared to the hardships of the Sierra, are all 
causes of the urbanization which is so characteristic of present times. 
Urbanization, however, such as is now taking place in Peru, has many nega­
tive aspects; industrialization is not at all developing at the same speed 
and neither is the necessarily concomitant investment in housing, streets, 
utilities, schools, etc. As a result, the area around Lima is growing ever 
mora crowded, unemployment is high, housing is in bad shortage, and food 
prices are going up; the suburbs or "barriadas", where the majority of 
those arriving from the mountains stay, are essentially a concentration of 
poverty. This is why a simple division of Peru into Coast versus Sierra is 
incomplete; within the coastal area and within Lima, extremes of wealth and 
poverty exist side by side. Also in the Sierra, not all is backward and 
underdeveloped; the mining centers are small enclaves of large scale and 
highly capitalistic undertakings. 
Generally speaking, Peru's diversified geography exhibits a richness 
in several resources which is much above what most other countries can 
account for. The Sierra contains an immense mineral wealth; the water of 
the Mantaro river is one of the greatest sources of power in the world, the 
sea along the Peruvian coast is extremely fertile, the coastal climate is 
well fitted for sugar and cotton growing, and the still little explored 
Selva may be the source" of many opportunities for forest product indus­
tries. 
On the other hand, there are very serious limitations to Peru's geo­
graphy. The cost of transportation and communication from one region to 
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another is high and will probably always be. Road construction over the 
mountains and into the jungle is very expensive, and the resulting lack of 
communications between the coast and the rest of the country has been one 
of the main causes of the very unbalanced development that has taken place. 
Also, agricultural development in the coast is made more difficult because 
of the high cost of irrigation. However, while the geographical picture of 
Peru presents many weaknesses, it is doubtful whether the latter were the 
most important liabilities to more balanced regional development; rather, 
the traditionalism, which is so characteristic of both labor and capital in 
Peru, may have been a much more important factor in impeding rapid economic 
changes and regional integration. These, however, are shortcomings that 
can be changed. On balance, taking into account the substantial natural 
resource wealth of the country, possibilities for development, also region­
ally, are promising. 
3. Social conditions 
The .existing social disequilibrium in Peru is a reflection of both the 
economic and geographical imbalances which were explained above and of the 
traditional very uneven distribution of income and wealth. Typical for the 
latter is, for instance, the property regime of agricultural land; in 1961 
about 0.5% of the total number of land holdings accounted for 76% of the 
total agricultural area, while 92% of the land holdings accounted for about 
8% of the area. Agrarian reform is meant primarily to bring about improve­
ments in this structure-(18). 
Peru's uneven income distribution appears, first of all, regionally. 
The average income in the coastal area is much higher than in the Sierra. 
According to the INP, per capita production in the Coast is almost seven 
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times as high as in the Sierra. Average calorie and protein intake in Peru 
is one of the lowest of the world: the problem being much more pronounced 
in the Sierra than in the Coast. Daily per capita requirements of calories 
and proteins are, according to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and for a climate such as Peru's, 2,300 calories and 80 
grams of protein. Based on a study by the Institute of Nutrition, the 
corresponding Peruvian averages are 2,015 calories and 51 grams of protein. 
However, on a regional basis, the averages are 2,246 and 61 for the Coast, 
1,780 and 47 for the Sierra and 2,003 and 41 for the Selva (19, p. 41). 
Housing in the Sierra is, generally speaking, primitive, and education 
lags far behind even the most basic needs. The very low standard of living 
of the Sierra farmer and his lack of education are, among others, important 
causes of his low productivity which in turn helps determine his standard 
of living. Average income is low and also badly distributed. This is due 
mainly to the land tenure system and to the exploitation to which the farm­
ers are subjected by the intermediaries in selling the product. However, 
the mining towns are substantially better off than the rest. 
The Coast, by contrast, has a much higher average income which is, 
however, extremely unevenly distributed. In the Lima area, luxury residen­
tial parts, such as the suburbs of San Isidro and Miraflores, exist side by 
side with the barriadas or low class suburbs. The high rate of migration 
from the mountains to the coast is, in fact, worsening this situation. The 
barriadas, which in spite of their planned suburban layout have all the 
appearances of slums, are expanding rapidly and unemployment is high be­
cause industrialization is not taking place at a fast enough rate. As a 
result, social pressure is no longer only confined to the Sierra, but ten­
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sions are mounting also in the Coast. 
Preliminary information on national income distribution in Peru for 
the year 1961 indicates the following: 15.4% of the population receives 
only 1.6% of the national income; 53.7% of the population receives 16.8% of 
income; and 97.5% of the population receives 75% of the national income. 
There are virtually no reasons to believe that income distribution has im­
proved in Peru over the last fifteen years; on the contrary, the living 
standard in the Sierra shows little amelioration, and the fast rise in 
national income accrued probably primarily to the upper and middle class 
people in the cities. The tremendous social disequilibrium which charac­
terizes Peru has to be gradually removed if economic and industrial devel­
opment is to be achieved. The rigid social structure seriously limits the 
possibilities of the poor people to advance in society, while at the same 
time the richer people receive many rewards without effort or capability. 
The result is an overall lack of motivation which is a very important psy­
chological impediment to economic progress. 
4. International relations 
It was seen earlier that the strength of Peru's economy is based 
largely upon its export sector. Both exports and imports of goods and 
services as a percentage of gross domestic product have gone up over the 
last fifteen years and by 1964 constituted about one fourth of the total 
each. The export sector is relatively well diversified and has become more 
so over time. Up to 1959, agricultural products (cotton, sugar, coffee, 
wool) constituted about half of total exports, the other half being com­
posed mainly of mining products (copper, lead, zinc, silver, iron) and fish 
products (which had reached already 10% of total exports by 1959). From 
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1960 on, however, both mining products and fishmeal became much more im­
portant, and the share of agricultural products dropped to a low of about 
30% in 1964, The strength through diversification of Peru's export sector 
could be witnessed, for instance, in the year 1965 during which agricultur­
al exports performed very badly, but mining exports were at unequalled 
heights. One result of this diversification has been that Peru, for the 
last few years, has shown a balance of payments position which has been 
unusually strong for an underdeveloped economy. 
Even though Peru's mix of export products has expanded spectacularly 
and has given proof of its strength, it would be a mistake to underestimate 
some important weaknesses. First of all, its agricultural products, as is 
well known, suffer from very slowly expanding world export markets. By 
contrast, mining exports are growing very dynamically. Yet, important 
price and volume fluctuations due to international developments (such as 
the U.S. war effort in Viet Nam which lies at the basis of the present high 
value of mineral exports) are a real setback. Finally, exports of fishmeal 
and fishoil which have grown tremendously and which have excellent market 
prospects, may have reached the upper supply limit. Furthermore, of great­
er importance than these (more or less speculative) considerations, is the 
fact that the growth of exports has set off an equally high rate of growth 
of imports. Peru's rise in income was translated in an increased demand 
for food and food imports. Peru's capital goods producing industry is 
still operating at a very minor scale and, consequently, capital goods im­
ports are very high. Finally, the unequal income distribution is another 
determinant of a high volume of imports; the higher income group prefers 
imported consumer goods over the domestic products, mainly because of 
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better quality, and also has a high propensity to buy imported luxury 
goods. 
On balance Peru's economy depends strongly, not only on exports, but 
also on imports. A major element in the very limited rate of inflation 
that characterizes the country has been the fact that there was always 
sufficient foreign exchange available to make up for shortages of vital 
goods (such as food) through imports. In a way, the tremendous export 
growth has been a factor in restraining the development of food production 
and of industry producing for the domestic market. Indeed, funds were al­
ways available to satisfy the various needs through imports. In general, 
the economy is very dependent on international developments, and a slowing 
down in the growth rate of its exports would create high economic and fi­
nancial difficulties. 
During the period 1945-48 Peru lived under a system of exchange con­
trol, but since 1949 it has adopted a free exchange system with flexible 
rates. The central bank has intervened in the exchange market only to 
smooth out seasonal fluctuations (for instance as a rule exports are down 
in the first trimester of the year); whenever a structural balance of pay­
ments problem appeared, Peru has traditionally let the exchange rate find 
its new equilibrium level. (An exception took place in 1958 when the ex­
change rate was kept at an artificial level for too long, with the result­
ing loss of all reserves.) This policy, together with Peru's export per­
formance and balance of payments position, has earned the country a good 
reputation internationally, and the climate for foreign investment, both 
private and public, has in general been quite satisfactory during the last 
fifteen years. The bulk of foreign direct investment has been in export 
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production. The explanation is quite simple; private investment is at­
tracted, above all, by the existence of a market. Adequate markets do 
exist for Peru's export products, but the same cannot be said for the ma­
jority of products for^domestic consumption. The Peruvian government real­
izes the importance of creating and maintaining business confidence, and 
its overall policy has been to stimulate private investment, foreign as 
well as domestic, through important incentives. There have not been any 
cases of expropriation so far. 
B. The Structure of Foreign Trade (1950-1964) 
1. Major exports, changes in prices, volumes and values 
Peru is basically an exporter of primary products. In contrast to 
most other Latin American countries, however, its exports are very diversi­
fied. In 1964, the twelve most important items constituted 94% of the 
total; 40% of the dollar value of total exports consisted of minerals 
(copper, silver, lead, zinc, iron, petroleum), 30% of agricultural products 
(cotton, sugar, coffee and wool) and 24% of fish products (fishmeal and 
fishoil). Four products - fishmeal, copper, cotton and sugar - made up 60% 
of total exports. 
The major characteristic of Peru's export sector over the period 1950-
64 has been its tremendous growth. Not only the traditional products such 
as cotton, sugar and metals have expanded, but the inclusion of new prod­
ucts, namely coffee, iron ore and fishmeal and the expansion of copper 
through the opening up of a new mine, led to spectacular development of 
exports. From 1945 to 1948, Peru's foreign trade had been controlled. In 
1949-50 very important changes took place in commercial and monetary 
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policy: liberal commercial policy was initiated, the value of the sol was 
halved, and reforms were introduced in the mining legislation. These mea­
sures were beneficial particularly to mineral exports; the mining secLor 
recovered and new foreign capital inflow occured into the exploitation of 
iron ore, the exports of which were started in 1953, and into the exploita­
tion of the Toquepala copper mines which started operating in 1960. 
During the period 1950-64 the volume of exports increased continuously 
with the exception of one year (1963), but the rate of increase accelerated 
tremendously after 1959. Tables 5 through 13 have been constructed on the 
basis of (20 and 21). Before 1959 agricultural exports were predominant 
(Table 5); total exports in constant 1960 soles grew from 1950 to 1959 at 
an annual cumulative rate of 7.3%. From 1959 to 1964 this growth rate, 
however, was much higher (10.8%), with mineral and fish exports having tak­
en the lead. In one year alone (1960) exports in volume were 30% above 
1959 due to tremendous increases in copper, fishmeal, and iron exports. 
Over the whole period (1950-64) exports in volume grew at the very high 
annual cumulative rate of 8.5%. 
In current dollar terms, Peru's exports grew at an annual cumulative 
rate of 9.2% from 1950 to 1964, but at only 5.5% from 1950 to 1959 versus 
16.3% from 1959 to 1964. In fact, in 1958-59 because of the world reces­
sion, prices were at their lowest of the whole period (Table 6). Export 
prices were very high in 1951 (Korea), but then dropped considerably in 
1952-53. The volume of exports increased, however, and the total decline 
in export value was kept within limits, 14% in two years. After that, 
prices rose gradually up to 1957. During the depression in 1958-59 prices 
again dropped substantially, but the volume of exports kept on increasing 
Table 5. Composition of exports for selected years (constant 1960 values) 
1950 1955 1959 1960 1963 1964 
Agric. products 53.0 49.1 
Fish products 2.6 3.9 
Mining products 42.3 44.4 
Rest 2.1 2.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
47.8 35.7 36.4 30.7 
10.2 12.1 19.8 23.3 
38.8 49.4 42.0 44.7 
3.2 2.8 1.8 1.3 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Table 6. Value-, volume-, and price-indices of exports and imports 
(Based on dollar values 1950 = 100) 
EXPORTS IMPORTS 
Year 
Value Volume Price Value Volume Price 
1950 100. 0 100.0 100. 0 100. 0 100.0 100. 0 
1951 128. 6 100.4 128. 1 149. 2 136.0 109. 7 
1952 121. ,5 113.0 107. 5 163. ,9 143.0 114. ,6 
1953 113. ,2 123.2 91. 9 166. ,8 155.6 107. ,2 
1954 127. ,1 134.9 94. ,2 142. ,2 133.8 106, .3 
1955 139, .3 143.2 97. 3 170. 6 155.1 110, .0 
1956 160 ,2 157.2 101, ,9 218. 8 201.5 108. ,6 
1957 166 .2 161.8 102. ,7 255. ,8 227.0 112. 7 
1958 146 .7 166.0 88, ,4 217, .9 187.2 116, ,4 
1959 162 .4 188.0 86 ,4 180 .3 152.5 118, .2 
1960 223 .8 244.3 91, .6 212 .3 174.9 121, ,4 
1961 256 .5 284.7 90, .1 266 .7 218.4 122, .1 
1962 279 .3 302.3 92 .4 304 .3 244.4 124, .5 
1963 279 .9 287.7 97 .3 315 .0 256.7 122 .7 
1964 345 .1 313.2 110 .2 325 .0 274.7 118 .3 
Table 7. Basic export products—current values (million dollars) 
Year Sugar Coffee Cotton Wool 
Fish-
meal 
Fish-
oil 
Iron 
ore Copper Lead Zinc 
Sil­
ver 
Crude 
Petrol­
eum 
Other TOTAL 
1950 29.7 1.0 67.9 7.9 0.3 _ _ 10..2 12.3 10.5 8.2 7.3 37.9 193.3 
1951 34.2 2.4 85.6 13.8 0.5 - - 15.3 23.6 15.1 10.4 4.4 43.2 248.5 
1952 32.8 2.8 79.3 7.6 0.8 - - 17.1 23.9 15.0 12.4 4.6 38.5 234.8 
1953 34.6 5.3 65.1 8.7 1.0 0.4 6.4 17.4 22.5 7.6 11.7 4.9 33.2 219.0 
1954 32.7 7.1 64.8 8.5 1.2 0.7 12.9 20.0 23.7 9.1 14.4 5.0 45.7 245.7 
1955 36.9 8.0 68.1 5.9 2.0 0.7 8.0 29.3 26.2 13.8 16.2 5.0 49.3 269.4 
1956 32.8 8.9 85.7 7.8 3.5 1.0 14.8 33.6 31.3 14.1 17.7 5.7 52.8 309.8 
1957 49.6 13.0 68.0 9.8 7.1 1.4 23.5 24.5 29.3 15.1 17.9 5.6 56.6 321.4 
1958 33.9 15.8 75.4 6.1 11.6 1.3 16.4 22.0 24.4 11.3 18.9 6.1 40.4 283.6 
1959 35.9 15.6 69.3 9.0 31.3 2.9 19.4 24.9 21.1 14.2 20.4 5.8 44.1 313.9 
1960 47.5 18.6 73.2 7.1 38.8 5.3 32.7 94.7 21.7 16.7 24.2 6.4 45.6 432.4 
1961 63.9 22.8 79.6 7.4 49.6 12.2 36.8 105.1 22.3 19.1 27.6 6.4 43.1 495.9 
1962 53.8 24.2 96.9 8.9 99.9 12.9 32.7 92.4 16.3 15.8 33.0 6.8 46.3 539.8 
1963 63.1 25.6 91.0 11.7 104,5 9.4 36.4 87.3 16.4 15.8 35.8 6.5 37.4 541.0 
1964 63.4 37.0 91.0 11.6 143.4 14.7 38.9 103.0 33.0 39.1 45.2 7.0 39.3 666.7 
Table 8. Ba&ic export products (composition in % of total) 
Year Sugar Coffee Cotton Wool 
Fish-
meal 
Fish 
oil 
Iron 
ore Copper Lead Zinc 
Sil­
ver 
Crude 
Petrol­
eum 
Other TOTAL 
1950 15.4 0.5 35.1 4.1 0.1 — _ 5,3 6.3 5.4 4.3 3.8 19.6 100.0 
1951 13.8 1.0 34.4 5.6 0.2 - - 6.1 9.5 6.1 4.2 1.8 17.4 100.0 
1952 14.0 1.2 33.8 3.2 0.3 - - 7.3 10.2 6.4 5.3 2.0 16.4 100.0 
1953 15.8 2.4 29.8 4.0 0.4 0.2 2.9 8.0 10.3 3.5 5.3 • 2.2 15.2 100.0 
1954 13.3 2.9 26.4 3.5 0.5 0.3 5.3 8.1 9.6 3.7 5.9 2.0 18.6 100.0 
1955 13.7 3.0 25.3 2.2 0.7 0.3 3.0 10.9 9.7 5.1 6.0 1.9 18.3 100.0 
1956 10.6 2.9 27.7 2,5 1.1 0.3 4.8 10.9 10.1 4.6 5.7 1.8 17.1 100.0 
1957 15.4 4.1 21.2 3.0 2.2 0.4 7.3 7.6 9.1 4.7 5.6 2.4 17.0 100.0 
1958 12,0 5.6 26o6 2,1 4.1 0.5 5.8 7.8 8.6 4.0 6.7 2.2 14.2 100.0 
1959 11.4 5.0 22.1 2,9 10.0 0.9 6.2 7.9 6.7 4.5 6.5 1.9 14.1 100.0 
1960 11.0 4.3 16.9 1,6 9.0 1.2 7.6 21.9 5.0 3.9 5.6 1.5 10.5 100.0 
1961 12.9 4.6 16.1 1.5 10.0 2.5 7.4 21.2 4.5 3.8 5.6 1.3 8.7 100.0 
1962 10.0 4.5 17.9 1.6 18.5 2.4 6.1 17.1 3.0 2.9 6.1 1.3 8.6 100.0 
1963 11.7 4.7 16.8 2.2 19.3 1.7 6.7 16.1 3.0 2.9 6.6 1.2 6.9 100.0 
1964 9.5 5.5 13.7 1,7 21.5 2.2 5.8 15.5 4.9 5.9 6.8 1.0 5.9 100.0 
Table 9a. Volume- and price-index ($ price) of selected exports (1963 = 100) 
Cotton Sugar Coffee Wool Fishmeal Fishoil 
Year Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price 
1950 58.7 127.2 58.8 79.9 2.6 157.7 84.4 80.5 0.4 75.6 _ _ 
1951 49.7 189.0 53.4 101.4 5.5 169.9 62.5 189.2 0.6 77.0 - -
1952 65.9 132.1 57.7 89.9 6.4 171.9 65.5 99.2 0.9 88.9 - -
1953 71.4 . 100.3 82.7 66.3 LI.7 178.0 71.3 104.2 1.0 89.6 5.6 84.9 
1954 67.1 106.1 85.5 60.6 11.4 242.6 66.5 109.6 1.4 82.5 7.8 98.5 
1955 68.0 110.0 97.8 59.7 17.0 184.7 52.9 95.7 1.8 105.6 7.2 106.0 
1956 87.3 107.7 86.7 59.9 17.6 198.4 68.5 97.6 2.7 126.5 7.5 135.5 
1957 64.9 115.2 100.4 78.2 27.6 184.4 78.2 107.0 5.9 114.5 9.7 157.2 
1958 85.6 96.7 83.0 64.7 43.2 142.6 62.0 83.6 10.2 108.9 12.2 112.2 
1959 91.4 83.3 96.7 58.8 49.6 123.0 93.0 82.9 26.7 112.0 27.3 112.5 
1960 79.5 101.2 106.3 70.7 65.9 110.1 62.7 96.4 48.8 76.0 44.3 127.8 
1961 90.8 96.4 112.3 90.1 84.9 104.9 67.6 93.9 68.2 69.5 84.4 153.3 
1962 110.5 96.3 96.5 88.3 93.4 101.3 81.1 93.7 101.7 94.0 101.7 134.2 
1963 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1964 92.6 108.0 85.7 117.3 105.5 137.2 85.4 116.0 137.4 99.9 82.4 189.5 
Table 9b. Volume- and price-index ($ price) of selected exports (1963 = 100) 
Copper Zinc Lead S ilver Iron ore Oil 
Year Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price Volume Price 
1950 16.6 70.3 28.3 234.7 50.9 147.1 40.5 56.8 - - 94.4 119.9 
1951 20.0 87.6 35.9 266.5 69.1 208.4 42.5 68.6 - - 85.8 79.5 
1952 18.9 103.3 41.4 229.6 74.4 195.9 51.2 67.4 - - 86.5 81.7 
1953 18.7 • 107.1 42.6 113.0 90.6 151.7 49.9 65.5 15.5 113.2 80.6 93.4 
1954 22.0 104.1 53.8 106.4 90.6 159.3 60.7 66.2 32.7 108.6 77.9 99.0 
1955 24.6 136.8 68.3 127.9 90.9 175.4 64.5 70.1 28.5 77.1 81.0 95.4 
1956 25.8 149.5 57.4 155.7 101.1 188.6 66.3 74.5 45.5 89.4 93.1 94.1 
1957 29.7 94.6 75.5 126.0 101.0 176.7 66.0 75.8 62.2 103.6 109.2 107.4 
1958 31.9 79.0 73.6 96.9 113.5 131.0 81.8 64.6 42.6 105.9 83.1 113.8 
1959 28 .8  99 .3  77.9 114.8 96.1 134.1 83 .5  68.1 56.3 94.5 79.9 112.1 
1960 102.5 105.8 77.3 136.6 99 .0  133.4 92.9 72.7 87.3 102.8 89.2 110.9 
1961 122.2 98.5 99.8 120.7 121.0 112.3 104.9 73.4 94.5 107.0 88.5 111.5 
1962 105.5 100.3 96.9 103.2 115.2 86.0 109.5 84.2 88.0 101.9 95.5 109.9 
1963 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1964 109.1 108.2 160.1 154.4 144.5 139.1 118.8 106.4 103.6 102.9 107.1 100.3 
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and again the decline in export value was limited. Clearly, even though 
very large price fluctuations occurred during the period 1950-59 and fur­
thermore prices were at a substantially lower level at the end than at the 
beginning of the period, the most important characteristic of export devel­
opment was the steady increase in volume. This aspect became much more 
pronounced after 1959. Export volume climbed spectacularly up to 1962, 
declined in 1963 and was up again in 1964. 
As can be seen from Table 8, the participation of agricultural prod­
ucts in the total dollar value of exports shows a declining trend over the 
period in consideration. (With the exception of coffee, which started at 
an insignificant level in 1950 and then grew remarkably.) Particularly 
after 1959 when both fishmeal and metals expanded rapidly, did the impor­
tance of agricultural products drop. Cotton and sugar, which were in 1950 
respectively the first and second most important foreign exchange earners 
constituting together half of total exports, had by 1964 dropped to respec­
tively the third and fourth place, preceded by fishmeal and copper. Table 
10 gives the yearly cumulative growth rates of the volume of Peru's major 
export products from 1950 to 1964. 
The volume of cotton exports grew 3.3% per year and sugar exports 
2.7%. While these growth rates may be considered to have been satisfac­
tory, they were very small compared with the phenomenal development of fish 
products and of the major minerals, leading to the relative decline in im­
portance of agricultural products. Cotton occupies a very important place 
in Peru's economy. About 45% of the cultivated area of the coast is de­
voted to cotton, while 170,000 people, or a little more than 5% of the la­
bor force, are engaged in this activity. About 70% of the crop is of 
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Table 10. Yearly cumulative rates of growth of volume of major exports 
(1950-1964) 
Rate Rate 
of of 
Product growth Product growth 
(%) (%) 
Cotton 3.3 Copper 14.4 
Sugar 2.7 Zinc 13.2 
Coffee 30.0 Lead 7.7 
Wool 0.1 Silver 8.0 
Fishmeal 53.0 Iron Ore® 18.9 
Fishoil^ 28.0 Oil 0.9 
^Period 1953-64. 
medium length (Tanguis), while the rest is of extra large variety (Pima, 
Karnak). Prices from 1950 to 1964 have on the average followed a downward 
trend. Peruvian cotton is of generally good quality. Sugar has always 
been important to the economy. It occupies about 3.5% of the cultivated 
area, and the efficiency of production is among the highest of the world. 
Peruvian wool exports have performed most poorly with a yearly growth in 
volume of 0.1%. The small but satisfactory development of sugar and cotton 
exports has been determined primarily by world demand conditions; the major 
cause of the stagnation of wool exports on the other hand has been internal 
supply problems. Production is backward, under capitalized and ineffi­
cient. In contrast to the other agricultural exports, coffee, starting 
from a very low level in 1950, has been characterized by a remarkable 
growth in volume (30% yearly) and in 1964 was responsible for 5.5% of 
Peru's export earnings. Peru produces a very acceptable blend of coffee. 
Prices, however, fluctuate very much and have had a downward trend. 
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Presently efforts are under way to stabilize prices internationally. 
By far the fastest growing Peruvian export product over the period 
1950-64 has been fishmeal; export volume grew 53% per year, and its byprod­
uct fishoil grew 28% per year. Since 1962, fishmeal has become the largest 
foreign exchange earner. The extraordinary development of this sector, 
which has made Peru the world's leading fishmeal producer, can be safely 
called the single most important event in Peru's economic history of the 
last few years. Presently more than 100,000 people are employed, directly 
or indirectly (shipyards, workshops), in this activity, and substantial ur­
ban developments are taking place in the major fishing harbors. The very 
fast and uncontrolled growth has, however, led to some very serious diffi­
culties; on the one hand, overinvestment and poor financing have led to a 
precarious financial situation for many firms, while on the other hand, re­
cent biological research maintains that the total stock of anchoveta (for 
fishmeal) is smaller than originally thought and that, furthermore, the 
limit has been reached. The restraint to expansion would, in other words, 
be conditioned by the supply of the resource. Demand for fishmeal, on the 
contrary, seems to be very strong and may become much more intense yet if 
the present efforts to adapt and utilize fishmeal for human consumption 
turn out to be successful. 
Besides fish and agricultural products, Peru exports minerals which in 
1964 constituted 40% of the total dollar earnings of export products. 
Metallic minerals have all expanded very rapidly over the period in consid­
eration; combustibles exports, on the other hand, have been practically at 
the same level from 1950 to 1964. (Yearly growth rate of volume: 0.9%.) 
The very slow expansion of petroleum production has been due to a large 
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extent to a legal conflict between the Peruvian government and the major 
petroleum company in Peru (International Petroleum Company). At the same 
time domestic demand is growing, and Peru which used to be a net exporter 
of petroleum and petroleum products has by now become a net importer. 
Metal exports, by contrast, have grown very dynamically, both because 
world demand conditions have been favorable and because Peru, besides being 
abundantly endowed with resources, has been a very efficient producer. The 
volume of copper exports, which more than tripled between 1959 and 1960, 
expanded at a yearly rate of 14.4% over the period 1950-64; exports of zinc 
grew at 13.2% per year, silver at 8% and lead at 7.7%. The jump in copper 
exports in 1960 was due to the initiation of exports by the Southern Peru 
Company in Toquepala, which is the largest producer in Peru, followed by 
Cerro de Pasco. The major characteristics of price developments are the 
decline during the depression 1958-59, and the recovery of prices in 1964. 
The volume of iron ore exports, which were started in 1953 by the 
Marcona Mining Company, grew at an annual rate of 18.9% up to 1964. Peru 
has immense iron ore reserves but is geographically badly located with re­
spect to the major markets, as its iron ore has to go through the Panama 
Canal. Competition from Australia (closer to Japan), Venezuela, Sweden and 
Africa (closer to Europe) is strong. At the same time important new re­
serves have been discovered in Australia, Canada. Africa and other coun­
tries. However, the efficient exploitation by the Marcona Mining Company 
has made Peru quite competitive, and iron ore exports amounted to almost 6% 
of Peru's merchandise exports in 1964. In the mining sector, in general, 
foreign capital is predominant. The total employed labor force amounted to 
only 73,000 in 1963 (see Chapter IV). The major function of this sector 
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during the period considered has been as a foreign exchange earner. 
It was mentioned earlier that Peru's exports are relatively well di­
versified by products and have become more so over time. The same can be 
said about its exports by markets. Table 12 shows that in 1964 the U.S. 
bought 31% of Peru's exports; other important markets are West Germany with 
12%, Japan 9%, Netherlands 9%, the United Kingdom (U.K.) 7.5%, Belgium 5.6% 
and Chile 4.3%. As shown in Table 11, the following major developments 
have taken place between 1950 and 1964. The dependence on the U.S. market 
has fluctuated somewhat but has not shown any important changes (about one 
third of the exports). Exports to the Latin American Free Trade Associa­
tion (LAFTA) countries (of which Peru is a member) have declined in rela­
tive importance from 26.4% in 1950 to 9.7% in 1964, while the percent of 
exports to the European Economic Community (EEC) has doubled over the same 
period, reaching one third of total exports in 1964. 
Finally, dependence on other European markets (mainly the U.K.) has 
diminished, and dependence on Asia (mainly Japan) has more than doubled up 
to 10.5% in 1964. Table 13 illustrates these relative changes in impor­
tance of the different markets. Both the LAFTA countries and the United 
Kingdom buy relatively less fishmeal and metallic minerals which have ex­
panded most rapidly over the period considered, and buy relatively more 
agricultural products and fuels, which have expanded very slowly. On the 
other hand, Japan buys very large amounts of metallic minerals, and the EEC 
is Peru's most important market for fishmeal. 
The U.S. is Peru's principal market for copper, lead, sugar and coffee 
and is the second largest buyer of Peru's fishmeal, silver and wool. The 
EEC is Peru's largest market for fishmeal and fishoil, zinc, silver, cotton 
Table 11. Composition of exports by major destination, imports by major origin, for selected years, 
(percent of total) 
U.S. and Canada 
LAFTA 
Other America 
E.E.C. 
Other Europe 
Asia 
Rest 
World 
EXPORTS 
1950 1955 1960 1964 
27.9 36.1 36.5 31.7 
26.4 18.4 7.7 9.7 
5.3 5.7 7.9 1.3 
15.0 20.5 30.9 32.9 
19.9 14.0 10.1 13.5 
4.9 4.4 6.4 10.5 
0.6 0.9 0.5 0.4 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
IMPORTS 
1950 1955 1960 1964 
55.1 52.2 47.1 44.2 
7.9 7.7 7.3 10.1 
0.3 2.0 2.3 2.3 
9.3 18.2 22.4 21.4 
22.5 15.9 14.2 13.7 
1.9 3.8 5.8 7.3 
3.0 0.2 0.9 1.0 
100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  
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Table 12. Composition of exports by major destination, imports by major 
origin, for major countries 
(1964 - percentages) 
Exports Imports 
United States 31.0 40.7 
West Germany 12.2 12.4 
Japan 9.1 5.6 
Netherlands 8.9 2.8 
United Kingdom 7.5 6.5 
Belgium 5.6 1.4 
Chile 4.3 0.9 
Italy 3.5 2.7 
France 2.7 2.2 
Argentina 2.1 7.2 
Canada 0.7 3.5 
Switzerland 0.3 2.8 
Rest 12.1 1,1.3 
World 100.0 100.0 
Table 13. Exports of principal goods, and total exports, by destination 
(1964: percent of total value) 
U.S. E.E.C. Japan U.K. LAFTA Other Total 
Cotton 3.3 37.2 8.0 9.6 23.5 18.4 100.0 
Sugar 43.7 12.4 - 16.4 27.4 0.1 100,0 
Coffee 79.4 12.3 - 0.2 0 .2  7 .9  100.0 
Wool 32.7 43.9 1.3 20.1 0.9 1.1 100.0 
Fishmeal 22.7 45.8 6.5 5.5 3.0 16.5 100.0 
Fishoil 3.5 67.7 - 1.4 10.2 17 .2  100.0 
Copper 57.7 29.1 4.7 5.9 1.6 1.0 100.0 
Zinc 20.0 24.6 21.3 7.4 16.6 10.1 100.0 
Lead 34.0 27.2 18.5 1.1 3.5 15.7 100.0 
Silver 29.4 50.1 9.4 4.6 2.8 3.7 100.0 
Iron ore 11.4 34.3 48.8 1.6 3.9 - 100.0 
Oil - - 8 .8  58.3 32.9 - 100.0 
Total exports 31.0 32.9 9.1 7.5 9.7 9 .8  100.0 
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and wool and the second most important market for copper, lead, iron ore 
and coffee. Japan is the major buyer of iron ore (almost 50%) and buys 
also important quantities of zinc and lead. The U.K. buys most of Peru's 
petroleum exports and the LAFTA countries are the second largest market for 
cotton, sugar, fishoil and petroleum. Within the EEC the order of impor­
tance of the different markets for Peru's products is the following: West 
Germany, Netherlands. Belgium, Italy and France. The most important mar­
kets in LAFTA are Chile, Argentina and Brazil. 
In conclusion, it is essential to note that the U.S., Canada, Europe 
and Japan (roughly speaking, the developed world) bought in 1964 87.2% of 
Peru's exports; Peru's present export mix has, by nature, its major market 
in the industrial countries, and the immediate advantages to be gained from 
the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association are, consequently, 
very small. 
2. Major imports, changes in prices, volumes and values 
From 1950 to 1964 Peru's imports have grown almost as rapidly as its 
exports. As opposed to export development, however, imports have shown a 
relatively irregular evolution over the period considered. The growth of 
imports has been possible primarily because of the growth in exports, which 
in Peru is the major determinant of income. The fluctuations which have 
appeared in the development of imports have been due to such short term 
factors as foreign capital inflows and devaluations of the currency. While 
exports from 1950 to 1964 in current dollar terms grew at an annual cumula­
tive rate of 9.2%, imports did so at a slightly lower rate, 8.8%. After 
the trade restriction period of the late forties, imports climbed 36% in 
volume from 1950 to 1951, (Table 6); at the same time import prices rose 
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and the value of imports increased 49%. Further increases in total im­
ports, both in value and volume, took place in 1952 and 1953. During these 
two years, net long term capital inflow was particularly high. In 1954 
capital inflow was substantially lower and in the meantime the currency had 
been devalued. Imports dropped significantly. 
In 1955 imports were up again and grew remarkably in 1956-57. Imports 
of capital goods were particularly high because of substantial foreign cap­
ital inflow for the Toquepala copper mines. By the end of 1957, however, 
Peru's gold and foreign exchange reserves had reached a very low level, and 
in an effort to correct this situation a series of devaluations took place 
throughout 1958 and up to the middle of 1959, when the sol was valued at 29 
to a dollar. As a result, imports dropped notably in 1958 and 1959. Dur­
ing 1959 the value of Peru's exports recovered after the world recession, 
the reserve position of the Central Bank improved, and in the second part 
of the year the currency was revalued to gradually reach its equilibrium 
level of 26.82 in 1962, level at which it stayed until the present. Conse­
quently in 1960, imports were up again and grew at a very high rate of 
12.5% per year from 1959 to 1964, both in value and in volume; the import 
price index was at the same level at the end as at the beginning of the 
period. Over the whole period 1950-64, imports grew at an annual cumula­
tive rate of 8.8% in current dollars, 7.5% in volume (1960 soles); import 
prices showed a slight upward tendency with no important fluctuations. 
The information on imports contained in Tables 14 through 17 is based 
on (20). The composition of imports in current dollars (Table 15) has 
changed little from 1950 to 1964. On the average 24% of the total were im­
ports of consumption goods, 29% imports of raw materials and 43% imports of 
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capital goods; the remainder were imports of fuels and some other unclassi­
fied items. Among the more important variations that took place in this 
composition during the period in consideration, the following could be men­
tioned. After the restriction period of the late forties, imports of con­
sumption goods were high in 1950-51 while capital goods imports were some­
what lower. The latter increased., however, in 1952 and were high in 1953, 
mainly because of substantial foreign capital inflow. Again in 1956-58 
foreign capital inflow (Toquepala) was high, and the proportion of capital 
goods in total imports was raised to about 47%. Towards the end of the 
period, in 1963 and particularly in 1964, imports of consumption goods in­
creased noticeably at the expense of a smaller percentage of capital goods 
imports. 
From Tables 16 and 17, containing respectively volume and price in­
dices for the different groups of imported goods, the following conclusions 
can be derived. While total imports in 1960 prices increased, from 1950 to 
1964, at an annual cumulative rate of 7.5%, consumption goods grew at the 
slightly higher rate of 7.8% and raw materials imports at a higher rate 
yet, 8.7%; capital goods iniports by contrast increased only 6.5% per year. 
Comparing these volume developments with the very small differences from 
1950 to 1964 in the composition of imports in value terms (Table 15), and 
on the basis of the indices of Table 17, it can be concluded that, while 
import prices of consumption goods and raw materials increased very little 
from 1950 to 1964, imports of capital goods have become much more expen­
sive. 
Peru's imports by country of origin are less diversified than its ex­
ports. On the basis of Table 11 it can be concluded, however, that from 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
14. Imports--current values (thousands of dollars) 
Total Consumption goods Fuels Raw Materials 
Sub Non­ Durable Sub Metallic Non-
Total durable Total Metallic 
175,629 48,011 34,403 13,608 3,514 53,113 6,214 46,899 
261,917 72,294 46,264 26,030 6,339 74,626 11,272 63,354 
287,549 71,903 49,688 22,215 4,635 84,771 11,865 72,906 
292,793 66,902 44,020 22,882 4,801 81,475 12,150 69,325 
249,699 61,094 44,848 16,246 6,452 73,798 12,181 61,617 
299,516 78,414 51,433 26,981 9,293 89,983 14,458 75,525 
384,1955 90,017 54,364 35,654 11,992 96,914 19,389 77,525 
449,515 105,671 66,805 38,867 15,788 112,138 20,191 91,946 
382,654 91,233 62,588 28,645 11,494 96,842 16,113 80,729 
316,695 67,856 49,053 18,803 12,502 102,844 15,288 87,556 
372,785 €2,532 51,941 30,591 17,129 121,813 20,602 101,210 
468,096 103,830 61,835 41,995 15,591 145,489 23,756 121,733 
534,292 113,920 69,584 44,336 16,318 152,175 24,309 127,865 
553,130 136,474 82,992 53,482 15,556 151,412 24,446 126,966 
570,887 147,567 87,008 60,559 17,505 167,284 24,847 142,437 
Table 14 (Continued) 
Year 
Sub Construction 
Capital Goods 
Machinery & Equipment 
Other 
Total Materials Agric. Indus. Transp. 
& Com. 
1950 68,826 9,789 7,033 29,007 22,997 2,165 
1951 106,516 17,056 9,754 44,850 34,856 2,142 
1952 122,684 19,760 11,864 59,602 31,458 3,556 
1953 137,828 26,024 11,716 65,786 34,302 1,787 
1954 103,971 18,575 9,297 52,976 23,123 4,385 
1955 118,314 24,048 10,939 60,405 22,922 3,512 
1956 178,448 34,169 11,708 91,792 40,779 6,824 
1957 213,062 42,385 14,801 103,673 52,203 2,856 
1958 180,056 35,969 13,844 87,722 42,521 3,029 
1959 131,740 15,555 7,852 65,254 43,079 1,754 
1960 149,978 17,201 10,556 78,764 43,457 1,334 
1961 201,534 24,825 13,576 105,422 57,711 1,653 
1962 249,867 31,497 14,006 140,838 63,526 2,013 
1963 247,884 24,170 14,436 137,740 71,538 1,805 
1964 235,860 27,889 14,638 130,115 63,217 2,672 
Table 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Iinports--composition of current values (% of total) 
Total Consumption goods Fuels Raw Materials 
Sub Non­ Durable Sub Metallic Non-
Total durable Total Metalli 
100.0 27.3 19.6 7.7 2.0 30.2 3.5 26.7 
100.0 27.6 17.7 9.9 2.4 28.5 4.3 24.2 
100.0 25.0 17.3 7.7 1.6 29.5 4.1 25.4 
100.0 22.8 15.0 7.8 1.6 27.8 4.1 23.7 
100.0 24.5 18.0 6.5 2.6 29.5 4.9 24.6 
100.0 26.2 17.2 9.0 3.1 30.0 4.8 25.2 
100.0 23.4 14.1 9.3 3.1 25.2 5.0 20.2 
100.0 23.5 14.9 8.6 3.5 25.0 4.5 20.5 
100.0 23.9 16.4 7.5 3.0 25.3 4.2 21.1 
100.0 21.4 15.5 5.9 3.9 32.5 4.8 27.7 
100.0 22.1 13.9 8.2 4.6 32.7 5.5 27.2 
100.0 22.2 13.2 9.0 3.3 31.1 5.1 26.0 
100.0 21.3 13.0 8.3 3.1 28.4 4.5 23.9 
100.0 24.7 15.0 9.7 2.8 27.4 4.4 23.0 
100.0 25.8 15.2 10.6 3.1 29.3 4.4 24.9 
Table 15 (Continued) 
Year Capital Goods Other 
Sub Construction Machinery & Equipment 
Total Materials Agric. Indus. Transp. 
& Com. 
1950 39.3 5.6 4.0 16.6 13.1 1.2 
1951 40.7 6.5 3.7 17.2 13.3 0.8 
1952 42.7 6.9 4.1 20.8 10.9 1.2 
1953 47.2 8.9 4.0 22.6 11.7 0.6 
1954 41.6 7.4 3.7 21.2 9.3 1.8 
1955 39.5 8.0 3.7 20.1 7.7 1.2 
1956 46.5 8.9 3.0 24.0 10.6 1.8 
1957 47.4 9.4 3.3 23.1 11.6 0.6 
1958 47.0 9.4 3.6 22.9 11.1 0.8 
1959 41.6 4.9 2.5 20.6 13.6 0.6 
1960 40.2 4.6 2.8 21.1 11.7 0.4 
1961 43.0 5.3 2.9 22.5 12.3 0.4 
1962 46.8 5.9 2.6 26.4 11.9 0.4 
1963 44.8 4.4 2.6 24.9 12.9 0.3 
1964 41.3 4.9 2.6 22.7 11.1 0.5 
Table 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Imports--volume index (1960 = 100) 
Total Consumption goods Fuels Raw Materials 
Sub Non- Durable Sub Metallic Non-
Total durable Total Metallic 
57.2 65.2 76,5 46.0 20.9 46.6 41.6 47.6 
77.8 91.1 91.7 90.0 32.3 55.9 60.2 55.1 
81.7 88.8 99 .4  70.7 25.3 61.1 59.3 61.5 
89.0 84.3 89.5 75.4 25.9 67.7 65.5 68.1 
76.5 78.5 94.8 51.0 34.9 67.6 68.1 67.5 
88.6 96.3 101.6 87.4 54.0 78.5 78.1 78.6 
115.2 108.8 108.6 109.1 67 .4  85.5 95.8 83.4 
129.8 126.1 130.8 118.1 81.9 96.3 96.4 96 .3  
107.0 111.0 123.6 89 .6  63.1 82.0 81.2 82.1 
87.2 84 .7  98.5 61.4 74.5 85.9 79.3 87.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
124.8 126.6 120.2 137.4 93.1 115.9 120.1 115.0 
139.7 141.0 138.2 145.8 95.9 124.4 125.4 124.2 
146.7 156.2 159.1 178.3 99.6 126.1 135.8 124.1 
157.0 185.4 175.2 202.7 114.7 144.8 129.0 148.0 
Table 16 (Continued) 
Year 
Sub 
Total 
Construction 
Materials 
Capital goods 
Machinery & Equipment 
Agric. Indus. Transp. 
& Com. 
Other 
1950 64.8 68.7 93.5 57.7 69.0 140.3 
1951 92.9 116.3 117.7 86.3 89.6 128.6 
1952 99.8 113.3 138.0 102.6 80.1 226 .5  
1953 115.8 157.6 127.6 117.5 93 .4  117.6 
1954 85.5 124.9 93.7 86:3  66 .5  284 .1  
1955 94.8 149.3 113.0 99.9 59.5 291.2 
1956 144.2 195.9 117.1 156.3 108.3 568.9 
1957 163.5 233.8 141.9 162.9 142.1 229 .2  
1958 129.0 213.8 124.3 128.0 98.4 236.0 
1959 90.6 93.4 81.0 88 .2  96 .3  135.0 
1960 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1961 134.8 144.0 164.8 132.6 127.7 123.2 
1962 156.3 167.7 117.8 169.3 137.6 146.8 
1963 158.2 147.1 114.1 170 .2  151.4 141.9 
1964 155.7 166 .0  113.0 169.9 136.3 205.5 
Table 
Year 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
Imports--index of dollar unit value (1960 = 100) 
Total Consumption goods Fuels Raw Materials 
Sub Non- Durable Sub Metallic Non-
Total durable Total Metallic 
82.4 89.3 86.6 96.7 98.2 93.6 72.5 97.4 
90.4 96.2 97.1 94.5 114.6 109.5 90.9 113.7 
94.4 98.2 96.2 102.8 106.9 113.9 97.1 117.2 
88.3 96.2 94.7 99.2 108 .2  98.9 90.0 100.6 
87.6 94.3 91.1 104.1 107.9 89.6 86.8 90.2 
90.6 98.6 97.5 100.9 100.5 94.1 89 .8  94.9 
89.5 100.3 96.4 106.8 103.8 93.1 98.3 91 .8  
92 .9  101.5 98.3 107.5 112 .6  95.6 101.7 94.3 
95.9 99.6 97.5 104.5 106.4 97.0 96.3 97.1 
97.4 97.0 95 .9  100.1 98 .0  98.3 93.5 99.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
100.6 99 .4  99.0 99 .9  97.8 103.1 96.0 104.6 
102.6 97.9 96.9 99.4 99.3 100.4 94.1 101.7 
101.1 99.5 100.4 98.1 91.1 98.6 87.4 101.1 
97.5 96.4 95.6 97.6 89.1 94.9 93 .5  95.1 
Table 17 (Continued) 
Year 
Sub 
Total 
Construction 
materials 
Capital goods 
Machinery & Equipment 
Agric. Indus. Transp. 
& Com. 
Other 
1950 70.9 82 .8  71.3 63 .8  76.7 115.7 
1951 76.5 85.3 78.5 66.0 89.5 124.8 
1952 82.0 101.4 81.5 73.7 90.4 117.6 
1953 79.4 96.0 87 .0  71.1 84.5 113.9 
1954 81.1 86.5 94.0 77.9 80.1 115.7 
1955 83 .2  93.7 91.7 76.7 88.7 90 .4  
1956 82.5 101.4 94.7 74.6 86.6 89.9 
1957 86.9 105.4 98 .8  80.8 84.5 93 .4  
1958 93.1 97.8 105.5 87.0 99.4 96 .2  
1959 96.9 96.8 91.9 93.9 102 .9  97.4 
1960 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1961 99.7 100.2 78 .0  100.9 104.0 100.5 
1962 106.6 109.2 112 .6  105.6 106.2 102.8 
1963 104.5 95.5 119.8 102.7 108.7 101.1 
1964 101.0 97 .7  122.7 97.2 106.7 97.4 
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1950 to 1964 an Improvement has taken place. The U.S. and Canada together 
provided in 1950 55.1% of Peru's import needs (U.S. 53%, Canada 2.1%); 
this percentage stayed almost the same up to 1958 but dropped quickly from 
1959 on to 44.2% in 1964. Imports from LAFTA countries fluctuated between 
5.3% and 8.4% during the period 1950-62, but increased during the last two 
years mainly because of higher food imports from Argentina. Europe has al­
ways been an important source for Peru's imports and together with Japan 
has, over the period 1950-1964, taken away part of the U.S. share in the 
Peruvian market, more particularly from 1959 on. Within Europe important 
shifts took place: "other Europe" (mainly the United Kingdom) saw its 
share of the Peruvian market gradually decrease while the common market 
countries, and primarily West Germany, became much more important sources 
of supply. 
The order of importance of individual countries of origin of Peru's 
imports, for 1964, is listed in Table 12. The U.S. is by far Peru's pri­
mary source of supply (40.7%), providing a wide variety of products. West 
Germany (12.4%) sells mainly manufactures. Imports from Argentina (7.2%) 
consist primarily of foodstuffs (meat and wheat). Other important sup­
pliers are the United Kingdom (6.5%: manufactures, whisky, lubricants) and 
Japan (5.6%: fertilizer, paper, fishnets and steel products). 
3. Major determinants of exports 
The level and growth of Peru's exports from 1950 to 1964 have been 
determined both by world- market conditions and by important supply develop­
ments. To a large extent, Peru's comparative advantage in the production 
of the goods it exports is simply based on its wealth in natural resources. 
This is true, of course, of its minerals and fishmeal. Furthermore, for 
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cotton, sugar and coffee, the existence of well suited climatological con­
ditions is a major determinant of comparative advantage. During the period 
1950-64 the supply of exports has increased tremendously under the combined 
influence of natural resource discovery and the initiative of entrepreneurs 
supported by a governmental policy favorable to rbo-th domestic and foreign 
private investments. Both coffee and fishmeal exports developed during 
this period, starting from an insignificant level in 1950. Iron ore is 
another new export product, added in 1953, and in 1960 an upward shift oc­
curred in copper exports through the introduction of the Toquepala mines. 
To the very favorable growth of supply, world demand conditions have 
to be added in an analysis of the determinants of Peru's export growth. 
The major markets for Peru's export products are the U.S., Western Europe 
and Japan, and consequently developments in these parts of the world have 
been of primary importance. Generally speaking, economic growth experi­
enced in this group of countries during the period considered was quite 
satisfactory, and particularly in Japan and in the European Economic Com­
munity growth in per capita income was high. 
Balassa (22) examines changes in imports in the industrial countries 
in the postwar period, more specifically from 1953-54 to 1960-61 in order 
to exclude the influence of the immediate postwar years and of Korea. 
Table 18 summarizes the results. GNP of the industrial countries rose by 
31% from 1953-54 to 1960-61, while the volume of imports from the develop­
ing areas rose by 48%. At the same time export prices fell 8% for the 
developing countries and their import prices rose 2%; the resulting in­
crease in the purchasing power of their exports was 33%. In other words, 
the purchasing power of exports of developing economies increased at 
Table 18. Exports of developing countries to industrial economies^ 
Temperate zone foods 
Competing tropical foods 
Non-competing tropical foods 
Agricultural raw materials 
Non-fuel minerals and metals 
Primary products, excl. fuels 
Fuels 
Total primary products 
Manufactured goods 
Total exports to industrial countries 
G.N.P. in industrial countries 
($ billion) 
1953-54 Volume index Value index Unit value 
$ million 1960-61 1960-61 1960-61 
(1955 prices) (1953-54 =100) (1953-54 =100)(1953-54=100) 
1,541 126 .8  124.3 98.0 
1,899 108.3 100.6 92.9 
2,881 140.4 83.1 59.2 
3,647 109.4 117.3 107.2 
2,076 134 .8  132 .5  98 .3  
12,044 123.2 108.3 87.9 
1,846 283.7 277.5 97 .8  
13,890 144.6 130.9 90.5 
447 248.1 274.7 110.7 
14,335 147.8 135.5 91.7 
700.7 131.0 
^Source (22, p. 10). 
^Includes fishmeal. 
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approximately the same rate as GNP in the industrial countries during the 
fifties. But, as Table 18 shows, large differences prevailed among the 
different commodity groups. 
By far the biggest increase took place in fuel exports. Peru did not 
benefit in the least from this development; its fuel exports, amounting to 
only about 1% of total exports in 1964, have been stagnant since 1950 be­
cause of supply limitations. Of major importance for Peru, however, have 
been the following developments. Non-competing tropical foods, including 
coffee, have expanded very well in volume terms, but the fall in prices 
from the high level in 1954 has resulted in a decline in the value ex­
ported. 
Competing tropical foods exports, including sugar, grew 8% in volume 
while the value of exports remained about the same. An important explana­
tory factor of the slow growth of the above group is the protection of do­
mestic sugar production in the developed countries. Also agricultural raw 
materials (cotton and wool) did not perform very well, largely as a result 
of the shift towards synthetic fibers. Exports of non fuel minerals and 
metals increased at very satisfactory rates, due primarily to Western 
Europe's and Japan's increasing needs for these materials. Finally, tem­
perate zone food exports, which expanded quite rapidly both in volume and 
in value, includes, as one of its best performers, fishmeal. The very 
rapid expansion of the exports of this feedstuff is a result of the inten­
sified demand for meat in the industrial world. 
Looking at Peru's individual export products, the following major ob­
servations can be made. From 1950 to 1964 Peru's coffee exports expanded 
enormously (79% of it being sent to the U.S. in 1964). The success and 
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acceptance of Peru's coffee lies primarily in its softness, which makes it 
ideal for mixing with other coffees. Prices, which were very high in 1954, 
have declined since but increased again in 1964. The International Coffee 
Agreement, which regulates export quotas in order to stabilize the market, 
is of course a major determinant of future developments. The production 
cost of cane sugar is generally lower than the production cost of beet sug­
ar. But the protectionist policy of the industrial countries has led to 
more self-sufficiency and slow growth in imports. According to Balassa, 
sugar consumption in the industrial countries grew 40% in the fifties, but 
imports increased only half that much. The U.S. used to buy most of its 
sugar requirements in Cuba, but since 1960 has shifted to other suppliers, 
and from 1960 to 1964 was the major market for Peruvian sugar. The major 
determinant of Peru's exports to the U.S. is, consequently, a non-economic 
factor, i.e. the sugar quotas established by the U.S. Of primary impor­
tance in the development of Peru's cotton exports has been its excellent 
quality and the diversified market structure, which has given Peru a very 
competitive position. A negative factor, however, has been the continuing 
shift towards increased use of synthetic fibers. This latter consideration 
applies also to wool exports; in Peru's case, however, the absolute lack of 
growth in wool exports was due to supply difficulties. 
Generally speaking, Peru's agricultural exports are influenced by such 
well known negative factors as low elasticity of demand for food, agricul­
tural protectionism in the industrial world and substitution of man-made 
for natural agricultural raw materials. Favorable factors have been the 
excellent quality of its cotton and coffee, and the efficiency of produc­
tion (with the exception of wool). 
As was mentioned earlier, the market developments for Peru's fishmeal 
and mineral exports, during the period 1950-64, have been excellent. In 
both Japan and Europe, Peru's most important iron ore markets, consumption 
of steel has been growing faster than industrial production. Japan, fur­
thermore, has to depend almost exclusively on imports for its requirements, 
and also Europe has to buy important quantities abroad. In general, the 
favorable growth in industrial production in the developed world has deter­
mined the development of Peru's mineral exports even though the recession 
of 1958-59 had important repercussions. On the other hand, U.S. quotas of 
lead and zinc affected adversely Peru's exports of those metals, while a 
gradual substitution of copper by aluminum has slowed down copper use. 
Fishmeal exports, finally, have experienced a spectacular development. The 
fast growing demand for meat in the industrial countries was not only 
translated in increased meat imports, but also in accelerated imports of 
animal feed. Consequently, fishmeal, very rich in proteins, has become 
Peru's major export product primarily to Western Europe, and Peru has be­
come the world's largest fishmeal exporter. 
4. Major determinants of imports 
A country's productive capacity and its efficiency in producing goods 
that are wanted internationally determine, in general, its ability to ex­
port which in turn is the primary restriction on its ability to import. 
Other factors delimiting a country's capacity to import are receipts from 
freight, shipping and net interests and dividends; in Peru's case, however, 
these are generally negative. In the short run, also, net public and pri­
vate capital inflows have an influence on the import capacity, but they may 
be disregarded as a long run factor. A country wants to import goods which 
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are not available domestically in sufficient quantities to satisfy demand 
or which can be obtained cheaper abroad. Import demand is determined pri­
marily by income. Other factors which have been important determinants of 
the development of Peru's imports from 1950 to 1964 are the evolution of 
net foreign capital inflow, devaluations and import duties. Finally, the 
level of imports is probably also affected by the uneven income distribu­
tion, as different income groups have generally different propensities to 
import. 
Table 19 contains information on gross domestic income (X^), (which 
differs from gross domestic product by the terms of trade effect), net long 
terra capital inflow (X^) and the exchange rate (X^), which have been the 
major determinants of the development of imports (Y) from 1950 to 1964. 
The relation Y = aX^ yields e, the income elasticity of imports, which for 
1950-1964 was found to be high, 1.19. 
Relating imports to income over the period in consideration, a rela­
tively good fit was found through regression analysis: 
Y = -1,703 + .270 X R^ = .85 
(1,635) (.031) 
Table 19 shows the value of imports estimated on the basis of this equation 
and the deviation of the estimated from the actual values. The following 
conclusions can be drawn: the deviations of the estimated from the actual 
values are important in seven of the fifteen years. In 195C, 1954, 1959 
and 1960 the estimated imports were substantially higher than the real 
values. This can be explained by devaluations of the currency in 1949, 
1953 and 1958-59. On the other hand, in the years 1956 through 1958, the 
estimated value was much below the actual value due specifically to capital 
Table 19. Imports of goods and services, gross domestic income, net long term foreign capital 
inflow (in millions of 1960 soles), exchange rate (1950-1964) 
Year Imports Income ^ ^ Capital inflow Exchange rate^ 
Y Y = a + bX^ Y - Y X^ X 
1950 6,968 36,004 8,015 1,047 300 1540 
1951 8,719 39,604 8,987 268 779 1520 
1952 9,052 40,046 9,106 54 1,544 1560 
1953 9,991 42,201 9,687 -304 1,703 1690 
1954 9,062 44,158 10,216 1,154 802 1970 
1955 10,350 45,651 10,619 269 1,165 1920 
1956 13,096 47,135 11,019 -2,077 2,342 1920 
1957 14,535 48,941 11,507 -3,028 2,997 1910 
1958 12,180 47,638 11,155 -1,025 2,789 2330 
1959 10,202 49,007 11,524 1,322 1,875 2760 
1960 11,427 55,650 13,317 1,890 181 2730 
1961 13,990 60,444 14,611 621 636 2680 
1962 15,770 65,008 15,843 73 883 2680 
1963 17,028 68,492 16,784 -244 2,353 2680 
1964 18,229 73,767 18,207 -22 1,691 2680 
^Average for imports during the year; soles per 100 dollars. 
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imports financed by important long term capital inflows for the Toquepala 
copper mines. Adding (net long term capital inflow) as an explanatory 
variable in the equation yields: 
Y = -2,491 + .256 X + 1.049 X = .95 
(1 ,036 )  (.020) ^  (.227) ^  
As capital inflow is to a very large extent translated into a net addition 
to imports, an alternative way of estimating the relationship between Y, X^ 
and Xg would be: 
Y - Xg = a + bX^ 
This yields: 
Y - X = -2,423 + .256 X = .93 
^ (1,004) (.019) 1 
Also the exchange rate could be added as an explanatory variable. 
Y - X„ = -1,853 + .324 X. - 1.864 X_ 
(822) (.028) (.647) 
The evolution of the different groups of imports - consumer goods, capital 
goods, raw materials - will be studied in more detail in Chapter V. 
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IV. CONTRIBUTION OF THE FOREIGN 
SECTOR TO THE MAIN MACRO-ECONOMIC 
POLICY OBJECTIVES (1950-1964) 
In the description of the structure of the Peruvian economy in Chap­
ter III, it was pointed out that the spectacular progress achieved during 
the last few years should not be overestimated in terms of its contribution 
to total economic development. Basic weaknesses of the economy, such as 
economic and geographic dualism, structural underemployment (as opposed to 
cyclical unemployment of the Keynesian type) and a very uneven income dis­
tribution have continued to exist. 
A program for Peruvian economic development would include a number of 
major policy objectives, such as a given increase in national income, an 
improvement in income distribution, an increase in employment, balance of 
payments equilibrium, price stability and certain regional goals. An appro­
priate weight has to be attached to each one of these targets reflecting 
the welfare function of the policymakers. 
Peru's economy being export-oriented, it is of great importance to 
analyze and attempt to measure the contributions made by exports to each 
one of the above mentioned objectives. The present analysis of the favor­
able and unfavorable characteristics of the export sector in terms of 
Peruvian economic development will also pay special attention to the study 
of backward and forward linkages of the sector. More particularly, in the 
case of foreign investment, the flow of factor payments out of the country 
will be examined. 
It has been shown in Chapter III that the primary stimulus to the 
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growth of the Peruvian economy from 1950 to 1964 was the performance of the 
export sector. Evidence of this conclusion can also be found in (23). The 
very dynamic development of the export sector, especially after 1959, was 
by far the major determinant of the growth in national income. In real 
terms, gross domestic product and exports grew, respectively, at an annual 
cumulative rate of 4.1% and 6.5% from 1950 to 1958, and at 7.6% and 10.8% 
from 1959 to 1964. 
While the beneficial effects of the growing export sector were felt 
in terms of a high aggregate income growth, the impact on other development 
objectives was much more limited, as will become clear from the following 
analysis. 
In order to study the repercussions of export growth on the other sec­
tors of the economy, the availability of a comprehensive input-output 
table, together with sectoral capital formation data, would be very desir­
able. Unfortunately, any analysis of the interdependence of the export 
sector with the rest of the economy has to be conducted in partial terms 
in view of the tremendous shortage of reliable statistics of the above type 
in Peru.^ 
The limited transmission of growth from the foreign sector to the 
other sectors in Peru's economy, as was explained very generally in Chap­
ter II, is due on the one hand to the particular type of export production 
in which Peru is engaged, and, on the other, to a number of domestic obsta­
cles. Peru's export activity consists predominantly of primary production: 
An input-output table is presently being completed by the Economic 
Research Institute of San Marcos University, Lima, Peru, in collaboration 
with Iowa State University. Professor H. Van de Metering. 
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agricultural, mining and fishing products. Backward linkage effects re­
sulting from this type of production are, by definition, limited^, and the 
opportunities for the establishment of industries supplying inputs for the 
leading export sector are, consequently, very few. The I.N,P. has, in 
(25), established total output figures by sectors (in millions of soles), 
broken down into value added and inputs for the year 1963. 
Table 20. Production Structure in 1963 (millions of soles) 
Sectors Total Inputs Value Inputs/Total 
output added output 
(percentages) 
Agriculture 18,903 3,655 15,247 19.3 
Fishing 1,876 452 1,424 24.1 
Mining 7,104 1,781 5,324 25.1 
Manufacturing 38,378 21,884 16,494 57.0 
Other sectors 66,398 19,856 46,542 29.9 
Total 132,659 47,628 85,031 35.9 
The input to total output ratios compare with similar average ratios 
for Italy, Japan, and the U.S. from (24), which are 0.31 for agriculture 
and forestry, 0.21 for metal mining, 0,24 for fishing, and much higher 
ratios (generally well above 0.50) for the different manufacturing activi­
ties. In other words, primary activity is carried out, by definition, with 
only limited backward linkage effects. 
See for instance (24). 
99 
On the ether hand, many of Peru's expert products undergo some form of 
transformation before they are exported, and thus leave the country as 
"manufactures". This includes, for instance, refining of sugar or of met­
als, or reduction of fish to fishmeal. This initial processing, however, 
is in some cases, such as fishmeal, virtually an integral part of the pri­
mary activity (fish has to be reduced to fishmeal within a few hours after 
catching). In other instances, such as refining, processing is mostly dic­
tated by transportation costs. For instance, in order to maintain its 
competitive position in world markets, Peru is presently being forced to 
export more of its iron ore in very concentrated form (pellets). But the 
extent of these forward linkages is very limited. Furthermore, as argued 
by Hirschnian in (26), forward linkage effects in general are, by them­
selves, not very powerful stimuli and have to be combined with backward 
linkage in order to be effective. The underdeveloped character of the 
Peruvian economy, given for instance the limited domestic market or the 
existence of inefficiency in many industries, does not permit much further 
processing of the obtained product within Peru itself. As an example may 
be cited the fact that Peru exports cotton rather than cotton textiles, due 
mainly to the very low level of efficiency in the textile industry. It has 
to be added that the lack of ability to take advantage of forward linkages 
is aggravated by import policies of the developed country markets, which 
impede further processing of raw materials in underdeveloped countries. 
Generally speaking, import duties on primary products are very low but in­
crease with the degree of processing. This is especially important for 
Peru in the case of minerals. 
In other words, the interindustrial effects which primary production 
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can set off elsewhere in the economy are, by nature, very limited. The few 
opportunities, which do exist are rarely exploited for a number of reasons, 
related to the undeveloped and traditional character of the economy. A 
substantial part of the input requirements for the export sector have to be 
satisfied through imports. Quantitative information on input requirements 
is presently not available for individual export activities, but does 
exist by sectors, such as presented in Table 20. Preliminary estimates by 
the INP indicate that in 1963, 19% of the inputs used in agriculture were 
imported, the larger part being fertilizer and insecticides. Cotton is the 
most important user of both of these inputs: about 40% of all fertilizer 
and of all insecticides. Sugar cultivation uses about 20% of all fertiliz­
er. 
The proportion of imported inputs in the total for the manufacturing 
sector in 1963 was 26%, versus 36% for fishing, while more than 50% of the 
inputs for the mining sector were imported. Competitive domestic produc­
tion of these imported inputs is hampered because of market size (for in­
stance in the case of fertilizer), low quality of the product (for instance 
jute bags) or similar reasons. In addition, as was explained above, poten­
tial forward linkages are not realized, resulting in the loss of the oppor­
tunity to increase export earnings or leading to further import require­
ments . 
The equipment and machinery used in export production provide another 
potential link with other sectors of the economy. Unfortunately, a domes­
tic capital goods-producing industry is only just starting in Peru, and as 
a result the bulk of equipment and machinery used has to be imported. 
Important differences do exist as between the different export 
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activities. Production of capital goods in Peru was for all practical pur­
poses insignificant until the fishmeal industry developed. Even so, the 
estimated production of machinery and equipment in 1963 was only of the 
order of 1,125 million soles, (roughly equal to 3% of the total output of 
the manufacturing sector). Most important was the production of fishing 
boats, tor a value of 490 million soles, and of machinery for fishmeal 
plants estimated at 156 million soles. In fact, whereas the capital goods 
used in the fish industry are for the major part produced domestically, 
they are at the same time th_: onl^ capital goods of importance manufactured 
in Peru. Other export activities (most of them highly capital intensive, 
such as the sugar and mining industries) have to satisfy their investment 
requirements mainly through imports. 
In conclusion it may be said _aat the high rate of growth of GNP in 
Peru in the period under consideration has been determined by the develop­
ment of exports. Fishmeal was the best performer, followed by mining pro­
ducts and agricultural products. These activities, however, have, in 
general, only limited backward linkage effects, and even when these effects 
exist potentially the underdeveloped character of the economy makes it dif­
ficult for these backwards (or forward) linkages to materialize. 
The internal demand for Peru's export products is very small. Domes­
tic utilization of metals is insignificant compared to exports. The same 
is true for fishmeal, even though its possible use for human consumption 
may be an important stimulus to the economy in the near future. Sugar is 
the only important product of which domestic consumption is high; approxi­
mately 40% of total output. Less than one sixth of the cotton output is 
consumed internally. Cotton, however, is important to the economy because 
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of its byproducts: fats, oils and animal feed. Finally coffee consumption 
in Peru is estimated at approximately one fourth of total production. 
Whereas Peru's export growth undoubtedly has been the principal deter­
minant of its total income growth, the effect of export development on a 
more equal distribution of income, regionally as well as by social classes, 
and the effect on employment creation appear to have been much more lim­
ited. It was seen already in Chapter III that the distribution of income 
in Peru is very uneven. Statistical information on this subject being very 
inadequate, only some very general inferences can be drawn about the effect 
of export growth on income distribution. Yearly national income data by 
functions, as published by the Banco Central de Reserva (27), distinguish 
between the following categories: wages, salaries, income of independent 
agricultural workers, other independent income and income from capital. 
Independent workers are independent professionals or other independent 
entrepreneurs who do not employ remunerated labor. An important character­
istic of independent income is that it represents not only the return to 
labor, but also the return to the capital provided by the independent work­
er and his family. 
In Table 21, three years were selected for comparison, (1950, 1961, 
and 1963), containing national income data by functions in millions of 
current soles and also, for each year, data on the labor force: wage 
earners, salary earners, independent agricultural workers and other inde­
pendent workers. Next, the income per worker (which may be assumed to be 
roughly proportional to income per capita) was calculated for each group, 
and the annual cumulative growth rate from 1950 to 1963 was derived. Even 
though income from capital could not be allocated as between the four 
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groups of income earners, it can safely be said that capital income accrues 
mainly to the group "salary earners", which includes managers of enter­
prises, and to some "other independent workers". 
Table 21 suggests the following major conclusions. The group of inde­
pendent agricultural workers, which makes up slightly more than one third 
of Peru's labor force and which receives by far the lowest incomes, has 
also had the lowest rate of increase in income per worker: 6.8%. In fact, 
according to the Banco Central de Reserva, the consumer price index rose 
from a level of 41,8 in 1950 to 100 in 1963, or at a cumulative rate of 
approximately 6.9% per year, which implies that independent agricultural 
income per capita in real terms, roughly speaking, was at the same level in 
1963 as in 1950. It should, however, be noted that the proportion of 
"independent agricultural workers" declined from 40.3% to 34.3% of the 
labor force from 1950 to 1963. No important changes took place in the rel­
ative positions of the other income earners (however, per capita income in 
the second lowest income group-wage earners did increase at a slightly low­
er rate than per capita income in the other groups) while income from capi­
tal represented about the same percentage of total national income in 1963 
as in 1950. 
Even though much more detailed information would be necessary in order 
to study satisfactorily the effect of export growth on income distribution, 
it is clear that the lowest income earners have not shared at all in Peru's 
economic growth in the past few years; in other words, the group of popr 
independent agricultural workers, has, in relative terms, become worse off. 
The latter conclusion has to be qualified, however, with the above noted 
observation that the participation of independent agricultural workers in 
Table 21. National income (millions of soles) by functions, and labor force (thousands) 
(1950, 1961, 1963) 
Yearly cumula-
1950 7o 1961 7o 1963 % tive growth 
1950-1963 (%) 
Wages a) Amount 3,025 21.3 12,951 24.1 16,087 23.8 
b) Labor force 905 35.0 1,212 37.6 1,295 38.0 
c) a/b 3.343 10.686 12.422 10.6 
Salaries 
a) Amount 2,493 17.6 12,387 23.1 16,232 24.1 
b) Labor force 270 10.4 404 12.5 439 12.9 
c) a/b 9.233 30.661 36.975 11.3 
Independent agricultural 
income 
a) Amount 3,059 21.5 7,461 13.9 8,094 12.0 
b) Labor force 1,040 40.3 1,136 35.2 1,166 34.3 
c) a/b 2.941 6.568 6.942 6.8 
Other independent 
income 
a) Amount 2,016 14.2 8,368 15.6 10,902 16.2 
b) Labor force 369 14.3 475 14.7 504 14.8 
c) a/b 5.463 17.617 21.631 11.2 
Income from capital 
Amount 3,602 25.4 12,520 23.3 16,142 23.9 
Total income 
a) Amount 14,195 100.0 53,687 100.0 67,457 100.0 
b) Labor force 2,584 100.0 3,227 100.0 3,404 100.0 
c) a/b 5.493 16.637 19.817 10.4 
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the total labor force has gradually become smaller. Thus, as more farmers 
leave their land and become for instance wage earners, they appear to be 
better off. Unfortunately, the lack of more detailed information about the 
structure of income within the different groups and about the changes 
therein prevents more definite conclusions about possible changes in income 
distribution. 
The above group of independent agricultural workers represents at the 
same time the small independent farmers from the Sierra. In other words, 
it would appear that the gap which exists between the Coast and the Sierra 
has, in general, become more pronounced. 
The existence of an extremely uneven income distribution in Peru is 
a major obstacle to domestic industrial development since it tends to limit 
"effective demand". The small group of high income earners maintains a 
high standard of living and satisfies many of its consumer wants through 
imports. These two factors combined, i.e. the preference of the higher-
income class for imported over domestic goods and the lack of purchasing 
power of most other categories, provide a strong obstacle to the develop­
ment of an efficient domestic productive sector. This type of import 
leakage, characteristic of the traditional export economy, has been ana­
lyzed thoroughly in (28). It has to be added that about 80% of the mining 
sector and about one fourth of both the fishmeal and sugar industries are 
foreign-owned, making up jointly about one half of the export sector. In 
this case a large part of the value added leaks out of the country in the 
form of amortization and other factor payments alone. 
While the latter cannot be estimated for the individual export activ­
ities due to the lack of detailed data (except to some extent for mining. 
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as will be seen below), its total quantitative importance can be judged on 
the basis of Table 24. Over the fifteen year period (1950-64) the sum of 
investment income remittances on private account amounted to $595 million, 
making up, on the average, almost 11% of merchandise export earnings. Most 
foreign direct private investment is in export activities, especially in 
the mining sector. Quantitative information on the value of foreign direct 
investments in Peru is not available, except for the U.S. part, which, how­
ever, makes up the bulk of the total. As reported in the Survey of Current 
Business (29), U.S. private direct investment in Peru totalled, at the end 
of 1963, $448 million, distributed as follows: $240 mi'C n in mining, 
$56 million in petroleum, $64 million in manufacturing, $11 million in pub­
lic utilities, $41 million in trade and $26 million in other sectors. 
For one sector, mining, the importance of factor payments leaving Peru 
can be estimated more specifically. Export earnings of minerals (not in­
cluding exports of combustibles) were for the year 1960, 1961, 1962 and 
1963 respectively, in million dollars: 195.5, 216.9, 197.8 and 198.0, or 
a total of $808.2 million. Investment income remittances to the U.S. from 
the mining sector were, for the same years, in million dollars: 37, 43, 
33, and 40 or a total of $153 million, which amounts- to 19% of mineral ex­
port earnings for those years. 
Data on amortization payments for foreign private direct investment 
are not available, only the amount of net private capital inflow as shown 
in Table 24. The latter was quite substantial over the fifteen year 
period, totalling $511.6 million. It is interesting to note, however, that 
the total net private capital inflow over the period 1950-64 was smaller 
than the sum of private investment income remittances. 
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The contribution of the export sector total employment has to be 
analyzed on a subsectoral baassis, as Table 22^ clearly indicates. Very 
generally, a distinction may be nnade between agricultural and other export 
activities. Within agricultu_jre, both cotton and sugar growing take place 
on very efficient farms. BotJtth of these activities utilize substantial 
amounts of labor, especially cotton which is relatively labor intensive 
employing 170 thousand workerrats in 1963, Sugar (field work), in turn, em­
ployed approximately 33,000 qgeople, even though very fast rising labor 
costs appear to have led to fitfurtbier mechanization. It can be seen that 
sugar refining, which is parttfttof manufacturing, is already highly mechan­
ized, giving employment to onmly gbout 7,000 people. 
Coffee, on the other hanmd, is grown mainly by small (often subsis­
tence) farmers. According tcz)(31) the activity employs 3,000 white collar 
workers, 66,000 heads of famiiiily for 200 days/year and 133,000 seasonal 
workers for 90 days/year, givw/ing a total of about 72,000 man/year. 
Generally speaking, the agricultural export activities support a sub­
stantial number of people 8,3% of the labor force in 1963). Unfor­
tunately export development oof these products has been much more modest 
(with the exception of coffees) than Peru's overall export growth. Further­
more, as will be studied in tithe aext chapter, prospects for future agricul­
tural export development are very poor. 
Conversely, both the minming and fishmeal sectors are very capital 
•'"Tables 21 and 22 show esach a different total labor force figure, due 
to the difference in source oaf information. Table 21 has been constructed 
on the basis of Banco CentraUB. de Réserva data, as was indicated earlier. 
Total and sectoral labor forccre figures in Table 22 (and in Table 23) are 
derived from (30). 
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Table 22. Gross domestic product and labor force, by sectors and principal 
export activities: 1963. 
Gross domestic product Labor force 
Millions of % Thousands % 
current soles 
Agriculture 15247 17.9 1660 50.2 
Cotton 2355 2.8 170 5.1 
Sugar 792 0.9 33 1.0 
Coffee 610 0.7 72 2.2 
Fishing 1424 1.7 18 0.5 
Mining 5324 6.3 73 2.2 
Manufacturing 16494 19.4 464 14.0 
Sugar refining 1791 2.1 7 0.2 
Fishmeal 986 1.2 13 0.4 
Metal refining 779 0.9 6 0.2 
Other sectors 46542 54.7 1092 33.0 
Total 85031 100.0 3307 100.0 
intensive, giving employment to only a small fraction of Peru's labor 
force. In the case of fishmeal, however, not only the direct but also the 
indirect employment effects (estimated at 85,000 people between shipyards 
and machine shops) should be considered. Mineral exports, which have the 
most promising prospects, are also very capital intensive, employing only 
a minimum of labor. 
The scarcity of time-series data on the Peruvian labor force makes it 
extremely difficult to estimate employment creation over time in the dif­
ferent export activities. Yearly estimates of the labor force, total and 
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by sectors (including fishing and mining) are available from 1950 on; how­
ever, yearly information on a subsectoral basis (i.e. for cotton, sugar, 
coffee, or the subsectors of the manufacturing sector) does not exist. 
Table 23 contains data on gross domestic product (total for Peru and 
fishing and mining sectors) for 1950 and 1964 (in million soles at 1960 
prices). Also presented are the corresponding employment figures. Whereas 
gross domestic product per worker increased by 42% from 1950 to 1964 for 
the Peruvian economy as a whole, it increased by 127% and 114% respectively 
for the fishing and mining sectors. In these two sectors together 35,000 
new jobs were created, or about 3.3% of the increase in the labor force. 
On the other hand, the same two sectors accounted for almost 13% of the 
total increase in Peru's gross domestic product. 
It is roughly correct to assume that the increase in employment in the 
fishing sector from 1950 to 1964 (14,000 jobs) together with the number em­
ployed in fishmeal factories, as shown in Table 22 (13,000 jobs), or in 
total 27,000 jobs, is equal to the total increase in direct employment in 
Peru's fishmeal (and fishoil) exports. The latter increased from an in­
significant level of less than $300,000 in 1950 to $158 million in 1964. 
In other words, for every $5,850 increase in export earnings of fishmeal 
and fishoil an additional job was created. 
Employment creation in the mining sector from 1950 to 1964 amounts to 
about 21,000. On the one hand, this figure overestimates the labor force 
increment in export production, as part of the mining output (nearly all 
petroleum and non-metallic minerals) is consumed domestically. On the 
other hand, some increase has probably taken place in the 6,000 people em­
ployed in metal refining in 1963. (Table 22), and this increase should be 
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added to the 21,000, in order to arrive at the increment in the labor force 
employed in mineral export production. Roughly speaking, however, it may 
be assumed that both errors are small and tend to cancel each other. From 
1950 to 1964 mineral exports increased from a level of $73 million to $278 
million, or by $205 million. In other words, in order to lead to the crea­
tion of one more job, mineral exports had to grow by almost $10,000. 
Similar information is not available for agricultural export activi­
ties, Given their more labor intensive character, however, it may be 
assumed that the number of jobs created per additional dollar of exports 
was substantially higher, with the exception of sugar, ,ich has become in­
creasingly mechanized. 
Peru's export sector has played a very important role in maintaining 
balance of payments equilibrium and relative price stability. In fact, the 
country is one of the few in Latin America, whose international accounts 
have shown considerable strength in the last few years. 
As can be seen in Table 24, official reserves increased in every year 
from 1959 on. 
Nevertheless it ought to be noted that with the exception of four 
years (1950, 1951, 1960 and 1964), the current account balance has been 
continuously negative, the deficit being financed by net long term capital 
inflow. Over the fifteen year period, the sum of balances on current 
account amounted to a total deficit of 749.2 million dollars which was 
compensated by net long-term capital movements totalling 714.7 million 
dollars. A closer look at the individual items in the current account re­
veals the following. Both the investment income and the non-financial ser­
vices accounts have been continuously negative. Furthermore, for the 
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Table 23. Gross domestic product and labor force. 
Total for Peru, fishing and mining. 
(1950 and 1964) 
1950 1964 Increase 
1950 to 
1964 (7o) 
Gross domestic product 
(millions of 
1960 soles) Total 
Fishing 
Mining 
34,409 
167 
1,831 
71,270 
1,266 
5,448 
107 
658 
198 
Labor force 
(thousands) Total 
Fishing 
Mining 
2,340 
6 
54 
3,403 
20 
75 
45 
233 
39 
Gross domestic 
product per 
worker 
(1960 soles) Total 
Fishing 
Mining 
14,705 
27,833 
33,907 
20,943 
63,300 
72,640 
42 
127 
114 
period under consideration, both have increased at rates faster than mer­
chandise exports or imports. Investment income consists primarily of re­
mittances on private investment. The deficit in non-financial services is 
caused mainly by freight and insurance payments. Furthermore, the balance 
for tourism in 1964, which had been traditionally in equilibrium, showed a 
substantial deficit. 
The negative balance in the service and investment income accounts 
has, over the period 1950-64, more than offset the generally positive trade 
balance (FOB). The latter has been positive in all years, except in 1952-
53 and in 1955 through 1958. An important contributing factor to the 
Table 24. Balance of payments^ (millions of dollars) 
1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 
1) Current 
account 
balancell.6 0. 1 -49. 3 -63. 5 -18. 2 -95. 1 -107.7 -155. 4 -122. 3 -40. 0 7. 9 -12. 4 -37. 2 -81. 8 
(a) Merchan­
dise bal­
ance 
FOB: 49.1 36. 1 -11. 5 -29. 3 28. 9 -13. 3 -22.2 -70. 6 -52. 9 42. 0 103. 3 81. 5 77. 5 37. 2 
(b)Invest­
ment in­
come: -26.6 -16. 5 -16. ,6 -11. 1 -32. 0 -52. 3 -45.8 -46. 2 -35. 2 -47. 7 -65. 9 -66. 7 -67. 0 -73. 0 
(c)Non-fi-
nancial 
ser-
vices;-12.2 -20. 9 -24, .9 -27, ,9 -22. ,9 -37. ,2 -51.0 -56. ,1 -48. 9 -44, ,2 -50. ,1 -54, ,0 -65. 9 -65. ,0 
(d)Transfer 
paymentsl.3 1. 4 3, .7 4. ,8 7, .8 7. ,7 11.3 17. ,5 14. ,7 9, .9 20. ,6 26, .8 18. ,2 19. ,0 
2) Net long term 
capital 
move­
ments: -3.2 23, ,9 42 .5 62, .4 -6 .8 72. ,5 68.3 118, .3 93, .4 48 .9 13 .8 1 .7 36, .7 56, .3 
(a)Private-2.0 25. ,0 40 .7 49, .4 -5 .8 21. 1 59.0 110, .9 88, .3 52 .8 27, .1 8 .1 19, .1 4, .7 
(b)Publie:-1.2 -1. ,1 1 .8 13 .0 -1 .0 51, .4 9.3 7, .4 5, ,1 -3, .9 -13 .3 -6, .4 17, .6 51, ,6 
3) Short term 
capital 13.7 10, .9 -11 .7 0 .3 0 .5 3 .4 41.5 9 .1 9 .2 0 .3 9 .0 13 .6 27 .0 -9, .7 
4) Errors and 
omis-
sions:-19.7 -28 .4 16 .9 -5 .5 31 .1 15 .5 12.8 -5 .6 6, .3 8 .2 2 .0 31 .4 -20 .2 53 .7 
5) Compensa­
tory: -2.4 -6 .5 1 . 6 6 .3 -6 . 6 3 .7 , -14.9 33 . 6 13 .4 -17 .4 -32 .7 -34 .3 -6 .3 -18 .5 
^Source (27). 
Table 24 (Continued) 
Exports 
Merchandise FOB 
Imports Balance Private 
(millions of dollars) 
Investment Income 
Public Total 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
198.4 
259.1 
245.7 
228 .2  
254.3 
2 8 1 . 2  
320.2 
331.5 
291.8 
322 .6  
444.3 
510.1 
555.9 
555,1 
684.5 
-149.3 
-223.0 
-257.2 
-257.5 
-225.4 
-294.5 
-342.4 
-402.1 
-344.7 
- 2 8 0 . 6  
-341.0 
-428.6 
-478.4 
-517.9 
-517.7 
Yearly cumulative increase 1950-52 
Exports Fob 
Imports Fob 
Investment inccrae 
Non financial services 
8.17„ 
7.6% 
11.2% 
12.0% 
1962-64 
49.1 
36.1 
-11.5 
-29.3 
28 .9  
-13.3 
-22.2 
-70.6 
-52.9 
42 .0  
103.3 
81.5 
77.5 
37.2 
1 6 6 . 8  
•25.0 
•15.0 
-15.0 
- 7.6 
-28.4 
-49.2 
-40.2 
-40.3 
-29.2 
-40.1 
-58.7 
-60.1 
- 6 0 . 8  
-65 .3  
-60.1 
-1.6 
-1.5 
-1.6 
-3.5 
-3.6 
-3.1 
-5.6 
-5.9 
-7.6 
-7.6 
-7.2 
-6.6 
- 6 . 2  
-7.7 
-12.1 
• 2 6 . 6  
•16.5 
-16.6 
-11.1 
-32.0 
-52 .3  
-45.8 
-46.2 
-35.2 
-47.7 
-65.9 
-66.7 
-67.0 
-73.0 
-72.2 
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negative trade balance in those two periods, was the high volume of capital 
goods imports for the mining sector, financed by foreign capital inflow. 
In other years, and particularly from 1959 on, the trade balance showed 
substantial surpluses, reflecting the strength of Peru's export develop­
ment -
Important aspects of Peru's economic growth are disclosed by analyzing 
the balance of payments. Foreign capital inflow has been predominantly in 
the form of private capital, of which a large part went into export pro­
duction. The subsequent servicing of foreign investment is provided for by 
the growth of exports resulting from the investment. On the other hand, 
exports being the leading sector, traditional imports could be expanded 
without much pressure on the balance of payments, and also without much 
incentive for import substitution. 
The inflow of public foreign capital has been substantial in the last 
two or three years, as compared to previous years. This increased inflow 
has resulted from the decision of the Peruvian public sector to assume a 
more important role in the promotion of economic growth through the initia­
tion of development programs. Given the commitment of the public sector 
to the promotion of economic growth, the trend of substantial inflows of 
public foreign capital is expected to continue. This inflow results in 
considerable debt service payments. As opposed to private direct invest­
ment in export production, which leads to relatively quick yields in terms 
of foreign earnings, official capital, generally speaking, has no immediate 
beneficial effects on the trade balance. Furthermore, as industrialization 
proceeds, new import needs will place additional pressure on the balance of 
payments. These considerations, together with the possible slowdown in the 
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rate of growth of exports, may, in the near future, change Peru's balance 
of payments structure substantially. 
In terms of price stability, Peru exhibits a much better than average 
picture among Latin American countries, due largely to a relatively sound 
monetary policy; however, the development of exports has also contributed 
substantially to the maintenance of a moderate rate of inflation. 
The importance of exports in terms of price stability can be seen in 
the following way. From 1950 to 1964, Peru's export growth experienced two 
significant setbacks, one in 1952-53 and one in 1958-59, both resulting 
primarily from declines in world prices for Peru's products. Relatively 
important currency devaluations took place on both occasions, raising at 
the same time, the level of internal prices, because of more expensive im­
ports. 
On the other hand, the strength of Peru's export sector and the avail­
ability of a sufficient amount of foreign exchange, made it possible to 
satisfy the increases in demand through imports, without excessive pressure 
on prices. An adequate level of foreign exchange provided the "safety 
valve" (imports) which reduced the upward price pressures which would 
otherwise have taken place because of the supply imbalances and bottlenecks 
characterizing the growth process. 
It has been seen that the growth of Peru's export sector resulted in a 
high rate of increase of GNP, while also contributing to relative price 
stability and equilibrium in the balance of payments. It appears that 
these three goals have ranked relatively high in the welfare function of 
Peru's policymakers in the past. 
It can be argued strongly, however, that, if Peru is to solve success­
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fully its major social and economic problems, more weight will have to be 
given to such goals as employment creation and a better income distribu­
tion. (The latter can be thought of also as intermediate steps towards the 
creation of more effective demand.) It was shown above that the export 
sector exhibits serious shortcomings as a means to contribute to the em­
ployment and income distribution ends. 
Income distribution has worsened not only in regional terms - Coast 
versus Sierra - but also personally and as among social classes. There are 
virtually no reasons to believe that any improvement has taken place over 
the period 1950 to 1964. Coffee growing provides substantial employment 
and has expanded very rapidly: it is, however, a subsistence activity for 
the larger part. Cotton, and to a smaller extent sugar, also employ sub­
stantial amounts of labor, but have not grown very fast. Furthermore, 
prospects for all types of agricultural export activities are relatively 
poor, and the possible contribution to employment in the future is, there­
fore, also limited. 
On the other hand, fishing and mining, both very dynamic export 
activities, make a very small contribution in terms of direct employment, 
and even though relatively high wages are paid, the effect on the rest of 
the economy is limited. However, fishing as opposed to mining, does pro­
vide some important linkages. 
Thus it can be concluded that the contribution of the export sector 
to employment creation and to a more equal distribution of income has been 
negligible and, furthermore, that its potential contribution to these de­
velopment goals is very limited. In view of this conclusion, the most 
important role of the Peruvian export sector has been, and is likely to 
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continue to be, as the generator of the foreign exchange which is essential 
for the financing of the imports required for the development of the econ­
omy and for the servicing of the foreign capital inflow. At the same time 
potential linkages have to be fully exploited. A number of inputs, such as 
jute bags or fish nets could be produced domestically. On the other hand, 
Peru could for instance process its cotton into high quality cotton yarn or 
cotton textiles, both for domestic consumption and for exports. Similarly 
mining exports earnings could be increased through exports of raining pro­
ducts in more processed form. It has to be added, however, as was men­
tioned before, that the successful exploitation of some of these forward 
linkages would require the collaboration of the importing countries (mainly 
the developed world) in terms of a lowering of import duties. 
Peru's export growth has led to equally fast expanding imports. As 
the size of the market increases and as capital accumulates with economic 
growth, more and more domestic production of import substitutes becomes 
feasible. The gradual industrialization of the country will make it possi­
ble to improve upon some of the above indicated shortcomings which accom­
pany primary product specialization. For instance more employment can be 
created and the greater linkage effects which characterize the industrial 
sector will provide strong stimuli to the development of the economy. 
The Industrial Promotion Law of 1959 expresses the desire of Peru's 
policymakers to promote the industrialization process through the provision 
of incentive legislation, involving tax exemptions, import duty concessions 
on capital goods and raw materials, and tariff protection of production. 
The problems associated with industrialization through import substitution 
in Peru will be analyzed extensively in the following chapter. In very 
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general terms, the hypothesis to be investigated is that the limited size 
of the Peruvian market (which is aggravated by the existing uneven income 
distribution and the related structure of consumer demand) is the main ob­
stacle to future development. Domestic production of import substitutes 
tends to be aimed primarily at the relatively small group of high and 
middle class consumers. The smallness of the market leads often to sub­
stantial inefficiency and high costs of production, which in turn prevent 
further expansion. Agricultural development would broaden the market, 
while an improvement in income distribution, both through increases in 
progressive income taxation and through high indirect taxes on the con­
sumption of (domestically produced as well as imported) luxury products 
would change the market structure. Consequently, import substitution could 
take place with respect to less sophisticated products for which a larger 
market would exist. High standards of efficiency would furthermore facili­
tate the way to exporting. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE FACTORS WHICH MAY AFFECT 
THE FUTURE STRUCTURE AND PROSPECTS 
OF PERU'S FOREIGN TRADE 
A. Impact of External Conditions", Supply Developments and New 
Institutional Arrangements on Peru's Exports 
1. World demand and Peru's supply 
As noted in Chapter III, the value of goods (FOB) exported by Peru in 
1964 was $667 million. Out of this last sum, $266 million, or 40% was made 
up of six major minerals (copper, silver, lead, zinc, iron ore and petro­
leum). Cotton, sugar, coffee and wool, together earned $203 million, or 
30%, while fishmeal and fishoil contributed $158 million or 24%. The re­
maining $40 million consisted of miscellaneous minor products. 
It was also seen in Chapter III that the developed countries consti­
tute, by far, the major market for Peru's products. In 1964, the U.S., 
Canada, Europe and Japan bought 87.2% of Peru's exports; by contrast, the 
member countries of the Latin American Free Trade Association accounted for 
only 9.7%. Even though the process of Latin American integration, which 
will be studied below, may lead to an increase in the significance of Latin 
American countries among Peru's export markets, these developments are very 
difficult to predict and will most probably take place only very gradually. 
In view of the importance of North America, Europe and Japan as export 
markets for Peru, the analysis of future prospects for Peru's major export 
commodities focuses primarily on those markets. 
One way of estimating future exports would be to use the information 
of the past and attempt to build econometric relationships between Peru's 
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exports and such factors as external demand and price developments. The 
external demand factor could be represented by a weighted sum of the income 
of the major markets, the weights being based on the share of Peru's ex­
ports to the different countries. 
However, the economic and non-economic factors affecting Peru's export 
products are very diverse. They include, besides general conditions of 
world demand and supply and the development of substitutes, other variables 
such as domestic demand (for some products), internal cost developments, 
supply limitations, and quotas in some markets. Consequently, simplified 
export functions of the type described above, would be of only limited use. 
Furthermore, as will be seen below, given the emergence of important domes­
tic supply limits in the near future for some products, past experience 
would be a very imperfect guide to the future. 
The following analysis of the factors affecting the prospects of 
Peru's exports has, therefore, been conducted on a commodity by commodity 
basis, taking into account in each case the major variables likely to in­
fluence future export volumes and prices. On this basis, growth rates for 
the major products, in volume and in value terms, have been established. 
In studying the demand for primary products, immediate attention is 
brought to certain frequently mentioned factors; the low income elasticity 
of demand for primary products, substitution by synthetics and the trend 
towards self-sufficiency in developed countries. While these characteris­
tics apply generally to agricultural products, they do not fit the case of 
minerals. Not only will demand for the latter products in developed coun­
tries rise almost as rapidly as their GNP, but furthermore, as mineral re­
sources, found in the industrial countries are, in general, quite limited, 
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an increasing proportion of demand may have to be met through imports. Be­
cause of these and other common characteristics, Peru's exports can best be 
analyzed in three main groups: agricultural commodities, fish products and 
minerals. These are as follows: 
Agricultural products Peru's most important agricultural exports 
are sugar, coffee and cotton. The general outlook for all three is quite 
discouraging J world production presently exceeds world consumption in 
every case. The income elasticity of demand in the developed world is very 
low for these commodities. According to Balassa (22) it is slightly above 
zero for sugar and about ,5 to .6 for coffee (except in the U.S. where it 
is lower) and for textile fibers. Furthermore, within the latter group, 
cotton encounters strong competition from synthetics. Also, non-economic 
factors, such as quotas and subsidies, play a very important role in world 
trade of these products. Table 25 gives the share of Peru in world exports 
of sugar, coffee and cotton; in general Peru's share is very small. In 
addition, its share has remained more or less constant over the last de­
cade, except for coffee which increased from zero to about 1.4%. 
Sugar Sugar is grown in the form of beet sugar in temperate 
climates and in the form of cane sugar in tropical climates. Even though 
the production cost of the latter is generally lower, increasing self-
sufficiency (the European Economic Community for instance supplies vir­
tually 100% of its sugar requirements) has had in the last few years a 
negative influence on world trade. 
In the period 1961-63, poor crops in Europe, together with reduced 
production in Cuba, caused a world deficit in sugar, resulting in sharply 
rising prices. Subsequent increased plantings and better crops led to the 
Table 25. Share of Peru in world exports of sugar, coffee and cotton.^ 
(for selected years) 
Year SUGAR COFFEE COTTON^ 
World 
(1,000 
Peru 
tons) 
Peru 
% 
World Peru 
(1,000 bags) 
Peru 
% 
World 
(1,000 
Peru 
tons) 
Peru 
% 
1950 13,100 277 2.1 29,228 17 - 2,662 72 2.7 
1955 16,012 483 3.0 33,698 114 .3 2,843 111 3.9 
1960 19,252 514 2.7 42,491 390 .9 3,700 107 2.9 
1961 22,211 552 2.5 43,672 567 1.3 3,385 132 3.9 
1962 20,568 463 2.3 46,256 624 1.3 3,454 135 3.9 
1963 19,134 481 2.5 49,139 668 1.4 3,895 112 2.9 
^Source: (13). 
For Cotton: selected years are commercial years 1950/51, 1955/56, 
1960/61, 1961/62, 1962/63, and 1963/64. 
present overproduction and decline in prices. 
The income elasticity of demand for sugar is generally low and becomes 
very small at higher income levels. In countries such as the U.S. and 
England, where per capita consumption is very high, total consumption may 
actually be expected to grow at the rate of population growth only. 
According to Balassa (22) sugar consumption in industrial countries may 
grow in the coming years at 2% annually. 
Presently about half of Peru's sugar exports is sold to the U.S. under 
the quota system, at a price substantially above the world market price. 
The rest is sold mainly to Europe and to Chile. Present world prices do 
hot cover Peru's production cost. Consequently, world price conditions do 
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not warrant increases in land under sugar cultivation. Some small in­
creases in yield could result in some increment in production which, how­
ever, will be mainly absorbed by a rise in domestic consumption. The 
latter has been growing at about 5% annually for the last few years. 
Supply considerations are, in other words, of primary importance in 
determining Peru's future sugar exports. Under the present conditions, ex­
port volume may reach the average of the last few years, or close to 
500,000 tons by 1970, at average prices slightly above the very low 1965 
level. Earnings would be more than $50 million. 
Coffee Even though the world exportable surplus of coffee is 
substantially above import requirements, prices have been relatively stable 
because of the operation of the International Coffee Agreement. The Agree­
ment, which was considerably strengthened in 1965, when the U.S. became a 
full participant, mainly restricts quantities brought on the world market, 
and helps in the promotion of coffee consumption. However, in the future 
it will have to accomplish the more basic task of adjusting production and 
consumption. 
Per capita coffee consumption in the U.S., Peru's major market, has 
actually been declining since 1962. As a result, promotional activities 
were initiated recently by the World Coffee Promotional Committee of the 
International Coffee Agreement. It is estimated that world market demand 
may increase at 2.5% to 3% per year. 
Costs of coffee production in Peru are competitive and the coffee is 
of good quality. No supply problems are present. Exports will be deter­
mined by Peru's quota (which for 1965/66 amounted to 547,000 bags or 32.8 
thousand tons) and by additional exports which Peru may succeed in placing 
124 
in markets outside the Coffee Agreement. By 1970 exports should be back at 
the 1964 volume, at the same price as prevailing in the past year. 
Cotton For the last few years, world cotton production has 
exceeded consumption by a considerable margin. As a result, the U.S., 
which has been acting as a supplementary world supplier, has increased its 
stocks significantly. Probably the most important effect of the new U.S. 
cotton legislation, as far as Peru is concerned, will be the general down­
ward pressure on world prices. 
Cotton, wool and synthetics are, to a large extent, good substitutes. 
In 1952, 83% of world consumption of textile fibers consisted of cotton and 
wool, the remaining 17% being made up by synthetics. In 1952 these per­
centages were respectively 75% and 25%. Strong competition from artificial 
fibers can be expected to exert downward pressure on cotton prices in the 
future. 
Peru exports cotton mainly to Europe, Argentina, Chile and Japan. 
Argentina and Chile, members of the Latin American Free Trade Association 
may become Peru's most dynamic markets in the future. The period 1961-64 
was characterized by high output and high world prices, which made it pos­
sible to absorb easily rising internal costs. The present low price 
level - which is expected furthermore to have a downward tendency in the 
future - has, however, considerably reduced profit margins. As a result, 
the area under cotton cultivation is not expected to increase, but some im­
provements in yield are likely. On the other hand, any tendency to a re­
duction in the land area allotted to cotton will be restrained by the fact 
that cotton is more suited to Peruvian climatic conditions than most other 
crops. Thus, it appears that Peru's exports will be determined primarily 
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by supply factors. 
Export volume in 1970 will probably be approximately at past peak 
levels. In the longer run, newly irrigated lands may be partially devoted 
to cotton growing; this will depend, however, on such factors as profit 
margins and exchange rate. The Latin American Free Trade Association could 
become a very important market for Peruvian cotton. It should also be men­
tioned that Peru's cotton is of general high quality, uniquely suited for 
mixing with wool or synthetic fibers. 
Fishmeal and fishoil Fishmeal is a valuable high protein feed, 
used in different livestock rations, but particularly in the poultry and 
hog industries. World demand for animal feed is a function of developments 
in meat production and feeding techniques, and of substitution among dif­
ferent kinds of animal feed. Increased economic growth and a corresponding 
increase in demand for livestock products, as well as the inability of many 
countries to expand production of animal feed fast enough and the high pro­
tein content of fishmeal, have all contributed to the very fast rising 
world demand for this product. Possible utilization of fishmeal in bread 
for human consumption will probably strengthen the demand for the former 
even more in the future. 
Over 90% of world exports of fishmeal is accounted for by the six 
member countries of the Fishmeal Exporter's Organization: Peru (which 
accounted for 66% of these six countries total exports in 1964, and as 
Table 26 indicates, for about 60% of total world exports). South Africa, 
Norway, Chile, Iceland and Angola. While these six countries export the 
larger part of their output, three other important producers, the U.S., 
Japan and the U„S.S.R., consume practically the totality of their produc-
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Table 26. Share of Peru in world exports of fishmeal,^ average 1955-59, 
annual 1959-64 (1,000 short tons) 
Year World Peru % Peru 
Av. 1955-59 615.2 109.1 17.7 
1959 839.1 306.1 36.5 
1960 1,083.9 571.3 52.7 
1961 1,488.4 838.4 56.3 
1962 1,853.9 1,175.0 63.4 
1963 2,054.1 1,278.4 62.2 
1964^ 2,610.4 1,562.0 59.8 
^Includes solubles and similar products. 
^Source (32, p. 18). 
Preliminary. 
Table 27. Share of Peru in world production of iron ore, copper, lead, 
zinc and silver^ (1960) 
World Peru Peru 
Iron ore (1,000 metric ton) 231,000 3,147 1.4 
Copper ore (1,000 metric ton) 3,640 182 5.0 
Lead ore (1,000 metric ton) 2,000 132 6.6 
Zinc ore (1,000 metric ton) 2,790 178 6.4 
Silver ( metric ton ) 6,900 943 13.7 
^Source (33). 
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tion domestically. 
The Fishmeal Exporter's Organization was formed in 1960, following a 
serious fall in prices resulting from the tremendous growth of Peru's out­
put. The purpose of the organization is to provide for continuity In sup­
ply at profitable prices and to promote consumption. World prices have im­
proved considerably since 1960. 
The future of Peruvian fishmeal exports will depend primarily on fac­
tors other than demand. Presently existing information on the fish popula­
tion and its reproduction seems to indicate that the amount caught in 1964 
and 1965 may represent a level not to be surpassed if the fish stock and 
its reproduction is not to be endangered. On the other hand, improvements 
in yield (fishmeal obtained per unit of fish) are still quite possible and 
could be of the order of 3% per year. Future price predictions are very 
difficult and depend also on the development of substitute products, among 
which are cottonseed and oilcake. But in view of Peru's supply limit, the 
favorable demand for protein-rich feedstuffs and the possibilities of 
utilizing fishmeal for human consumption, prices are expected to remain 
strong. 
Peru's future exports of fishoil, which is a byproduct of fishmeal, 
will, of course, be conditioned by the same supply limitations. 
Minerals Table 27 shows Peru's relative importance as a world pro­
ducer of its major mineral exports. It was already seen in Chapter III 
that the world demand for minerals has been very favorable, as a result of 
rapid economic growth in the industrial world. Relating Peru's mineral ex­
ports to the growth of industrial production in the U.S., Western Europe 
and Japan, a fairly good fit can be obtained. But supply developments, in 
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Peru, played a very important role and will continue to do so in the fu­
ture . 
Iron ore According to Balassa, steel consumption has been 
growing at a rate lower than industrial production in the U.S. but at a 
slightly higher rate than industrial production in Western Europe and 
Japan. The market for iron ore is at present a buyer's market. The in­
tense exploration for iron ore, as a result of the fear of a world shortage 
immediately following World War II, led to the discovery of immense re­
serves. To quickly fulfill short term demand, however, small and medium 
size exploitations were started, such as for instance the Marcona and Acari 
mines in Peru. 
According to Balassa, Peru accounted in 1959-61 for about 3% of the 
iron ore entering world trade. But Peru is badly located with respect to 
the major markets. Iron ore was sold, originally, mainly to the U.S., but 
increasing competition (from Venezuela, Canada) caused a market shift to 
Europe and Japan, conditioned by contractual agreements, whereby, in ex­
change for buying Peruvian iron ore, Japan sold boats for iron ore trans­
port and Europe sold machinery. Competition has become even more intense 
lately, particularly because of the large output forthcoming from 
Australian deposits, conveniently located to satisfy the Japanese market. 
Nevertheless, a factor which is improving Peru's competitive position 
is the expansion of exports in pellet form, which cuts down on transporta­
tion costs. The biggest producer, Marcona, will reach a production level 
of 7 million tons, of which (by 1967) 3 million tons will be exported in 
the form of pellets. The second producer, Acari, accounts for more than 
half a million ton of mineral. 
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Prices for iron ore are expected to be relatively stable: pellets 
sell for about $11.20 per metric ton, mineral for about $5 to $6 per metric 
ton. The increasing proportion of pellets in total exports will, of 
coursé, result in higher export earnings, which may reach 59 to 60 million 
dollars by 1967. 
Copper Demand for copper has been rising slightly less than 
industrial production in the U.S. and at the same or even higher rate than 
industrial production in Western Europe and Japan. Substitution of copper 
by other products, i.e. aluminum, has gone further in the U.S. than in 
other parts of the world. As substitution of copper by aluminum may become 
more pronounced in Western Europe and Japan, reflecting the U.S. experi­
ence, world copper consumption in the future may be expected to rise at a 
slightly lower rate than industrial production. 
The world has abundant reserves of copper. Major producers of the 
free world were, in order of importance, in 1960: the U.S., Zambia, Chile, 
Canada, Congo, Peru and Mexico. These seven countries exported in 1960 
2,324 thousand tons, the share of Peru being 6.9% of the total. Peru 
gained importance as a copper producer particularly since 1960, and pros­
pects for future developments are excellent. Copper output is expected to 
grow at about 5% per year up to 1970. In the early seventies three new 
mines, each representing an investment of up to $200 million, will come 
into exploitation: Cuajone, Cerro Verde and Michiquillay. Each mine will 
have a productive capacity of about 100,000 tons per year. If brought into 
exploitation in the period 1971-73, as planned, Peru's copper export capac­
ity will increase by almost 150% in three years, reaching more than half a 
million tons per year. 
130 
High economic growth in the U.S.. and a number of political factors 
affecting copper supplies, have caused a severe short run shortage of this 
metal. Prices being received by Peruvian producers in 1966 have risen more 
than 50%. Given the expected increase in world supply, however, prices 
will probably return to a more normal level by 1967 or 1968. On the other 
hand, if actual prices are sustained for a long period of time, substitu­
tion by aluminum may seriously affect world copper consumption. 
Lead and zinc Lead is used mainly in connection with the 
automobile industry (i.e. batteries, additives to gasoline) and in cables, 
pipes, sheets and other structural uses. It is recoverable in many cases 
thereby making secondary lead also very important. Western European and 
Japanese consumption have increased strongly from 1950 to 1960, mainly be­
cause of high automobile output, but U.S. consumption has been relatively 
stagnant. In fact, in many of its structural uses, lead can and is being 
substituted by aluminum and plasties. Future consumption will probably 
grow at a rate significantly below that of industrial production. 
Zinc, which is used especially in the automobile and construction 
activities, is generally not recoverable. Zinc consumption will probably 
continue to grow at rates faster than primary lead consumption, but below 
industrial production growth. This last trend has been reflected in Peru's 
past exports, with zinc growing significantly faster than lead exports. 
Peru accounts for more than 6% of world output of both lead and zinc, 
and for 9 to 10% of world trade. High prices since 1964 have resulted in 
significant increases in output and exports, which may continue to grow at 
about 5% per year, given Peru's production plans. 
Surplus world lead supplies from 1959 to 1961 resulted in declining 
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prices, but since 1962 a shortage has appeared and prices have gone up 
strongly. Likewise, world zinc supplies were in surplus from 1959 to 1962, 
with prices declining, while a shortage in 1963-64 caused an upturn in 
prices. However, a new zinc surplus in 1965 and a reduction in the lead 
shortage have weakened prices. It appears that further price drops in both 
metals are probable, particularly in view of future increases in U.S. out­
put. 
Silver The U.S., Mexico and Peru are the world's largest sil­
ver producers, but Peru is the most important exporter. Peru's production 
prospects are for a yearly increase of about 5%. Prices, which are pre­
sently being controlled by the U. S., may very well rise somewhat towards 
the end of the decade. Furthermore, by that time a phosphate mine will be 
opened which, together with its byproducts, salt and potash, will increase 
Peru's export earnings by around $10 million. 
The results of the foregoing analysis of Peru's major export products 
have been summarized in Table 28. Data for 1960-65 are from (25). 
In order to estimate the growth rate of total exports, the sum of the 
products considered, given their preponderance in the total of Peru's ex­
ports, has been assumed to represent adequately the path of total exports. 
Peru's total exports will grow on the basis of the above projections at 
about 3.8% annually both in current and in constant 1964 dollars, between 
1964 and 1970. Mineral exports will account for most of this growth. 
It is thus anticipated that the rate of growth of exports will be 
considerably below that of the last 15 years. It has to be added that the 
best export performer of the past, fishmeal, is at the same time the most 
important unknown in these projections. As explained above, however, pre-
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Table 28. Volume, price and value of major exports, 1960-65 
Estimates 1970 and 1975^ 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1970 1975 
Sugar Vol. 526 557 479 496 425 366 500 550 
Price 90 115 112 127 149 102 110 110 
Val. 47 64 54 63 63 37 55 61 
Coffee Vol. 26 34 37 40 42 35 42 49 
Price 702 670 646 638 875 840 840 840 
Val. 18 23 24 26 37 29 35 41 
Cotton Vol. 100 114 139 125 115 114 140 165 
Price 730 697 696 731 792 759 650 650 
Val. 73 79 97 91 91 87 91 107 
Fishmeal Vol. 507 708 1,056 1,038 1,426 1,415 1,640 1,900 
Price 76 70 95 101 101 110 110 110 
Val. 39 • 50 100 105 144 156 180 209 
b 
Iron ore Vol. 3,125 3,382 3,149 3,580 3,710 4,594 4,900 4,900 
Price 10.47 10.89 10.38 10.18 10.48 10.22 12.00 12.00 
Val. 33 37 33 36 39 47 59 59 
Copper Vol. 168 199 172 163 179 180 240 600 
Price 564 529 537 534 575 674 650 650 
Val. 95 105 92 87 103 121 156 390 
Lead Vol. 118 142 135 121 167 151 224 286 
Price 184 157 120 136 198 251 198 198 
Val. 22 22 16 16 33 38 44 57 
Zinc Vol. 158 207 182 187 275 266 369 471 
Price 106 92 87 85 142 134 134 134 
Val. 17 19 16 16 39 36 49 63 
^Volume is in 1,000 tons, price in U.S.$ per ton (FOB), and value in 
millions of U.S.$ (FOB). 
^Volume is in terms of iron content. Price is average price per unit 
of iron content, and price increase in 1970-75 is due to increasing propor­
tion being exported in the form of pellets. 
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Table 28 (Continued) 
1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1970 1975 
1,971 
40.00 
79 
15 
Sum of exports of ten products in current prices: 
1964: 594 
1970: 741 
1975; 1081 
Annual cumulative growth rates: 
Silver^ Vol. 927 1,035 1,070 983 1,152 1,027 1,544 
Price 26.10 26.62 30.87 36.40 39.27 38.02 40.00 
Val. 24 28 33 36 45 39 62 
Phosphates^ Value ------ 10 
1964-70: 3.87= 
1970-75: 7.8% 
Sum of exports of ten products in 1964 prices: 
1964: 594 
1970: 745 
1975: 1060 
Annual cumulative growth rates: 
1964-70: 3.8% 
1970-75: 7.3% 
^Volume is in kg., price in U.S.$ per kg. (FOB). 
^Value is the sum of sales of phosphates, and byproducts; salt and 
potash. 
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sent knowledge of fish population indicates that a limit has been reached 
in yearly catch. 
From 1970 up to 1975 exports will probably grow at a higher rate, 
about 7.5%, mainly because of added copper supply. 
2. International institutional arrangements and Peru's foreign trade 
One of the most typical problems of less developed countries is a 
persistent tendency to run into balance of payments difficulties. Some of 
the underlying causes of this tendency will be examined in the second part 
of this chapter. In order to provide a solution to a deficit in their ex­
ternal accounts, underdeveloped countries have relied primarily on import 
substituting industrialization. While import substitution could be carried 
out relatively easily for consumer goods, their production requires in­
creased imports of raw materials and capital goods, and substitution by 
domestically produced goods of the latter two categories is mu ' harder to 
attain. 
In fact, industrialization has made balance of payments crises much 
harder to solve, since it is much more difficult to restrict imports of raw 
materials or capital goods than imports of consumer goods. As a result, 
underdeveloped countries have, recently, come to attach relatively much 
more importance to the other aspect of the solution of balance of payments 
difficulties, namely increased export earnings, with respect to both their 
traditional primary exports and exports of manufactured goods. This last 
view was expressed particularly in the 1964 United Nations' Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which, even though it did not take, for the 
moment, any specific action, at least established itself as a continuing 
organization of the United Nations. 
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Attempts are also being made to promote exports and to carry import 
substitution further into the field of raw materials and capital goods, 
primarily through the creation of larger regional markets, such as, for 
instance, the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA). 
The implications of both UNCTAD and LAFTA will be discussed and their 
importance for Peru examined. 
The United Nations' Conference on Trade and Development In recent 
years, some of the basic principles of international commercial policy, 
applicable to members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT)^, have weakened considerably. To a large extent, this has been a 
result of attempts, on the part of underdeveloped economies, to devise ways 
for trade to play a more effective role in assisting their economic devel­
opment . 
The decreasing importance of certain commercial rules became very 
clear when, for instance, in 1963, GATT explicitly agreed that in the 
Kennedy Round of trade negotiations the principle of reciprocity would not 
be applied strictly. In UNCTAD, the case for tariff preferences for ex­
ports of underdeveloped countries in the markets of the industrial world, 
challenged what is probably the most basic principle of GATT: the most-
favored-nation rule. The idea of tariff preferences, proposed by the 
underdeveloped world, was looked upon favorably by most developed coun­
tries, the United States being the main exception. 
Preferential entry into the industrial world of manufactures and semi-
The member countries of GATT account for approximately 80% of inter­
national trade. 
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manufactures originating in underdeveloped countries, as opposed to these 
same items coming from developed countries, is basically an extension of 
the well known "infant industry" argument. It is assumed that underdevel­
oped countries are temporarily incapable of producing at competitive 
prices, because they have not had a chance to take advantage of economies 
of large scale production and of external economies. Preferential tariffs 
are meant to assist them in doing so. 
The efforts to increase the less developed countries' exports of manu­
factures and semi-manufactures are based on the presumption that import 
substitution and traditional exports alone are not sufficient to solve 
persistent balance of payments difficulties, and that import substitution 
alone, has in practice very often led to inefficiency which in turn impeded 
the process of economic growth. 
It should be pointed out that UNCTAD did not limit itself to the pro­
blem of preferential tariffs. Among other important subjects being dis­
cussed, were: finding means of increasing earnings of traditional ex­
ports, by a reduction of existing trade barriers and by appropriate inter­
national commodity agreements. Actually, substantial improvements could 
be made in the external accounts of less developed nations, by actions 
along traditional GATT lines. After all, primary products make up almost 
nine-tenths of total exports earnings of the lesser developed world, and 
easier access of these products in developed country markets could greatly 
increase export earnings. 
Existing trade barriers for primary products take many forms, such as 
tariffs, subsidies, quotas, excise taxes and others. Important from Peru's 
standpoint is for instance the protection of sugar production in the indus-
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trial world. (Quotas in the U.S., subsidies in the European Economic 
Community and United Kingdom.) As the cost of beet sugar generally exceeds 
the cost of cane sugar, the absence of protection would probably substan­
tially reduce sugar production in the developed countries to the advantage 
of cane sugar producers such as Peru. 
Lower or zero tariffs or excise taxes would furthermore increase sugar 
consumption, even though the price elasticity is not very high; the latter 
observation applies equally well to coffee. Changes in the U.S. cotton 
subsidies or import quotas could also substantially affect other countries' 
share of the world market. 
Finally, fishmeal and minerals are, in general, not subject to serious 
restrictions, except for a few tariffs. However, differential tariffs for 
some minerals, depending on the degree of processing, do constitute for 
underdeveloped countries a barrier to increasing export earnings, by pre­
venting them from exporting these minerals in a more processed form. 
Major changes in the protectionist policies of the industrial coun­
tries do not seem very likely given the present state of affairs. This is 
why much consideration is being given to commodity agreements, which can 
provide a means of assisting underdeveloped economies by stabilizing and 
raising prices. The International Coffee Agreement, of which Peru is a 
member, has up to now been effective in stabilizing prices at a remunera­
tive level, through its control of exports. Similarly, the U.S. sugar 
quotas which, given the domestic protection, are probably the only prac­
tical type of agreement at this moment, benefit Peru substantially, as the 
price paid is well above the world price. However, an international sugar 
agreement (which was one of the endeavors of UNCTAD) would improve the 
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sugar problem substantially. 
On the other hand, it has to be added that past experience with com­
modity agreements has been rather unsatisfactory, for a variety of reasons, 
the analysis of which lies outside the scope of the present study. Factors 
which could be mentioned are, for instance, the important competition from 
synthetics and the heterogenous character of many commodities, such as 
coffee (which makes the problem of establishing stable prices extremely 
difficult) and the fact that agreements normally request the collaboration 
of producers and consumers, which raises many problems. 
Whereas commodity agreements could be useful in assisting less devel­
oped economies with respect to their primary product exports, preferential 
tariffs would be aimed at supporting exports of manufactured and semi­
manufactured products from underdeveloped economies. Up to now, the U.S. 
has strongly opposed the establishment of preferential tariffs. 
On the one hand, it can be argued that the effectiveness of preferen­
tial tariffs in assisting exports of less developed economies is question­
able on the grounds that the present average tariff structure of the 
developed world is too low to provide the underdeveloped countries, through 
preferences, a margin high enough to give them adequate export incentives. 
This has been explored very well in (34), where it is also pointed out that 
the price charged by the less developed exporter must be below the domestic 
price in the preference giving country (which includes large "countries" 
such as the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Asso­
ciation besides the U.S.) and that it cannot be above other developed ex­
porters' price by more than the tariff. On the basis of the above consi­
derations, it would appear, in other words, that preferential tariffs for 
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manufactured and semi-manufactured exports of less developed countries 
would provide the latter with only relatively very small advantages. Con­
sequently, their effectiveness as an incentive mechanism seems questionable 
if compared with the relatively high margin of protection often granted to 
the domestic production of import substitutes in underdeveloped countries. 
On the other hand, it is important to note that "effective" tariff 
protection in developed countries is often higher than the nominal protec­
tion which is specified by the tariff on the finished good. Developed 
country duties are, generally speaking, lower on raw materials and higher 
on more finished goods; a 10% duty on the finished good and no duty on the 
imported raw material signifies a more than 10% effective protection for 
the value added generated in the country. In other words, preferential 
treatment is usually larger than a superficial analysis of tariffs would 
seem to indicate. 
The possibility of success of a system of preferential tariffs depends 
not only on the above mentioned economic implications, but also on a num­
ber of obstacles of a more practical nature. The degree of interest shown 
by the different developed countries, for instance, will be conditioned by 
the intensity of domestic problems which are likely to result, following 
preferential entry of exports from less developed economies. Other pro­
blems may result because the various underdeveloped countries may be able 
to take advantage of the new agreement with different degrees of success. 
It is obvious that the internal industrial structure in some developed 
countries will be much more vulnerable to an opening up of markets than in 
others. It is interesting to note, in this connection, that the industries 
in which the underdeveloped countries may become competitive first, are at 
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the same time old established industries in the industrial world which will 
press hard for their own protection. Past experience with cotton textiles 
would tend to support the above contention. 
Conversely, great differences exist within the underdeveloped world in 
the ability to exploit new market opportunities. If preferences were to be 
extended for instance on a non-discriminatory basis to all underdeveloped 
countries, it would seem that the more advanced ones among them, such as 
Argentina or Brazil because of their relative lead in industrial develop­
ment, would tend to gain more than the relatively less developed countries 
such as Peru. Further problems relate, among others, to some African 
States which presently receive preferential treatment in the European Com­
mon Jlarket, and would not like to lose this privilege. Finding workable 
solutions to all these and other opposing interests will clearly be a very 
difficult task. 
Evidently UNCTAD has dealt with problems of the utmost importance to 
underdeveloped economies, i.e. how to make trade contribute more efficient­
ly to economic development, and more particularly how to raise export earn­
ings. It should be kept in mind, however, that such devices as commodity 
agreements or preferential tariffs represent at best only part of the solu­
tion. The most important changes have to come from within the less devel­
oped economy. In many countries domestic policies conducive to export 
development are a first and most important necessity. These will be dis­
cussed later in this chapter. 
The Latin American Free Trade Association The argument for Latin 
American integration is based above all on market size. The treaty estab­
lishing LAFTA was ratified in June 1961 by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
141 
Mexico, Peru, Uruguay and Paraguay; later in 1961 Colombia and Ecuador 
joined the other seven. Together, the nine countries represent a potential 
market comparable to the U.S. or the European Common Market in terms of 
population. 
It was assumed when LAFïA was created originally that the removal of 
trade barriers within the area would result in the creation of a large mar­
ket and, therefore, lead automatically to industrial growth. The availa­
bility of a large market, as was explained also in the section referring to 
UNCTAD, makes industrialization easier and import substitution cheaper and 
thus provides furthermore a rational basis for the promotion of exports of 
manufactures. In addition, less developed countries will find it easier to 
compete within a regional market such as LAFTA, than in the developed coun­
try markets. 
The creation of the LAFTA market is taking place through a series of 
tariff reductions which have to be completed by 1973. Traditionally intra-
LAFTA trade has been relatively small (about 10% of total foreign commerce 
of the area) and consisted mainly of temperate and tropical agricultural 
commodities and of some minerals. Barriers to this kind of trade were 
relatively easy to remove. Tariff negotiations made good progress at 
first, but have been running increasingly into difficulties. 
In the past, manufactured goods made up very little of intra-area 
trade. A primary aim of LAFTA, however, is an increase in the production 
and trade of such goods. Especially, the larger countries, such as 
Argentina and Brazil, do produce a large number of manufactures, but as 
their respective industries were established under the strong incentive of 
heavy protection, prices are generally very high. Consequently, removal of 
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tariff walls becomes extremely difficult. This is the reason why tariff 
negotiations have encountered an increasing number of obstacles. 
Another major problem in the integration area is related to the uneven 
relative degree of development of the different countries. 
Following the liberalization of intra-LAFTA trade, it may be expected 
that the free play of market forces would tend to lead to a further con­
centration of industry in the industrially more advanced countries, i.e. 
Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, because of the existence of external econo­
mies. Unequal benefits would, of course, seriously compromise the success 
of the integration movement. The removal of trade barriers will, there­
fore, have to be supplemented by more coordinated economic policies if the 
gains from integration are to be distributed more equally. 
The two least developed countries, Ecuador and Paraguay, have already 
been granted a number of special privileges, such as more rapid liberaliza­
tion by the other seven countries of imports originating in Ecuador or 
Paraguay, and continued protection of domestic production in these two 
countries of otherwise liberalized items. Similarly, the group of coun­
tries consisting of Peru, Chile, Uruguay and Colombia has been given an 
"intermediate" status, also subject to special treatment. 
It would appear, however, that, in order to avoid the above mentioned 
tendency toward uneven distribution of benefits among the member countries, 
additional policy interferences be necessary. The special privileges 
granted to the less developed economies may, for instance, have to be ex­
tended beyond the transitional period, while the development of their so­
cial overhead capital may have to be subsidized by the more advanced part­
ners; overall coordinated government policy appears imperative. 
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It may also be asked whether the Latin American integration movement 
as such is desirable at all or, in other words, whether the integration 
will lead to any substantial increase in the level of economic welfare. 
The measurement of changes in welfare, following integration, has tradi­
tionally relied largely on a comparison of the trade-creating and trade-
diverting effects of the regional grouping (35), and the integration is 
said to contribute to an increase in economic welfare if the former out­
weigh the latter. It has been pointed out, however, by various authors, 
for instance (36), that, while on the one hand presently existing condi­
tions in Latin American seem to indicate that the scope for trade creation 
is very limited in the area and that trade diversion may be considerable, 
on the other hand, measurements of economic welfare, based on the concepts 
of trade creation and diversion, are essentially static and assume a given 
amount of resources. The problem of Latin American integration has to be 
looked upon differently. The ultimate objective of the Latin American 
countries is increased economic growth, and the desirability of economic 
integration depends primarily on whether it can assist Latin America in 
the attainment of this goal. It can be argued strongly that the existence 
of a large market would provide the opportunity of taking advantage of ex­
ternal economies and of economies of large scale production. In this way 
the conditions are created for a more efficient process of import substi­
tution and export promotion, resulting furthermore in an increase in em­
ployment and a strengthening of the balance of payments position of Latin 
America with the rest of the world. In other words, long run gains (high 
growth rate, employment, balance of payments equilibrium) may substantially 
outweigh short run losses in efficiency (trade diversion). 
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Peru, whose import restrictions are the most moderate of the LAFTA 
countries, and whose industrial structure belongs to the more underdevel­
oped ones of the region, is consequently very vulnerable to the short run 
disadvantages which accompany the creation of LAFTA. Table 29 illustrates 
to some extent the importance and the evolution of Peru's trade relation­
ships with other LAFTA countries. 
As the figures indicate, the level of Peru's exports to other LAFTA 
countries has, on the one hand, remained essentially unchanged in dollar 
terms from 1950 to 1965. As a result, the percentage of Peru's total ex­
ports which goes to LAFTA markets has, over the period, dropped from about 
one fourth to only 8.1% in 1965. The most important items by far are sugar 
exports to Chile and cotton exports to Chile and Argentina. 
On the other hand, imports from LAFTA countries have grown faster than 
overall imports, the relative share in total imports having risen from less 
than 8% to about 11%. These imports consist primarily of wheat and meat 
from Argentina and of some other foodstuffs. As a result of these move­
ments, Peru's commercial balance with LAFTA has been reversed from a large 
positive balance in the 1950's to a strongly negative balance in 1965. 
The explanation goes back to the present distribution of imports and 
exports. Peru's imports contain a sizeable amount of foodstuffs, which can 
be supplied by LAFTA. Its exports, on the other hand, find their main mar­
kets in the industrialized world. 
Trade diversion at the expense of Peru would probably occur in the 
near future, if Peru were to open its market to consumer goods imports 
from, for instance, Brazil, Argentina, or Mexico, which would probably be 
higher cost items than those originating in Peru's more traditional sources 
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Table 29. Peru's intra-LAFTA trade^ (in million dollars and as percent of 
total trade, 1950-1965) 
Year Millions of dollars Percent of total trade 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports 
1950 51.2 -14.7 36.5 26.4 7.9 
1951 50.4 -21.0 29.4 19.9 7.5 
1952 66.6 -17.7 48.9 27.9 6.2 
1953 51.2 -17.9 33.3 23.1 6.1 
1954 39.9 -21.1 18.8 16.1 8.4 
1955 49.9 -23.1 26.8 18.4 7.7 
1956 46.9 -20.3 26.6 15.0 5.3 
1957 44.7 -30.1 14.6 13.5 6.7 
1958 38.1 -20,7 17.4 13.1 5.4 
1959 46.7 -20.8 25.9 14.9 6.5 
1960 33.5 -27.5 6.0 7.7 7.3 
1961 31.5 -31.8 -0.3 6.4 6.8 
1962 48.8 -45.2 3.6 9.0 8.4 
1963 49.1 -62.0 -12.9 9.1 11.1 
7 
1964 64.5 -58.9 5.6 9.7 10.2 
1965 54.1 -80.9 -26.8 8.1 11.1 
^Source (25). 
146 
of supply. On the other hand, as mentioned above, the country's primary 
exports can, generally speaking, be sold equally well to non-LAFTA members. 
It appears, in other words, that the liberalization of trade within Latin 
America may, in the short run, lead to a net loss in economic welfare for 
Peru. It is interesting to note in this connection that between 1962 and 
1964, Peru's exports to LAFTA of negotiated products remained stagnant 
(actually decreased slightly) while its exports to LAFTA of not negotiated 
products increased substantially (in other words without the help of any 
negotiations). Conversely, imports of negotiated products (most food­
stuffs) increased much more than imports of not negotiated products. It 
is, of course, correct to argue that imports of foodstuffs from LAFTA may 
have increased in any case. Even though the experience of two years is 
much too short to derive any very meaningful conclusions, the above men­
tioned trends tend to support the fears expressed above. 
Furthermore, it was seen earlier that, as a result of the liberaliza­
tion of trade, the free play of market forces would tend to lead to a con­
centration of new industry in the already industrially more advanced coun­
tries. It seems clear, consequently, that if Peru (tnemther with some 
other LAFTA members) is to benefit from the integration, preferential 
treatment will be required which may take the form of prolonged protection 
of Peruvian industry, technical assistance and development of Peru's infra­
structure financed by the more advanced countries, and similar measures. 
Equal benefits for Peru does not necessarily imply that, for instance, 
Peru's intra-LAFTA trade has to be continuously in equilibrium. It is 
clear that the country's comparative advantage may be such as to lead to a 
balance of payments deficit with LAFTA and a surplus with third countries. 
147 
The test of equality of advantages for Peru will consist rather in whether 
the integration movement succeeds in providing a set of conditions equally 
conducive to future development for Peru as for the other LAFTA members. 
It was explained above that a system of preferences and a coordinated re­
gional economic policy may be required for this purpose. 
Under the latter circumstances, the long run advantages for Peru of 
expanding and improving its industrial structure within a large Latin 
American market, rather than within the very limited domestic market, will 
most probably exceed short run losses to a considerable extent. The larger 
market will bring with it thorough changes in scale, method and organiza­
tion of production, the benefits of which would ultimately result in faster 
economic growth. 
The Peruvian and Latin American textile industry could be cited as an 
illustration of the problems involved. According to (37), per capita con­
sumption of textiles in Latin America has, over the last decade, remained 
practically constant, due particularly to relatively very high prices. The 
latter are a result, not only of the inefficiency in the industry and con­
sequently high costs of production, but also of the deficient marketing and 
distribution system. As large segments of Latin America's population con­
sume presently only insignificant amounts of textiles, a lowering of prices 
could result in substantial increases in consumption. 
A comparison of the consumer price level of textiles in 1962 in the 
different Latin American countries shows that, while prices are lowest in 
Colombia, Peru appears among the countries with the highest textile prices 
of the region, about double the prices of Colombia (Table 30). Yet in terms 
of major input prices (cotton, wool, labor force), before productivity con-
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Table 30. Comparison of consumer prices of textiles and costs of major 
inputs (raw material and labor force), in selected Latin 
American countries (indices: Colombia = 100) 
Consumer price 
of textiles 
(1962) 
Cost of major 
Cotton textile 
industry 
inputs® 
Wool 
industry 
Argentina 176 84 68 - 71 
Bolivia 183 74 75 
Brazil 256 68 65 - 76 
Colomb ia 100 100 100 
Chile 193 101 76 -134 
Ecuador 128 85 148 -152 
Peru 204 87 69 
Uruguay 274 139 63 
^Some difference exists in the reference period for the different 
countries. 
siderations, Peru compares very favorably with other Latin American coun­
tries and is substantially better off than Colombia. The difference in 
consumer prices, in other words, appears to be the result of Peru's extreme 
inefficiency in both the production process - obsolete machinery, deficient 
organization of production - and the commercialization system-
Very high import duties, and, in some countries, a number of quantita­
tive and other import restrictions, provide the Latin American textile in­
dustry with an exceedingly large amount of protection. Inter-Latin-
American trade in textiles is, consequently, extremely small. A liberali­
zation of trade in textile products within Latin America could have a 
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number of beneficial effects. Presently the small size of the national 
markets for instance implies that many plants have to produce too large a 
variety of products (fragmentation of production) which tends to increase 
production costs; the availability of a wider market could result in sub­
stantial cost reductions. Also, it may be expected that the existence of a 
more competitive environment following trade liberalization would have very 
positive effects on efficiency. 
The Latin American integration movement, in other words, could be a 
most valuable aid in the efforts to increase the productivity in the tex­
tile sector in Latin America. It is clear, however, that a strictly com­
mercial policy, consisting of a gradual elimination of import restrictions 
only, would run into very stiff opposition on the part of the less effi­
cient producers; trade liberalization would, most probably, make very lit­
tle progress. 
It appears necessary, therefore, to combine the opening up of markets 
with a coordinated investment and technical assistance program, whereby 
joint action be taken in order to bring the textile industry in the dif­
ferent countries on a more equal competitive level. Under the above con­
ditions, the Peruvian textile industry could play a vital role in Latin 
America, given its relatively favorable position in terms of raw material 
and labor costs. It is important also to note in this connection that Peru 
is the largest producer in Latin America of long staple cotton; given this 
advantage, Peru could produce for instance cotton knitting yarns of much 
higher quality than most yarns presently used in Latin America. 
Among a number of other items, in which Peru could perform a relative­
ly important role within LAFTA, the following may be mentioned. The need 
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to stimulate agricultural production will greatly increase the demand for 
fertilizer in Latin America. The potential availability of large amounts 
of low cost sulfuric acid as a byproduct of the refinery of the Toquepala 
copper mines together with the recently discovered phosphate deposits in 
the desert of Sechura could turn Peru into a very important super-phosphate 
producer in Latin America. As the LAFTA countries have to import presently 
the larger part of their phosphate fertilizer needs, the potential market 
is very large. 
Another product of importance for Peru is jute, for the production of 
which excellent conditions exist in the Selva. Both Peru and some other 
LAFTA countries import at the present time substantial amounts of jute and 
jute products from India and Pakistan. Quantitative information on a pro­
posed expansion of jute production in Peru will be presented later in this 
chapter. It appears, generally speaking, that Peruvian production, given a 
small margin of tariff protection, could be substituted for present imports 
into LAFTA countries. 
Peru's abundant fish resources along the coast have made the country 
the world's leading fishery nation. The major product, fishmeal, which is 
presently used mainly in livestock rations, may in the future play an in­
creasingly important role in human consumption as a cheap source of pro­
teins. For the Peruvian internal market, fishmeal for human consumption is 
already being elaborated on an industrial scale and mixed in small propor­
tions with flour for use in some of the bread and noodles. In view of the 
protein deficit in Peru and in other LAFTA countries, a potentially very 
large market exists. 
Similarly, the role of Peru as a supplier to Latin America of other 
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fish products, such as fishoil and canned or dried fish (imports of the 
latter into LAFTA countries from outside the area were in 1964 of the or­
der of $20 million) may become very significant. 
Peru's mineral resources also offer a number of industrial opportuni­
ties which may be exploited in the LAFTA market. Examples are the indus­
trialization of copper (wire, tube) or the production of lead oxide and 
other lead products. A natural comparative ad/antage appears to exist also 
in the production of metal alloys, given the diversity of metals available 
to Peru. 
Efforts should also be initiated to exploit more effectively for ex­
port, to Latin America and to the rest of the world, some resources which 
are virtually unique to Peru, such as Pisco (a high quality alcoholic 
beverage), alpaca (a luxury wool) and a number of artesan products. Given 
the uniqueness of these products, the potential market may be considerable. 
B. Development Policies and Future Import Needs 
1. Limits to development 
As explained extensively in Chapters III and IV, the substantial 
economic growth which has been witnessed in Peru in the last few years was 
based primarily on export development. Furthermore, the country has been 
able to sustain this high rate of growth largely through its own resources, 
and through imports paid for by exports. With the exception of the period 
1955 through 1958, when large amounts of foreign capital were invested in 
the mining sector, net reliance on foreign resources has, indeed, been rel­
atively small. 
The rapid rate of expansion, in terms of GNP, can be traced back to 
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both supply and demand developments. Peru's favorable natural resource 
endowment (particularly minerals and fish) constitutes a first element of 
success. Secondly, the rate of investment has been substantial (averaging 
around 21% of GNP from 1955 to 1964), and judging from the rate of growth 
of GNP, the incremental output capital ratio was relatively high. The mar­
ginal savings rate, which depends primarily on profits in the export sector 
and, to a smaller extent, on profits in the industrial sector producing for 
the domestic market, has been high especially since 1959. 
In the third place, as was seen in Chapter IV, the balance of payments 
has shewn considerable strength in the last few years, and certainly did 
not constitute a limiting factor on Peru's growth. Finally, as the labor 
force employed in the export activities does not on the average require 
high levels of skill, there was always an ample supply of labor. Likewise 
the entrepreneurial class kept on increasing steadily in size. 
In other words, Peru's recent successful expansion has been facili­
tated by the fact that no serious supply bottlenecks prevailed during the 
process. 
Chenery and Strout in (38) have, for a large number of countries, in­
cluding Peru, attempted to determine which of three basic supply bottle­
necks - skills, savings or trade - have primarily limited recent growth 
performances. Even though the reference period, 1957-1962, is very short 
and consequently the reliability of the information obtained somewhat re­
strictive, the analysis leads to the same general conclusions as noted 
above; Peru has in recent years experienced growth without running into 
important supply limitations. 
On the demand side, Peru's growth was led by rapidly expanding for­
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eign markets. The latter offered the "opportunity" which was readily ex­
ploited by a growing class of entrepreneurs. Inasmuch as the shortage of 
entrepreneurship is often cited as a limit to development, this is so, not 
because of an absolute absence of entrepreneurs, but rather because their 
lack of knowledge and experience hampers their decision making. As a con­
sequence traditional investment into real estate or commerce is preferred 
to industry. However, the tremendous profits that could be made in fish-
meal, together with an extremely strong world demand, facilitated the deci­
sion making process in the case of Peru. 
Much recent economic literature has possibly underestimated the im­
portance of a strongly growing demand, by concentrating on the different 
types of supply limitations. In Peru, demand (primarily foreign) led the 
way to growth, and supplies could be relatively easily drawn upon. In the 
group of countries analyzed by Chenery and Strout in (38), the countries 
whose growth performance did not encounter significant supply limitations, 
were also countries whose export development has generally been very good. 
Domestic demand being quite often very limited in underdeveloped areas, 
those countries which could not count on some dynamism in their export 
development have normally run into either a savings and (or) a foreign ex­
change gap. 
Conversely, countries with rapidly rising external demand have gener­
ally shown a higher elasticity of supply than is often thought. It is not 
implied here that underdeveloped countries do not often have strong supply 
limitations. What is meant is that limitations imposed upon them by the 
size of the market should not be passed over lightly. 
One of the most positive aspects of Peru's expansion is probably that 
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such elements as skills, entrepreneurship and savings which are necessary 
ingredients for growth seem to have increased throughout the postwar per­
iod. In this sense, Peru has certainly broadened the base from which to 
attack its future problems. This does not necessarily mean, however, that 
Peru is successfully completing the transitional period to continuing and 
self-sustaining growth. World markets for Peru's major export products 
have been very favorable, but inasmuch as the products are raw materials 
(fish, minerals), their supply is essentially determined exogenously, and 
they may run outl Also, in the future, Peru's import demand will have a 
tendency to grow faster than its export demand, as will be seen below. 
The process of industrial growth, both through import substitution and 
through promotion of exports of manufactures, will depend considerably cn 
wh^t could be described as "flexibility" of the factors of production. 
At an early stage of development, such as Peru's, savings are quite 
often available. In order for savings to be channeled into investment, 
productive opportunities have to exist and be perceived by entrepreneurs. 
The tremendous expansion of the fishmeal sector, which has been financed 
predominantly by domestic capital, illustrates the considerable elasticity 
of savings to the opening up of investment opportunities. However, the 
structure of market demand changes continuously; for instance, Peru is 
faced presently with slow growth prospects in its cotton, sugar and coffee 
markets. Hence, new outlets for savings have to be identified continuous­
ly; the slowness and difficulties of the latter process in underdeveloped 
economies appear to be major bottlenecks in the development process. As 
a consequence, funds are too often directed towards luxury consumption and 
capital flight, or into excessive investment in real estate and commerce. 
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The above mentioned "flexibility" is related in the following way to 
the different supply and demand limitations, which may occur during the 
development process. Domestic savings will generally not be sufficient 
for large scale undertakings, such as mining, and foreign capital inflow 
will be necessary. Or the government may have to invest extensively in 
infrastructure, and its domestic savings may have to be supplemented by 
foreign resources. 
On the other hand, up to now Peru has not encountered a labor con­
straint probably because the skills required in its primary export sector 
are minimal (i.e. cotton pickers) and the supply of unskilled labor is very 
elastic at this stage. However, as more involved industrial development 
takes place, skilled labor and experienced entrepreneurs may become a pri­
mary limit to growth. Alternatively, an import-export gap may appear. 
On the demand side, the development of the domestic market may have to 
be supplemented by new primary product exports as well as exports of manu­
factures. Thus, the overall problem which Peru will face would appear to 
consist primarily in the flexibility in terms of adjusting the supply of 
factors of production to the changing structure of demand. 
It is the function of economic policy to contribute to the extent 
possible to an improvement in the above described flexibility. The present 
analysis is focused especially on the problem of import substitution versus 
export promotion. The choice between these two alternatives, and the eco­
nomic policies determining it, are of central importance to the future 
development of Peru. 
It should be noted first of all that, in spite of the excellent export 
performance of the past, a strong tendency to develop an import-export gap 
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is always present. As was shown earlier in this chapter, Peru's future ex­
port growth will probably not be as dynamic as in the past. Furthermore, 
being an underdeveloped country, the diversity and fast growth of its im­
port demand can only with great difficulty be offset by expanding exports 
and import substitution, because of the relative lack of flexibility of 
factors of production. Hirschman [(26) pp. 169-173] also blames structural 
factors for the permanent tendency towards import surpluses in underdevel­
oped countries, while Chenery and Strout in (38) likewise point to the pre­
dominance of the trade limit in the course of economic development. 
The study of equilibrium in the foreign trade sector in Peru is of 
importance, secondly, from the standpoint of market limitations in future 
growth. Industrial development through import substitution has long been 
sought as the only way towards development, exports being considered mainly 
as an exogenous variable only. Even though the shortcomings of this 
approach are, for obvious reasons, less important in large than in small 
countries, experience shows that even such large countries as Brazil have 
recently run in severe foreign trade bottlenecks (39). Peru, with its 
limited domestic market, has to frame its economic policy in such a way 
that it will lead to equilibrium between export promotion and import sub­
stitution. This, as will be seen below, requires a revision in some of its 
trade policies and an adequate manipulation of its exchange rate. 
2. Import needs 
The evolution of imports from 1950 to 1964 was analyzed in Chapter 
III. The composition of imports over the period considered underwent only 
minor changes, while an income elasticity of 1.19 obtained for total im­
ports. However, an important additional observation, as can be seen from 
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Table 31. Ratio of imports to gross domestic product and composition of 
imports by major categories, for selected years. Peru and 
average for Latin America 
1950 1955 1960 1961 1962 
Ratio of imports to GDP; 
Latin America^ 10.5 9.9 9.2 9.1 8,7 
Peru 13.0 16.5 14.3 16.3 17.2 
c 
Composition of imports: 
Latin America:^ 
1. Non durable consumer goods 13.6 12.7 11.9 12.5 12.7 
2. Durable consumer goods 5.9 5.8 6.2 6.3 5.1 
3. Combustibles 8.2 10.6 9.4 8.1 7.9 
4. Metallic raw materials 7.4 7.6 7.6 8.7 7.2 
5. Non metallic raw materials 26.4 26.9 28.2 29.6 27.8 
6. Construction materials 6.5 5.5 4.1 3.9 4.8 
7. Agricultural equipment 4.8 3.8 3.4 3.0 2.7 
8. Industrial equipment 17.6 17.6 17.2 17.4 21.0 
9. Transportation equipment 7.2 7.5 9.4 7.4 9.0 
10. Other 2.4 2.0 2.6 3.1 1.8 
Peru: 
1. Non durable consumer goods 21.5 17.4 15.3 14.9 13.0 
2. Durable consumer goods 5.8 9.6 8.9 10.4 10.3 
3. Combustibles 1.8 3.1 4.9 3.5 3.2 
4. Metallic raw materials 3.9 5.0 5.3 5.0 4.6 
5. Non metallic raw materials 24.2 24.0 27.5 25.5 26.4 
6. Construction materials 4.9 8.1 5.1 5.9 6.2 
7. Agricultural equipment 4.7 4.5 3.0 3.2 4.6 
8. Industrial equipment 18.8 19.7 18.8 20.1 20.6 
9. Transportation equipment 13.8 7.4 10.8 11.2 10.6 
10. Other 0.6 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.5 
^Source (40, pp. 58-59). 
Latin America does not include Cuba. 
'^Elaborated on the basis of FOB values, 1960 prices. 
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Table 16 of Chapter III, is the greater stability over time of the volume 
of raw material and fuel imports as compared to capital and consumption 
goods imports. 
Table 31 shows the relation between imports and gross domestic pro­
duct, and the composition of imports, for Latin America and for Peru, for 
a selected number of years. The main observations suggested by the table 
are the following: While the ratio of imports to GDP has been declining in 
Latin America as a whole, it has increased substantially in Peru. In 1962 
this ratio was approximately twice as large for Peru as for Latin America. 
As far as the composition of imports is concerned, the smaller proportion 
of raw material imports and the larger share of consumer goods imports for 
Peru than for Latin America are indications that import substitution in 
Peru has not taken place to the same extent as in Latin America on the 
average. The higher share of capital goods imports in Peru, where domestic 
production of these items is extremely small, has (to some extent) been 
translated in a higher GNP growth than the average for Latin America. 
Future import projections are particularly difficult in a country 
where important structural changes are likely to take place. As was men­
tioned above, time series information for Peru yields an overall income 
elasticity larger than one. A more disaggregate analysis of the relation 
between the major components of Peru's imports (consumer goodsj capital 
goods, raw materials and services) and other macro-economic variables, 
based on Table 32 yields the following results for the period 1950 to 1964. 
Standard errors of the coefficients are in parentheses. Imports of con­
sumer goods (M^) are closely related to the evolution of total consumption 
(C), with the marginal propensity (with respect to consumption) to import 
Table 32. Macroeconomic information for the derivation of import functions^ (millions of 1960 soles) 
Gross Consumer Capital Raw Imports 
domestic Con­ Investment Exports Imports goods goods material of Exchange 
product sumption imports imports imports services rate" 
1950 34,409 29,334 6,596 5,447 6,968 1,467 2,650 1,696 1,155 1,540 
1951 36,694 31,132 8,967 5,315 8,720 2,050 3,800 2,057 813 1,520 
1952 38,505 30,677 10,373 6,507 9,052 1,998 4,083 2,230 741 1,560 
1953 41,010 32,366 11,424 7,211 9,991 1,897 4,738 2,412 944 1,690 
1954 42,707 34,726 9,289 7,754 9,062 1,768 3,498 2,512 1,284 1,970 
1955 44,161 35,927 10,422 8,161 10,349 2,169 3,878 2,967 1,335 1,920 
1956 45,175 36,693 12,568 9,011 13,097 2,449 5,899 3,363 1,386 1,920 
1957 47,162 39,068 13,482 9,147 14,535 2,839 6,690 3,667 1,339 1,910 
1958 47,591 39,363 10,754 9,655 12,181 2,500 5,277 3,105 1,299 2,330 
1959 49,499 41,051 7,634 11,015 10,201 1,908 3,708 3,250 1,335 2,760 
1960 55,650 42,691 10,700 13,686 11,427 2,251 4,091 3,826 1,259 2,730 
1961 60,782 46,319 12,555 15,898 13,990 2,850 5,513 4,330 1,297 2,680 
1962 65,260 49,436 14,659 16,936 15,771 3,174 6,395 4,634 1,568 2,680 
1963 67,650 53,289 15,292 16,097 17,028 3,742 6,471 4,708 2,107 2,680 
1964 71,270 54,991 16,816 17,692 18,229 4,174 6,371 5,421 2,263 2,680 
^Source (14 and 20). 
^Soles per 100 dollars, average rate for Imports during the year. 
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consumer goods, being higher than the average (,062). 
2 
M = -856 + .084 C R = .82 
^ (439) (.011) 
Furthermore, the exchange rate (T) has played a very important role in ex­
plaining consumer goods imports, and can be added as an explanatory vari­
able: 
= -782 + .149 C - 1.233 T = .97 
(199) (.010) (.172) 
According to the latter equation, for a given exchange rate, .15 of a uni­
tary increment in consumption is accounted for by imports. Imports of raw 
materials (M^) can best be related to gross domestic product. 
2 
M = 1,192 + .091 GDP R = .95 
° (284) (.006) 
The relation indicates very fast growing imports of raw materials, the mar­
ginal propensity with respect to GDP (.091) being above the average (.067). 
Domestic production of capital goods in Peru is very limited, and conse­
quently the bulk of capital equipment has to be imported. As noted by 
Thorbecke and Condos in (23, footnote 5), total investment (I) has been es­
timated, in the preparation of the National Income Accounts, on the basis 
of Imports of capital goods (M^). Historically, the relation between 
and I has fluctuated little, around an average of .42. 
= .42 I 
Imports of services (M^), other than freight and insurance, fluctuated 
around 12.8% of imports of goods, or 
= .128 (Mg + Mg + M^) 
Total imports: 
M •--= + M + M. + M . 
C o i s  
161 
Together, these relationships confirm the high and growing dependence on 
imports during the period 1950-64. While they describe past development of 
Peru's imports reasonably well, their usefulness for future projections is 
limited, as will become clear from the following discussion. 
It has been repeatedly stressed in this study that Peru's growth in 
the past was based on export development. Since the rate of growth of ex­
ports was quite high, the capacity to import could accommodate with rela­
tive ease the demand for imports. 
Presently Peru imports relatively large quantities of all types of 
goods: food and other consumer goods, raw materials and capital goods. 
Some of these, such as food and raw materials, are very rigid; they are, as 
opposed to for instance other consumer goods or capital goods, extremely 
difficult to contract in times of balance of payments problems. In genetf^ 
al, as income grows, imports become much more diversified. The demand for 
"newer" products, which Peru as well as other underdeveloped countries 
typically do not produce, tends to grow very fast together with the demand 
for capital goods necessary to the beginning industrialization process. 
The above factors, which apply to some extent to most underdeveloped 
countries, lead to a tendency to run into an import surplus. Peru, in the 
recent past has been shielded from this problem because of the booming 
growth of its diversified primary exports and because a substantial part of 
imports went directly into export activities (capital goods and raw materi­
als). This accounted for the already mentioned easy adjustment of imports 
to the capacity to import. 
The-^fact that exports are likely to expand at a lower rate in the fu­
ture, however, together with the desire of the country to achieve a high 
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income growth and to industrialize, will most probably lead to a growing 
import-export gap. This tendency has already become pronounced during 1965 
and the first few months of 1966. 
With industrialization and import substitution taking place, changes 
will occur in the composition of imports. For instance, consumer goods 
can easily be substituted, but their domestic production requires increased 
imports of capital goods and raw materials. The above deri-^ed import func­
tions, based on time series data, are consequently of limited use only and 
have to be supplemented by cross section information. Particularly, the 
experience of other countries, which are further on the way to industriali­
zation than Peru, should be helpful. 
Unfortunately, cross section analysis also exhibits serious shortcom­
ings as a tool for projection purposes. A cross section import function, 
c .1 la ted on the basis of average data for 1952-54 for 62 countries, and 
expressing imports per capita (M) as a function of income per capita (Y) 
N n 
and population (N) was derived by Chenery in (41). 
U - Yo H 
Y J was found to be .987 and y 2 equal to -.281, or in other words, per 
capita imports would rise almost as fast as income per capita, but would 
decline as population increases. 
The negative would result from the increase in the market size 
(proportional to population) which facilitates import substitution. 
Balassa in (22, pp. 73-74) correctly points out that the negative Y gives 
rî 1 2 
expression not only to a market size effect but also to a "trading" effect. 
A large country normally has a smaller international trade to GNP ratio 
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than a small country, simply because of the larger number of domestic trad­
ing units and consequently the larger relative importance of internal 
trade. While the trading effect holds for cross section analysis, however, 
it cannot be said to hold over time with population growing in every coun­
try at the same time. The equation, in other words, would imply a downward 
bias if used for projection purposes. 
Time series information for Peru can probably be supplemented by exam­
ining the experience of other underdeveloped countries which are going 
through the stages of industrialization which Peru is about to start. How­
ever, one has to be cautious here again when interpreting the income elas­
ticity of import demand since repeated balance of payments crises have led 
to numerous import restrictions which have obscured the relationship be­
tween import "demand" (as opposed to actual imports) and income, 
Brazil's "industrial" experience up to date has been summarized very 
well in (39) and is probably not typical for most countries. According to 
the above process, industrialization and import substitution start with 
relatively easily substitutable consumer goods and are often initiated 
under the pressure of an import surplus. The latter pressure together with 
the not uncommon belief that industrialization as such is a sufficient con­
dition for development often result in a policy of import substitution at 
any cost. The already small market^ is further limited because of high 
prices, while the same factor constitutes an important obstacle to possible 
future exports. Also, import substitution requires increased imports of 
Peru will, o course, have much more of a market limitation than a 
large country such as Brazil. 
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raw materials and capital goods which are much more difficult to produce 
domestically, again mainly because of the market limit. In general, past 
experience shows that industrialization does not weaken import demand. On 
the contrary, with an increasing proportion of imports being made up of raw 
materials and intermediate products, import demand becomes much more rigid 
downward, and the possibilities for relatively easy substitution are soon 
exhausted. 
Given Peru's past experience, together with the latter considerations, 
the income elasticity of demand for imports may be expected to be at least 
equal to unity. It was seen that, according to the earlier derived import 
functions for 1950-64, the marginal propensity to import raw materials with 
respect to GDP is substantially higher than the average, while imports of 
investment goods tend to grow at the same rate as total investment. If the 
rate of growth of investment is higher than that of GDP (almost a condition 
to development), imports of investment goods would grow relatively more 
than GDP. On the other hand, significant import substitution of existing 
consumer goods imports may take place, but this will increase intermediate 
imports, and furthermore new consumer goods imports are continuously being 
added to the existing ones. 
To estimate import demand one has to know at what rate income is 
likely to grow. Prospects for traditional exports do not warrant a high 
income growth, but increased import substitution together with foreign 
capital inflow will probably become more important determinants of income 
than in the past. The current target of Peruvian national planning au­
thorities of a 77o growth rate seems very optimistic, in view of the export 
projections presented in the beginning of this chapter. 
165 
Other factors, such as budget deficits or domestic inflation, also 
exert strong pressure on import demand, as for instance in 1965, with im­
ports growing at around 22% in current terms (following a budget deficit 
and strong inflationary pressure) and in the early part of 1966 when im­
ports grew at a yearly rate of about 15% in current terms. 
The implications of these developments for Peru's balance of payments 
are obvious. In examining the latter in Chapter IV, it was seen that the 
sum of balances on current account from 1950 to 1964 amounted to a total 
deficit of $749.2 million, which was compensated by net long term capital 
movements totalling $714.7 million. The breakdown of these two sums is as 
follows: (Amounts are in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Exports of goods and services : 6,108.6 
Imports of goods and services ; -6,362.5 
-253.9 
Transfer payments 179.5 
-74.4 
Investment income: private ; -595.0 
public -79.8 
-749.2 
Long term capital: public in : 456.3 
out : -253.3 
net 203.0 
private net : 511.7 
Total ; 714.7 
The sum of exports of goods and services, imports of goods and ser­
vices, and transfer payments shows only a very slight deficit of $-74.4 
million. It may be recalled that both exports and imports grew at about 
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the same rate. 
The deficit in current account is, consequently, accounted for mainly 
by investment income payments and within these primarily by private remit­
tances. The latter were, on the average, equal to 9.7% of total earnings 
of exports of goods and services. It is interesting to note, that over the 
period considered, private investment income payments exceeded total net 
long term private capital inflow by a small margin. 
There are good prospects for substantial private long term capital in­
flow, particularly in mining, but also in the industrial sector. Neverthe­
less, it may be assumed that private investment income payments will con­
tinue to at least offset, on the average, net private capital inflow. 
Under the above assumptions, the capacity to import would be deter­
mined mainly by the sum of export earnings and public capital inflow net of 
amortization and interest payments. On the basis of earlier established 
export projections, exports of goods and services may reach $940 million by 
1970 (Table 33). Public capital inflow has in the lest few years started 
to play a very prominent role, not only as a supplement to domestic sav­
ings, but also as an important determinant of the capacity to import. This 
function, however, besides being temporary, is essentially limited by the 
absorptive capacity of the country for'new public investment funds 'arid by 
the extent which international lending agencies are willing to commit them­
selves. A commonly used rule of thumb to determine a country's public in­
debtedness capacity is that interest and amortization payments on the for­
eign public debt should not exceed, except temporarily, about 12% of mer­
chandise export earnings. 
On the basis of these considerations, INP has calculated, for the 
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elaboration of the 1967-70 development plan, preliminary figures for total 
public capital inflow, amortization and interest payments. Table 33 con­
tains this information, together with the resulting capacity to import. It 
can be seen that the capacity to import would grow by only about 7% between 
1966 and 1970, or less than 2% annually. 
In order to project imports, the following factors have to be taken 
into account. An increase in import duties of about 13% during 1963-64 re­
sulted in a low level of imports for the year 1964. However, mainly under 
the influence of inflationary pressure during 1965, imports grew by about 
22% in one year. Under the assumption of no further increase in import 
duties and no acceleration of inflation, it appears reasonable to consider 
the import figure for 1965 as a basis for projection. If income is to grow 
at 5.5% and with an income elasticity of import demand equal to one, im­
ports would, as shown in Table 33, be substantially above the capacity to 
import.^ After 1970 the situation would improve considerably, given the 
faster projected growth of exports. 
Earlier, it was mentioned that private investment income payments 
would, on the average, at least offset private capital inflow. Towards the 
end of this decade, of course, the large planned investments in mining may 
result in a volume of net private capital inflow considerably above private 
income payments, resulting in a larger capacity to import than shown in 
Table 33. However, this would be essentially temporary. The important as­
pect is the direction in which Peru's balance of payments' structure is 
Assuming no price changes, constant 1965 dollars would be equivalent 
to current dollars. 
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Table 33. Exports, public capital inflow net of amortization and interest 
payments, capacity to import and import projections (1966-1970) 
1966 1967 
(million dollars) 
1968 1969 1970 
(1) Exports^ 809 840 872 905 940 
(2) Public capital inflow 131 150 150 130 100 
(3) Amortization 55 59 59 71 81 
(4) Interest payments 25 26 30 33 36 
(5) (2)-(3)-(4) 51 65 61 26 -17 
(6) (l)+(5) Capacity to 
import 
860 905 933 931 923 
(7) Import projections 874 922 973 1027 1083 
^The projected rate of growth of exports between 1966-1970 was taken 
as 3.8% per year (see the beginning of this chapter). 
likely to develop. Obviously, vigorous and well conceived efforts along 
the lines of import substitution and export promotion will be necessary in 
order to improve the trade balance and equilibrate the balance of payments. 
3. Import substitution versus export promotion 
It was seen in the previous section that Peru's export expansion has 
been accompanied by equally fast growing imports of all types of goods. As 
the volume of a number of these imported items reaches a certain magnitude, 
domestic production or import substitution becomes feasible. In this 
sense, imports fulfill the very important role of creating the market for 
domestic entrepreneurs. Conversely, as import growth is made possible by 
an expansion of exports, it is clear that both exports and imports play a 
crucial role in this process. 
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In Peru, import substitution has up to now been much less notable than 
in most other Latin American countries, mainly because of the tremendous 
growth of its primary exports, which absorbed a large amount of resources 
and guaranteed a large capacity to import. However, the desire of the 
country to industrialize, together with the prospects that future primary 
exports may not suffice to insure an adequate income growth, will probably 
lead to a marked increase in the importance of import substitution in the 
development process. 
Starting domestic production of an hitherto imported commodity is not 
an easy task. During the first few years, new industries encounter pro­
blems everywhere. Undoubtedly in a country such as Peru, with its relative 
lack of a trained labor force, adequate transport and public utilities, 
serious losses may be incurred. In addition, consumers have become accus­
tomed to the imported item and will normally resist somewhat the shift to 
the domestically produced good. Consequently, incentive legislation and 
protection may be necessary in order to assist and protect entrepreneurs at 
the outset. Peru's Industrial Promotion Law of November 30, 1959 was cre­
ated with this purpose. In very general terms, the law provides import 
duty concessions on machinery and raw materials, not competitive with 
Peruvian machinery or raw materials, and tax exemptions for new industries 
(for instance 3 years in the Lima-Callao area). An important provision is 
that the imported equipment must be new. Furthermore, the law tries to 
stimulate decentralization by giving greater incentives to investments out­
side Lima. Finally, adequate tariff protection can be obtained for the 
goods produced. Some of the problems which accompany a policy of protec­
tionism will be studied below. 
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It is important to recognize that, in drawing up commercial and devel­
opment policies in general, most policymakers are to a certain extent in­
fluenced by past experience in international trade relations. In general, 
heavy dependence on foreign markets and their fluctuations have created a 
more or less pronounced anti-export attitude in many developing countries. 
This has been accentuated by the fact that exports consisted mainly of pri­
mary products, often in the hands of foreign interests or of a select group 
of domestic exporters. Yields in the export industries were often very 
high with relatively marginal effects on the development of the rest of the 
country. As a result, export products have traditionally been considered 
logical items for taxation. While this policy may not hurt mineral ex­
ports, it does constitute an obstacle to increasing other (such as handi­
craft) exports. More importantly, it indicates that the role of exports in 
development is not fully understood. 
Import substitution, consistent with the anti-export attitude, is 
often regarded as a much surer road to development. In addition, a policy 
of import substitution, as was mentioned in the previous section, finds its 
main "raison d'etre" in balance of payments pressure. Nevertheless, a num­
ber of countries have met with failure in achieving balance of payments 
equilibrium through import substitution (39). Prebisch in (42) describes 
this very well: the possibilities for reasonably efficient substitution of 
consumer goods imports are quickly exhausted because of the limit of the 
market, while increased imports of raw materials and capital goods make im­
port demand much more ligid. 
A major shortcoming of import substitution policies is that they tend 
to concentrate only on a partial aspect of the very complex problem of 
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initiating economic development. Other and more basic changes are neces­
sary in the structure of underdeveloped economies than simply substituting 
some selected imports by domestic production. As a result of a very uneven 
income distribution, the market for many consumer durables, for instance, 
is very limited. Generally, however, consumer durables are candidates for 
early substitution. Their production relies strongly on imported inputs. 
Usually new industries are protected through tariffs which are meant 
to be temporary. However, because of the poor income distribution and the 
resulting limited market, the demand for the products of the new plants 
does not grow much after the original imports have been substituted with 
the result that tariff protection may have to be maintained. High protec­
tive tariffs reduce the competitiveness of these goods in foreign markets 
thus limiting the import-substitute industries to the narrow national mar­
ket. 
The amount of substitution which can take place in the above fashion 
is very limited and the balance of payments problem situation is not usu­
ally improved. The above observations derive mainly from other countries' 
experiences, as Peru's history of import substitution policy is too short 
to draw meaningful conclusions. 
A policy of import substitution at any cost would clearly be justified 
only if autarky were the main goal of the country. Such a goal is obvious­
ly not an appropriate one for a small economy such as Peru. 
The problem as to where scarce resources are to be allocated depends on 
the contribution which can be made by them to the major policy objectives 
of Peruvian economic development (income growth, employment creation, in­
come distribution, balance of payments equilibrium, etc.) The answer to 
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this question will essentially determine what type of production - for the 
domestic market, for export, or for both - is desirable. For instance, a 
more equal income distribution, by classes as well as regionally, would 
most probably change the structure of consumer demand. This could increase 
effective demand and lead to a larger market for a number of consumer 
goods. Since many of these goods are produced under labor intensive condi­
tions, the level of employment is thereby increased. Thus in a number of 
cases the developmental goals may be complementary. 
The importance for Peru of shaping its development policies towards 
the attainment of internationally competitive activities cannot be over-
stressed. First, the Peruvian market will remain small in terms of pur­
chasing power for many years to come. Secondly, the very fact of being a 
small country forces it to adhere as much as possible to the principle of 
international competitiveness and to export. The above considerations are 
of utmost importance in drawing up development policies. 
It is clear, of course, that in certain cases protection may be justi­
fied if the loss in economic efficiency is more than compensated by the 
contribution which can be made to other policy objectives. An example can 
be found, for instance, in the proposed expansion of jute production in 
Peru, see (16). Not only does Peru presently import most of its jute bags 
requirements, but jute imports of several other LAFTA countries are also 
substantial. Excellent conditions exist in the Peruvian Selva for an ex­
pansion of jute production. As India and Pakistan (by far the world's 
largest producers and exporters) produce at very low prices, domestic pro­
duction in Peru would probably require protection at the outset. 
National production of jute in 1964 corresponded to about 10% of total 
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demand. While the national manufactured product costs now 23.7 soles per 
kg. versus an import (GIF) price of 13.8 soles per kg., it is estimated 
that a proposed new plant, utilizing domestic raw material would produce 
at about 18.6 soles per kg. This price could be further brought down, 
mainly through improvements in yields. 
Export activities (for instance fishmeal, sugar) are among the most 
important users of jute and production costs would be increased if domestic 
jute were used. Bags, however, represent only a relatively small fraction 
of the total cost in these activities and the additional cost of production 
has to be weighed against contributions to other development goals. Thus 
if all bags now imported were produced domestically, with domestic raw ma­
terials, about 13,400 extra jobs in agriculture could be created (as pro­
duction would be located in the Selva, it would also contribute to regional 
development) and about 1,500 jobs in transport, manufacturing and services. 
Furthermore, about $7.5 million would be saved in _ eign exchange (in 
order to arrive at a net basis the value of machinery, fertilizer or other 
inputs which would have to be imported should be subtracted) and a further 
lowering in the cost together with some protection within LAFTA would re­
sult in a further expansion of production and employment. 
Even though other factors would have tc be taken into account such 
as, for instance, the possibilities that consumers, in view of increased 
costs turn to other means of packing (paper bags for instance), it is clear 
that the benefits to the country in terms of job creation, regional devel­
opment and foreign exchange savings may outweigh the net loss in efficien­
cy. The latter, however, has to be fully recognized. The detrimental 
effects on the country's export efficiency, through raising the internal 
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costs in the economy, may seriously affect future balance of payments 
equilibrium. 
Generally speaking, a number of arguments have been brought forth in 
favor of protectionism, the most important one of which is probably the in­
fant industry argument. This argument assumes that the domestic activity 
will be protected only temporarily, until it has had time to reach inter­
national efficiency standards. The long run gains are intended to consid­
erably outweigh short run losses. As mentioned before, however, experience 
has shown that the theoretical framework does not apply easily in practice. 
Protection tends to become permanent, often because the protection was too 
high to start with, resulting in a lack of incentive to increase efficien­
cy. Furthermore, as the protected industries were often initiated under 
the narrow conception of import substitution policies, discussed above, the 
lack of market growth resulted very naturally in a continuation of protec­
tion. 
It was explained earlier in this chapter that an Important difference 
exists between effective tariff protection and nominal protection.^ If, 
for instance, the tariff on a finished manufactured good is 10% ad valorem, 
but if 50% of this manufacture consists of duty free imported inputs, it is 
clear that the effective protection on the domestic processing of this 
manufacture is double the nominal rate, or 20%. In the simple case of one 
input, effective protection can be expressed as follows: 
A discussion of protectionism in Latin America and of the concept of 
effective tariff protection can be found in (43). 
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Q 
where E = effective protection (in %) 
tq = tariff on manufactured good (in %) 
t^ = tariff on input (in %) 
I = input as a % of total value of production 
Q 
V = value added as a % of total value of production. 
Q 
With several inputs: 
V 
Q 
r = number of inputs. 
Thus, the already high tariff protection granted to products being 
produced under the Industrial Promotion Law is effectively much higher than 
the nominal rate because inputs can often be obtained at world market 
prices, without any duty charges. The incentives to improve efficiency are 
considerably weakened under these circumstances. In other words, while the 
infant industry argument is basically sound, account must be taken of the 
fact that excessive effective protection may result in the infant industry 
never reaching maturity. 
It can be argued, however, that the very strong competition encount­
ered from imports requires a more or less prohibitive duty if domestic 
producers are to conquer the whole domestic market in order to take advan­
tage of economies of scale. In that case legislation such as the Indus­
trial Promotion Law could be improved upon by requesting for instance that 
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the protection be extended only on the condition that (1) the manufacturer 
sell at a price descending ultimately to the price of the imported good 
before the levying of the protective duty, and (2) the domestically pro­
duced goods be of similar quality to substitute import goods. 
The high level of protection being extended to import substituting 
industries under the Industrial Promotion Law can be illustrated fol­
lows. Among products presently produced in Peru are, for instance, shovels 
and cardboard cones. A given type and size of shovel imported from 
Czechoslovakia costs GIF 9.4 soles per kg., while the "same" English shov­
el is listed at 17.4 soles per kg. (The difference in price is probably to 
some extent related to quality.) A given size of cardboard cones presently 
produced in Peru costs imported GIF 12 soles per kg. Import duties are 
listed below. 
Table 34. Import (GIF) price and import duty for selected products 
GIF Specific duty Ad 
soles per soles per kg. valorem Total 
kg.  - -  % % 
Shovel (Czechoslovakia) 9.4 20 30 243 
Shovel (England) 17.4 20 30 145 
Cardboard cones 12.0 15 30 155 
Clearly, tariff protection of such magnitude may result in substantial 
price increases, speculative profit margins for the protected producers, 
and little incentive to increase efficiency. By way of illustration, the 
same type of shovel produced domestically is presently listed at 35 soles 
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per kg. 
It is interesting to note, also, that the raw material (steel) used in 
the manufacturing of the shovels in question is imported. As the particu­
lar type of steel is not produced domestically and given the provisions of 
the Industrial Promotion Law, only marginal amounts of import duty apply to 
the raw material. This means that the effective rate applying to shovels 
is substantially higher than the already high nominal rate above. Indeed 
steel input represents about 40% of the total production value of shovels; 
supposing no other inputs enter in the production process and steel is im­
ported duty free, effective protection with respect to the English shovel 
would amount to 145% - 0 or about 240%. 
60% 
The concept of effective protection is helpful in disclosing another 
important aspect of present Peruvian protective policy. On the basis of 
the above presented formula, it can be seen that, if t. .1 is greater than 
Q 
tq, effective protection would be negative, or in other words, the value 
added in the particular production process would, under these conditions, 
be taxed instead of subsidized. 
Even though Peru still imports a very large part of its steel require­
ments, a government steel mill (SOGESA) has been operating for about 10 
years and is presently expanding its capacity in order to satisfy the 
entire domestic demand for steel. For a number of reasons present pro­
duction takes place under very inefficient circumstances. 
The standard duty on all imported steel in Peru is about 20% ad 
valorem GIF. Presently the bulk of domestic production consists of 
"structural rounds" for construction. Data, provided by steel importers on 
average market prices (Lima) of "structural rounds" are as follows; pro­
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duced by SOGESA: 5.5 soles per kg. 
Imported: 4.2 soles per kg.: 2.7 soles per kg. = GIF 
1.5 soles per kg. = 20% 
import duty + 35% 
other taxes and 
transport to market. 
Consequently, in order to protect the domestic steel industry, an addition­
al 150% ad valorem GIF has come into effect on all products being produced 
by SOGESA, raising the total duty to about 170%. 
It can be argued that a basic industry such as steel, can provide a 
tremendous stimulus to industrial development because of its very important 
forward and backward linkages. However, the need for producing steel at 
competitive prices becomes clear if one considers its importance as an in­
put in many sectors. Input-output information would be necessary in order 
to study the effect of high input prices on prices of finished goods. A 
very simple example may, however, be used as another illustration. 
Steel wire is the only important input of barbed wire production, and 
represents about 50% of the total production cost. Suppose Peru starts 
production using steel wire produced by SOGESA. In this case t. . I is 
Q 
equal to (170%) (50%) or 85%. In other words, a nominal protection as high 
as 85% on barbed wire production would still not represent any effective 
protection on the production process. The effects of this policy on over­
all prices and import duties on products utilizing domestic steel are ob­
vious. 
The implications of the foregoing analysis of present Peruvian commer­
cial policies are as follows. Inasmuch as Peru is a small country, an im­
port substitution policy at all costs could clearly not be justified. The 
potential for efficient import substitution, however, will be very limited. 
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Thus, the increasing demand for imports of raw materials and capital goods 
together with service payments on foreign capital will have to be financed 
by increasing exports. Even though Peru is in the very fortunate position 
of being able to finance a large part of its import needs through the ex­
ports of its raw material wealth, the analysis of the previous section sug­
gested that further diversification of exports is necessary. 
Industrialization will have to be guided by standards of internation­
al competitiveness. Protection for infant industries may, of course, be 
necessary, but it has to be rational and gradually eliminated, even though 
in some specific cases, employment considerations may justify and result in 
a continued protection. 
A very uneven distribution of income and the resulting structure of 
consumer demand limit the size of the domestic market for import substitu­
tion industries. A limited market, together with high protection lead to 
inefficiency and prevent some of the new industries from competing in the 
export market. Excessive widening of the industrial structure and lack of 
specialization may result from this type of industrialization policies. 
Agricultural development and changes in the tax structure appear nec­
essary in order to increase the size of the domestic market. Industriali­
zation has to be concentrated as much as possible on industries with export 
potential. The domestic market can in this way be supplemented with ex­
ports in order to take advantage of economies of scale and of a larger and 
more dynamic market. Imported management skills (through education or for­
eign advisors) might improve the viability of infant industries. The above 
factors require a rational attitude with respect to protectionism and the 
avoidance of overvalued exchange rates, as will be seen in the last part of 
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this chapter. The successful experience of such countries as India, 
Israel or Japan, with exports of manufactures, could serve as an example. 
C. Effect of Growth and Inflation on the Balance of Payments 
An underdeveloped country usually finds the problem of keeping its 
external accounts in balance, during the development process, one of the 
hardest to solve. The trouble can be accounted for by such factors as 
a) the relative lack of flexibility in allocating resource according to the 
changing conditions of world demand; and b) a very strong import demand, 
which, as income grows, becomes ever more diversified. Foreign borrowing 
has provided cgnsiderable assistance in temporarily rendering this bottle­
neck less severe. 
Any conventional borrowing, however, results in interest and amortiza­
tion payments. With debt service absorbing a growing share of export earn­
ings and with raw materials becoming proportionally more important in the 
import bill, the balance of payments will be characterized by increased 
rigidity. This rigidity may present serious problems during the develop­
ment process. Furthermore, successful development will, at some point in 
the future, require exports surpluses and a reduction of balance of pay­
ments rigidity. The implications of these considerations for Peru's com­
mercial policy were analyzed previously. 
Another major problem which may aggravate the pressure on the balance 
of payments severely is a high rate of domestic inflation. Latin American 
countries, in particular, have seen their economic difficulties multiply as 
a result of this phenomenon. However, as Table 35 shows, Peru has, by 
average Latin American standards, been characterized in the past by a rela­
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tively mild rate of increase in the cost of living. 
The analysis of inflation in Latin America, in the economic litera­
ture, gave rise to a number of conflicting explanations. At one extreme, 
monetarists blame factors such as unsound monetary policy, budget deficits 
and excessive wage demands. According to their thinking, the maintenance 
of price stability should be a primary aim of any government. Structural­
ists, on the other hand, maintain that there is much more to the inflation­
ary tendencies of underdeveloped economies, and that in particular supply 
rigidities create imbalances and consequently lead to price increases. It 
is argued that some inflation is bound to exist and that excessive monetary 
controls would probably result in a reduction in employment and economic 
growth. 
The thesis that inflationary problems result from more than only mone­
tary mismanagement can probably be supported by the failure of most of the 
International Monetary Fund stabilization programs in Latin America. 
Peru's successful stabilization program in 1959 is a notable exception. 
However, the spectacular expansion of exports (mainly fishmeal and copper), 
starting in 1960 and based on decisions taken independently from the stabi­
lization program, provided the latter with a major element of success. The 
importance of a favorable balance of payments position, in order to lessen 
pressure on prices, at least for those goods which can be imported, has 
been discussed in Chapter IV. 
A comprehensive analysis of Peru's inflationary experience does not 
exist. This is due partly to the absence of good quality price indices. 
^See for instance (45). 
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Table 35. Cost of living indices for selected countries^ (1958= 100) 
Argen­
tina 
Boliv­
ia 
Brazil Chile Colom­
bia 
Ecua­
dor 
Mex­
ico 
Peru Uru­
guay 
Vene 
zueli 
1950 24 1.20 26 7. 10 58 85 52 58 41 90 
1951 32 1.60 28 8. 68 63 95 59 64 47 97 
1952 44 1.98 35 11 61 98 68 68 54 98 
1953 46 4.01 42 13 66 98 66 74 57 97 
1954 48 8.93 50 23 72 101 70 78 64 97 
1955 54 16 60 40 71 103 81 82 69 96 
1956 61 45 73 63 76 98 84 86 74 98 
1957 76 97 87 79 87 98 89 93 85 95 
1958 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1959 214 120 137 139 107 100 102 113 140 105 
1960 272 134 185 155 111 102 108 122 194 109 
1961 309 144 256 167 121 106 109 131 237 106 
1962 395 152 390 190 124 109 110 139 263 105 
1963 491 151 684 274 164 115 111 148 317 106 
1964 600 167 1,270 400 192 120 114 164 454 107 
1965 771 172 2,050 512 199 124 118 191 
_b _b 
^Source (44). 
^Not available. 
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The cost of living index of Table 36 shows a more or less stable rate of 
inflation from 1950 to 1965. Budget deficits may, of course, be a very im­
portant force leading to inflation. On the basis of Table 36 it can be 
seen that a slight acceleration of inflation took place in 1959 and again 
in 1964-65, both times coinciding with budget deficits. In addition, many 
other forces are undoubtedly at work; the most important one of which is 
probably the disparity between the growth of the export sector and the 
growth of most other sectors of the economy. The higher income resulting 
from the growth of exports increases,,,among others, the demand for domes­
tically produced goods. Inasmuch as the supply of the latter is inelastic, 
and the deficit cannot be made up through imports, prices will rise. For 
instance, increasing imports of food products in Peru have to some extent 
alleviated the pressure on prices. Nevertheless, a number of domestic 
goods or cLees cannot be replaced by imports and prices will rise if 
supplies do not keep up with demand. Also, high wages paid in export ac­
tivities such as fishmeal will affect other wages and subsequently prices. 
The decline in the purchasing power of Peruvian currency in terms of 
the dollar, as a result of domestic inflation, has led to relatively im­
portant devaluations on two occasions, i.e. in 1953 and in 1958-59. The 
devaluation itself, of course, will give rise to inflation through its 
direct effect on the internal level of import prices and of export prices, 
(to the extent that world prices of exports for a number of products are 
"given" to a small supplier such as Peru soles receipts will increase) and 
through its indirect effect on prices of domestic goods which will in­
creasingly be substituted for imports. Harberger in (46) argues that these 
effects can be quite substantial and that it is much easier to cope with 
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Table 36. Exchange rate, central 
cost of living index^ 
government deficit (-) 
(1950-1965) 
or surplus (+) and 
Exchange rate^ 
(soles per $1) 
Central government 
deficit (-) or 
surplus (+)" 
Cost 
index 
of living 
(1958= 100) 
1950 15.40 308 58 
1951 15.20 314 64 
1952 15.60 126 68 
1953 16.90 -7 74 
1954 19.70 346 78 
1955 19.20 -198 82 
1956 19.20 -364 86 
1Ï57 19.10 -255 .93 
1958 23.30 -713 100 
1959 27.60 -255 113 
1960 27.30 915 122 
1961 26.80 396 131 
1962 26.80 -54 139 
1963 26.80 -84 148 
1964 26.80 -1,693 164 
1965 26.80 -1,771 191 
^Source (20, 27 and 44). 
^Average rate for imports during the year, 
c 
Millions of current solas. 
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them when they result from small rather than large devaluations. Yet, the 
information of Table 36 definitely shows no acceleration in the cost of 
living index following the two devaluations. 
In addition to the above factors which have been most responsible for 
the rise in the cost of living in Peru, it has to be added that expecta­
tions of future price behavior are a very important determinant of infla­
tion. Generally speaking, Peru seems to attach great importance to a rela­
tively stable price level. Furthermore, sound monetary policy has been 
followed which has helped t. maintain a rather mild rate of inflation. 
The effects of inflation on a country's international competitive 
position are negative ceteris paribus. The expansion of experts, and what 
is equally important, their diversification V7ill slow down, while imports 
will tend to increase. Rising internal prices relative to world market 
prices may bring about diversion of exports products from the export to the 
domestic market. Yet, as internal consumption of Peru's major export com­
modities (basically raw materials, produced largely for export) is general­
ly very small, competition between the domestic and the export market is 
extremely weak and will not affect export supplies significantly. 
A rise in the cost of living will, however, increase wages and thus 
production costs. Since export activities are, in general, quite capital 
intensive, rising labor costs will only affect total costs moderately. 
Information on production costs is very scarce. Table 37 contains 
estimates of labor and total costs, together with profit margins for cot­
ton, mining of metallic minerals and fishmeal. In the case of raw cotton 
the estimated average production cost per quintal and per hectare was based 
on the valley of Chancay (47) which should be more or less representative 
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of the average. Data for mining of metallic minerals are derived from the 
national income accounts of the INP. The figures for fishmeal are based on 
(48) and (49). According to (48) in 1962, 1 ton of fishmeal had an average 
market value of 2,627 soles of which 322 soles was profit, 202 soles labor 
costs, and 2,103 soles other costs containing 1,218 soles worth of 
anchoveta. The total value of anchoveta (1,218 soles), according to (49), 
was distributed in the following manner: 17.5% profits, 42% labor costs 
and 40.5% other costs. 
It can be seen that labor costs represent about one third of total 
costs. The corresponding percentage is only slightly lower for mining. 
Even though cotton is much more labor intensive than raining or fishmeal, 
wages paid in the latter two exceed by a very large margin those paid in 
agriculture. It can be derived from the table that an increase in wages of 
for instance 20% would raise total costs by 6.6% in cotton, 6% in raining, 
and 6.8% in fishmeal. Peru is a relatively small supplier on the world 
market of most of its exports, with fishmeal being the main exception. 
Consequently, world prices are given for all practical purposes. Domestic 
cost increases will, thus, have to be absorbed through reduced profits. 
Profits in cotton growing have been squeezed considerably in the last 
few years. While according to (47) in the valley of Chancay in 1964-65 
cotton still appeared to be profitable, a number of valleys were already 
showing losses. Rising costs have been due not only to higher wages, but 
also to the earlier mentioned increase in import duties in 1963-64, which 
made inputs such as imported jute bags or fertilizer more expensive. 
Other cost elements have risen as well as, for instance, agricultural tools 
which are now partially produced domestically under tariff protection. It 
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Table 37. Relation between labor costs, total costs and profits in 
different export activities (Cotton and fishmeal; current 
soles; metallic minerals: millions of current soles) 
Cotton Metallic Fishmeal 
(Chancay valley) minerals 
(1964-65) (1964) (1962) 
Labor costs 3,733.00 33 7o 1,495 30 % 714 34 7o 
Other costs 7,513.32 67 % 3,412 70 7o 1,378 66 % 
Total costs 11,246.32 100 7o 4,907 100 % 2,092 100 % 
Profit 623.60 1,321 535 
Market value 11,869.92 6,228 2,627 
Profit as % of 5.3% 21.2% 20 . 47. 
market value 
is clear that if domestic inflation continues at past rates, more and more 
land will be diverted from cotton to.domestic crops, with a resulting de­
cline in Peru's exports, but also with a decline in imports of foodstuffs. 
However, the shift of resources from exports to import substitution may, 
because of increasing domestic production costs, have to be accompanied by 
tariff protection and may involve inefficiency of resource allocation (cot­
ton is ideally suited to Peruvian climatic conditions). On the other hand 
it has to be added that world market prices for cotton have declined re­
cently. Should this trend continue, a reallocation of resources away from 
cotton and into other activities would become necessary. 
Wage increases have an almost equally important effect on metallic 
mining, but here the profit margin is substantial while also world prices 
have recently risen considerably. As profits can absorb large cost in­
creases, mining appears to be much less vulnerable than cotton. It should 
be noted, however, that Peru possesses a number of marginal mines (in cop­
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per, lead, zinc) operating generally only in times of high world prices. 
The share of wages in total cost is probably much higher in these mines 
than in the larger ones. The output of smaller mines has in the past been 
very responsive to world prices, and thus inflation may be expected to have 
a considerable impact on their production. 
Data on fishmeal in Table 37 refer to 1962, for which information was 
available. Considerable profit margins allowed cost increases in the last 
few years to be absorbed. Not only did wages rise, but a tremendous over­
capacity was generated in the sector resulting in an overall increase in 
unit costs and a reduction in profits, in spite of an upward tendency in 
world prices. It could be argued that Peru, given its leadership in the 
world market (Peru accounts for about 60% of total world exports), could 
force prices to rise. This policy, however, is limited for reason of com­
petition of substitutes, especially oilcake. The initial effect of further 
inflation on fishmeal production in Peru will probably be a reduction in 
the existing overcapacity in the sector resulting in a decline in unit 
costs, which in turn will make a further cost increase absorption possible. 
While a further rise in the cost of living will unavoidably reduce 
cotton supplies in the near future, mining and fishmeal output appear to be 
less sensitive. Yet, as was pointed out above, the supply of minerals may 
decrease,over .time and a rise in the price of fishmeal on the world market 
may meet with great difficulties. 
Inflation will both- affect existing exports and discourage diversifi­
cation as new products, such as manufactures, are faced immediately with a 
comparative disadvantage. On the other hand, imports will have a tendency 
to increase. This is specifically true only for those imports which are 
189 
competitive with domestic production. It can be said, broadly speaking, 
that capital goods imports and a substantial part of raw materials and even 
consumer goods imports are, however, not competitive. It would appear, 
consequently, that a quantitative analysis of the effect of inflation on 
imports would have to be done on a product by product basis. Good quality 
price indices (which are lacking at this stage) would, furthermore, be 
needed in order to perform such analysis. 
It has been seen, in any case, that at least consumer goods imports 
reacted strongly to devaluations, which implies that the effect of a rise 
in the domestic price level on those goods was substantial. . Tourism is 
another very competitive item, and the increasing deficit in the tourism 
balance in the last two years (especially because of increased travelling 
by Peruvians abroad) is probably largely a result of the acceleration in 
1 
the rise in the cost of living recently experienced. 
The effect of inflation on the future development of Peru's competi­
tive position is probably much more important than its effect on the pres­
ently existing trade structure. The start of new industries will be ex­
tremely difficult because of competition from imports. An increasing level 
of import duties might be necessary to protect the above new industries. 
The INP has determined on the basis of a sample that, for instance, between 
1962 and the end of 1964, average import duties rose from a level of about 
20% to about 40%. This trend results in further cost increases, a reduc-
relative lack of tourist facilities in Peru and guerrilla activity 
in the recent past, both discouraging the flow of foreign tourists to Peru, 
may be mentioned among other factors contributing to the present deficit in 
the tourism balance. 
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tion in the country's international competitive position and a lack of in­
centive to improve the latter. In addition, export diversification is 
jeopardized. With respect to the capital account in the balance of pay­
ments, the most important consequence of inflation is probably a deteriora­
tion in the climate for foreign investment. 
These adverse effects can, of course, be offset by a change in the ex­
change rate. The analysis of the effects of a devaluation on Peru's exist­
ing exports and imports can be done as follows. (Downward sloping demand 
curves are assumed.) In dollar terms, a devaluation cannot increase the 
value of imports; it can leave them unchanged or reduce them. The earlier 
analysis of imports indicated that a substantial reduction could probably 
be achieved. Export earnings in dollar terms could be lower, unchanged or 
higher, depending on the elasticity of the foreign demand curve. However, 
world prices of Peru's agricultural and mineral products are mostly given 
and, consequently, export earnings should not decrease. On the contrary, a 
devaluation would at least prevent, as was seen before, a reduction in for 
instance cotton supplies for export. In the case of fishmeal, given the 
supply limitations and a strong world demand, it can also be expected that 
the price in dollars would not fall. Profit increases, which would accom­
pany a devaluation in very lucrative export activities, could be offset 
through taxation. 
Thus, it would appear that a devaluation would probably improve the 
trade balance significantly. Furthermore, an adequate rate of exchange is 
a necessary condition if a commercial policy as described in the previous 
section is to be implemented. 
It is true, of course, that devaluation (or more generally the price 
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mechanism) is not in itself sufficient to generate the appropriate struc­
tural changes which are needed in underdeveloped economies. To the extent 
that the problems of inflation and balance of payments deficit are caused 
by structural factors such as supply inelasticities, changes in relative 
prices will not, by themselves, remove these bottlenecks. The defects of 
the price mechanism as a resource allocator were analyzed in Chapter II. 
However, it would appear that the removal of the basic bottlenecks and 
the necessary increase in the flexibility of resources to adapt readily to 
changes in the structure of demand, may be impeded by the maintenance of an 
overvalued exchange rate and the resulting disparity between the actual and 
real price of foreign exchange. 
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VI, CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Economic development involves the transformation of a backward and 
stagnant economy into a self-sustaining one. It rests primarily upon the 
realization of changes in the internal social and economic structure of the 
underdeveloped country, while it is important to emphasize that succcssful 
development necessitates above all action with respect to internal condi­
tions, it may be argued that a number of benefits can be derived from the 
existence of economic relationships with the rest of the world. For in­
stance, more savings can be obtained than the domestic economy alone is 
able to generate, while on the other hand, international specialization 
enables the country to obtain a higher rate of return on its investment 
than would otherwise be possible. 
Experience indicates, however, that the expansion of the foreign 
trade sector in presently underdeveloped countries does not seem to help 
the growth process very much. Consequently, considerable skepticism has 
arisen in the economic literature about the validity of the principle of 
classical comparative advantage, and the contribution of foreign trade to 
economic development has been seriously questioned. 
The analysis in Chapter II led to the following general hypotheses as 
to the role of the foreign sector in the development of a country such as 
Peru. On the one hand, even though the classical comparative cost doctrine 
is inadequate in determining optimal resource allocation for underdeveloped 
economies and elements of growth theory have to be included in establishing 
the extent and scope of international specialization, the opportunities re­
sulting from foreign trade are vital in determining the rate of growth. 
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On the other hand, an explanation as to why foreign trade has failed 
to contribute substantially to development can be found in the weak carry­
over from the export sector to the other sectors of the economy. Typically 
the export sector in underdeveloped countries does not have important back­
ward (or forward) linkages with the rest of the econor. , does not make an 
important contribution to employment and a large part of the factor pay­
ments leaves the country in one way or another. In addition, the few po­
tential linkages which do exist are rarely exploited for a number of rea­
sons related to the undeveloped and traditional character of the economy. 
In Chapters III and IV it was shown that foreign trade was definitely 
the leading sector in the growth of the Peruvian economy from 1950 to the 
present. While the tremendous expansion of exports has been translated 
into a high aggregate income growth and balance of payments strength, the 
analysis indicated that the economic and social problems which remain to be 
solved are so serious that the spectacular progress achieved during the 
last few years should not be overestimated in terms of its contribution to 
total economic development. There are virtually no reasons to believe that 
any improvement in income distribution has taken place; the gap between the 
Coast and the Sierra has widened and employment creation in the export 
sector has been very small. 
The analysis in Chapter IV showed that the limited transmission of 
growth from the export sector to the other sectors in Peru's economy is 
due, on the one hand, to the particular type of export production in which 
Peru is^engaged (capital intensive primary production, with limited back­
ward linkage effects) and, on the other, to the undeveloped character of 
the economy which prevents some of the potential linkages to materialize. 
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In other words, while the performance of the single most important leading 
sector in Peru's economy - primary products exports - was outstanding in 
terms of GNP growth and balance of payments, a further stimulus could not 
be expected from this sector given its very nature (primary products) and 
the backwardness of the economy. The most important role of the Peruvian 
export sector has been as the generator of the foreign exchange which is 
essential for the financing of imports required for the development of the 
economy and for'the servicing of the foreign capital inflow. 
It was seen in Chapter V that, in spite of strongly growing world 
demand for minerals and fishmeal, future exports are likely to grow at a 
considerably lower rate than in the past. Export volume may grow at an 
annual cumulative rate of 3.8% up to 1970, as opposed to 8.5% experienced 
from 1950 to 1964. In other words, prospects are that traditional exports 
will not lead to a high income growth. Consequently, if Peru is to achieve 
an adequate rate of growth in per capita GNP and also if it is to solve 
successfully its major social and economic problems through more employment 
creation and better income distribution, domestic agricultural and indus­
trial development is of primary importance, together with large investments 
in social overhead capital. 
The development process, will, furthermore be characterized by a 
strongly growing import demand. (Especially for capital goods and raw 
materials). Assuming a growth rate for exports of 3.8% per year, an amount 
of foreign public capital inflow calculated on the basis of a public in­
debtedness capacity of 12% of merchandise export earnings and an income 
growth rate of 5.5%, it was seen that imports would, by 1970, tend to ex­
ceed the capacity to import by over $100 million. A policy of import 
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substitution and (or) export promotion appears imperative. The latter 
would require identifying new export alternatives. 
In trying to make the foreign sector contribute as much as possible to 
the attainment of the various economic policy objectives such as income 
growth, balance of payments equilibrium, employment and others, a choice 
has to be made with respect to commercial policy which falls somewhere be­
tween two extremes; self-sufficiency on the one hand, and a system based 
un international comparative advantage on the other. 
The pursuit of self-sufficiency and a parallel expansion of the dif­
ferent sectors of the economy would not only achieve the balancing of 
supply and demand requirements by sectors, but also the benefits of exter­
nal economies resulting from the interdependence of investments could be 
obtained, 
It appears however that, for a very small country such as Peru, both 
supply and demand limits would constitute very serious obstacles to this 
kind of approach to development. Sufficient capital, entrepreneurial and 
skilled labor resources would clearly not be available for the diverse 
activities which a balanced growth process would require. The small size 
of the market would, furthermore, prevent the exploitation of economies of 
scale. Problems caused by limited markets have to some extent been ana­
lyzed in (37). Production costs are often high simply because the plant 
capacity is less than optimal, as for instance in steel or chemicals con­
versely in case plants with optimal capacity have been built, high costs 
result mainly from underutilization of the equipment. In (50, pp. 107-112) 
for instance it is estimated that the Latin American chemical industry 
could reduce prices, if production were to be organized on a regional 
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basis, to the following levels below international prices: 18% in 
Colombia, 14% in Mexico, 10% in Brazil, 9% in Peru, and to levels approxi­
mately equal to international prices in Argentina, Chile and Venezuela. 
In other cases, such as textiles, high costs result from the very large 
variety of products (fragmentation of production) which any given plant has 
to produce. 
International specialization of production, as opposed to a policy 
leading to self-sufficiency, would, of course, not run to the same extent 
into supply limits and would permit the exploitation of economies of scale. 
The difficulty here would be first of all that no full advantage can be 
taken of external economies, a condition which may have a negative influ­
ence on competitiveness. (It was argued in Chapter II that in the deter­
mination of comparative advantage itself, such factors as external econo­
mies have to be taken into account). Secondly, it may not be easy to find 
export opportunities for the products concerned. 
Considering the advantages and disadvantages associated with either 
approach to development - balanced growth versus international specializa­
tion - a strong case can be made for a small country such as Peru to adhere 
as much as possible to the second approach. It was argued in Chapter V 
that the small size of the country does not warrant a pattern of growth 
directed towards self-sufficiency. The limit to a relatively efficient 
policy of import substitution is reached very soon, as the experience of 
much larger countries such as Brazil has indicated. Thus, the increasing 
demand for imports of raw materials and capital goods together with service 
payments on foreign capital will have to be financed by increasing ex­
ports. Even though Peru is in the very fortunate position of being able to 
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finance a large part of its import needs through the exports of its raw 
material wedlth, it was argued that further diversification of exports is 
necessary. 
The market for sound industrial development is extremely small because 
of the size of the country and the existing uneven income distribution to­
gether with the fact that employment generated in the export sector has, 
generally speaking, been very limited. A limited market together with high 
production lead to inefficiency and a low growth rate. An improvement in 
income distribution could change the structure of consumer demand such that 
import substitution could be carried forward with respect to less sophis­
ticated products, for which a larger market would exist and which subse­
quently would also have uore export possibilities. The production of these 
goods can usually take place with more labor intensive techniques and a 
resulting higher employment level. Thus in a number of ways the develop­
mental goals may be coir.ple, ntary. 
The difficulty involved in conquering export markets is, of course, 
not to be overlooked. Important obstacles to successful exporting do exist 
to a certain extent. Demand for Peru's agricultural exports (cotton, 
sugar, coffee) grows only very slowly, and trade in these products is fur­
ther impeded by a number of barriers as was studied in Chapter V. On the 
other hand, market prospects for minerals and fishmeal are excellent. As 
far as manufactured exports from underdeveloped countries are concerned, 
the industrial world has been somewhat reluctant to open its markets. A 
good example can bë found in textiles, in the production of which some less 
developed countries have become very efficient. The increase of their ex­
ports was so rapid that an international cotton textile agreement was 
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motivated, regulating trade in cotton textiles. 
It appears that much could be done in terms of pressuring developed 
countries in order to lower import barriers, through such international 
organizations as for instance the United Nations' Conference on Trade and 
Development. Alternative markets might be found in underdeveloped coun­
tries such as the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which 
would furthermore be a protected market. It can be argued that, within 
the larger LAFTA area, a more balanced approach to development would be 
possible and consequently also external economies could be maximized. It 
was shown furthermore in Chapter V that the quantitative role of Peru in 
LAFTA could be quite important. 
It is essential, however, to look upon integration primarily as an in­
strument to other ends. The most basic condition for successful and effi­
cient import substituting and exporting are adequate domestic policies and 
attitudes. As was discussed in Chapter V, Peru's Industrial Promotion Law, 
by granting excessive protection to new industries, may lead to the crea­
tion of an inefficient, high-cost domestic industrial sector and thus im­
pede exporting. Protection for infant industries may, of course, be neces­
sary, but it has to be rational and gradually eliminated. It was pointed 
out, however, (Chapter V, B) that in some cases continued protection may be 
justified if the contribution to other policy objectives (for instance, 
employment) more than compensates the loss in efficiency. 
In the analysis of the effect of inflation on Peru's balance of pay­
ments, it was shown that the present rate of inflation appears to affect 
existing exports only moderately, while imports would seem to be somewhat 
more sensitive. The most important impact of continually rising internal 
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costs, however, is the effect on the future development of Peru's competi­
tive position. It would appear that the avoidance of an overvalued rate of 
exchange is a necessary condition if development policies, as outlined 
above, are to be successfully implemented. 
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